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MANAGING LEGAL CHANGE:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LAW
Hugh Baxter*
One perspective on the Supreme Court is to see it as a manager of legal
change. At a particular time, and with respect to a particular issue of federal
law, a majority of Justices may coalesce around a law-transforming project.
Because the Court enjoys nearly complete control over its docket, such a
coalition of Justices may select carefully the cases most advantageous to the law-
transforming project. And because the Court's pronouncements on matters of
federal law are binding on all other interpreters, the Court may enforce its legal
transformation by exercising its disciplinary powers of review. The Court's
implementation of such law-changing projects is subject to a number of constraints,
including the case-or-controversy limitation, the strategies of litigants, resistance by
those the change would affect, disagreements among the change-favoring Justices,
procedural rules, and informal norms such as stare decisis and the requirement
of reasoned explanation. One way of evaluating the Court's work-besides
substantive criticism of the rules or principles the Court ultimately adopts-is to
examine how successfully the Court has pursued its law-transforming project,
and in particular, how successfully it has negotiated the constraints that define
the Court's power to manage legal change.
The law-transforming project examined in this Article is the Court's recent
revision of Establishment Clause doctrine, particularly in the context of govern-
ment aid to religious education. For a number of years, a majority of Justices
were on record as opposing what had been the governing Establishment Clause
standard-the Lemon test-on the grounds that it was insufficiently constrain-
ing on judicial interpretation and excessively restrictive on government aid to
religion. But the change-favoring Justices could not obtain a majority for any
Lemon-replacing standard. Finally, in its 1997 Agostini v. Felton decision,
the Court moved toward clarifying Establishment Clause doctrine and trans-
forming the principles set out in Lemon.
In this Article, Hugh Baxter argues that the Court made a serious error in
choosing Agostini as the vehicle for its transformation of Establishment Clause
doctrine. The prime difficulty was Agostini's procedural context which, as the
* Associate Professor, Boston University. A.B., Stanford University, 1980; Ph.D., Yale
University, 1985; i.D., Stanford University, 1990. Special thanks to Pnina Lahav, Ron Cass, Fred
Lawrence, Jack Beermann, Katharine Silbaugh, and Gerry Leonard for insightful comments on an
earlier draft, and thanks to Manuel Utset, Richard McAdams, and Tracey Maclin for suggestions
and guidance. For Marina Leslie.
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Article explains, prevented the Court from acknowledging that its decision was
changing the law. As a result, the Court could argue only that pre-Agostini
precedent already had changed the law; the Court could not present new argu-
ments, not yet sanctified by precedent, for transforming Establishment Clause
doctrine. The Court's reading of pre-Agostini precedent is mistaken, and more
important, the Court did not-and because of the procedural context could
not-develop the sort of reasoned explanation one would expect from a decision
to overrule the Court's precedents and change the law. Further, because Agos-
tini denies lower courts the power to recognize what the Court itself professes to
recognize-that the law already has been transformed, and Supreme Court
precedents already have been abandoned-the Court finds itself ensnared in the
paradox of reversing a lower-court decision it acknowledges was correct.
Escaping this paradox would have required the Court to recognize a more active
role for lower courts in the process of managing legal change. This Article main-
tains that, besides extricating the Court from paradox, recognizing a more active
role for lower courts would have been independently desirable. Agostini's
irony, the Article concludes, is that it combines an insistence on the Court's
exclusive prerogative to manage legal change with an alarmingly poor exercise of
that very prerogative.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT AS MANAGER OF LEGAL CHANGE
One way to understand the role of the Supreme Court of the United
States is to see it as a manager of legal change. The Court stands at the
apex of the federal judicial hierarchy, and through the doctrine of hierar-
chical precedent,' the Court's pronouncements on matters of federal law are
binding on all courts. Because the Court fills its docket almost entirely at
its own discretion, a self-conscious majority of Justices can pursue a project
of transforming an existing body of federal law by selecting the case or cases
strategically most advantageous to that project. The Court then can exer-
cise its disciplinary powers of review to ensure that its interpretation holds
sway. Both of these aspects of the Court's power-its ability to pursue
coherent law-reform strategies when a majority coalesces around a particu-
lar issue, and its ability to enforce those strategies by disciplining other legal
interpreters-are what I mean by the Supreme Court's power to manage
legal change.
This power, of course, has limits. Given the Court's scarce resources
and limited opportunities for review, other courts can blunt or delay the
Supreme Court's law-reform projects with their own strategies of evasion or
circumvention Other governmental agencies, as well as persons subject to
the law, also may be able to evade or circumvent the Court's requirements.3
Losing litigants may choose not to seek the Court's review, thus diminish-
ing the occasions upon which the Court will have an opportunity to issue
law-changing decisions, and Congress can overturn the Court's law-
changing statutory decisions by legislative enactment.4 Finally, the Court's
1. For an investigation into the rationales for hierarchical precedent, see Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817
(1994).
2. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095
(1987) ("[TIhe Court's awareness [of] how infrequently it is able to review lower court decisions
has led it to be tolerant, even approving, of lower court and party indiscipline in relation to
existing law."); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 75 (1994) (referring to the "neglected point" that "the Supreme Court presides
over the entire federal court system and depends on lower courts to carry out any agenda the
Court might have").
3. Cf. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1095 (noting the "management dilemmas" the Court faces
in controlling lower courts and agencies).
4. For an excellent study of the dynamics of congressional overriding of the Court's statu-
tory decisions, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
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law-reform efforts do not always have social effect, or at least not the social
effect the Court would like them to have.5
The Justices' power to pursue law-transforming projects is subject to an
additional set of constraints: the various rules and norms that govern the
Court's own decision-making processes. The Constitution, for example,
imposes the case-or-controversy requirement and jurisdictional limits.
Statutes and procedural rules, including the Court's self-prescribed rules,
additionally limit the Court's ability to pursue law-changing strategies in
particular cases. While there is no formal legal procedure for enforcing
these requirements against the Court,6 the Court nonetheless regularly
treats them as constraints.
The Justices are further constrained-although again, not in a way
officially enforceable against the Court-by informal norms governing the
Court's operation. One such norm is stare decisis. While as the Court has
said repeatedly, "'sItare decisis is not an inexorable command,"'" and while
the Court on occasion overrules its own decisions, still, stare decisis lim-
its-or at least influences-the Court's transformation of the law.8 In some
cases when the Court's inclination toward legal change is weak, stare decisis
likely prevents the Court from overruling. And even when the impulse to
change is stronger, overruling has costs for the prevailing majority-perhaps
impaired relations with fellow Justices who would have adhered to the
precedent,9 the sting of a dissenting opinion, professional criticism, and
sometimes public disapproval." While these costs will not always deter the
majority from executing its law-transforming project, at a minimum they
affect the way in which the majority manages its transformation.
5. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Move-
ment, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
6. While impeachment proceedings are theoretically available, they are practically uni-
maginable except in the most extreme instances of judicial disobedience.
7. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808,828 (1991)).
8. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
54, 111-12 (1997) (noting that stare decisis "plays a large, recognized role in shaping the Court's
agenda"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 745, 747-48, 750-51 (1988) (describing stare decisis as "agenda limiting").
9. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and The-
ory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 122 (1991) ("[Tlhe more areas in which a Justice routinely dis-
sents or deviates from precedents, the less influence she has on the Court and the more likely she
becomes a marginalist.").
10. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75
B.U. L. REV. 941, 971-74, 993-94 (1995) (analyzing the role of professional norms, collegial
norms, and professional criticism as constraints on judicial behavior).
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Stare decisis is related to a second informal norm that governs the
Court's exercise of its law-changing power. Even in ordinary cases, the
Court is expected to provide reasoned explanations for its decisions." This
expectation increases with a decision to change the law, and particularly
with a decision to overrule one of the Court's precedents. At least occa-
sionally, this requirement might deter an overruling or other change in the
law. In other cases, it leads the Court to take special care in constructing
a plausible justification. Even if not formally enforceable against the Court,
the requirement of reasoned explanation, like the norm of stare decisis,
channels the course of the Court's law-transforming strategies.
Finally, the norms governing the Court's decision-making processes
impose one additional and important constraint: the need for five Justices
to reach agreement on the law-changing standard. This requirement may
operate as a brake on legal change. In some instances, the required five Jus-
tices may agree on the need for change, and agree even on the general
direction of change, yet disagree as to the particular standard that should
govern. This difficulty may thwart the change altogether, and at a mini-
mum, it will affect significantly the course and extent of the transformation.
The most moderate change-favoring Justices may well be in a position to
limit the extent of legal change. The lack of particular agreement may pro-
duce either a splintered Court-changing prior law, but without a majority
behind any particular standard-or a compromise outcome that no single
Justice would have preferred. In my references to the law-changing strategy
of "the Court," or a "majority" of the Court's Justices, I mean to include the
possibility that particular disagreements among the change-favoring Justices
will complicate any attempt to manage a change in the law.'4
11. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143-50 (William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958); cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 633 (1995) (exploring the functions and justifications for reason giving).
12. See Monaghan, supra note 8, at 757-58 (arguing that in constitutional adjudication
something more than disagreement with the precedent's conclusion should be required for over-
ruling); see also Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 141-43 (supporting Monaghan's position and arguing
for full explanation of the grounds of overruling).
13. See Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 143.
14. 1 recognize that my references to "the Court" as actor, or even "a majority of the Court"
as actor, will strike some readers as bizarre personifications. The Supreme Court, after all, is an
institution that operates through the (largely) independent judgment of its personnel, and the
institution's personnel changes over time. I retain the conventional usage for two reasons. First,
the idea of "the Court" structures the discourse that bears the Supreme Court's name: the various
writings the Justices issue in the course of rendering decision either are written "for the Court," or
if not, are correspondingly limited in their power. This basic institutional fact affects both the way
in which the Justices operate and the legal effects of their writings. Second, in some instances a
majority of Justices may agree even on the particulars of a possible legal change, and in that event,
347
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All of the above constraints on the Court's law-changing projects-
resistance from other interpreters, actors, or litigants; legislative correction
of statutory decisions; the slippage between legal decision and social effect;
and the various rules and norms governing the Court's own decision mak-
ing-do not just circumscribe or limit the Court's power to manage legal
change. In an important sense, they define that power. These constraints
are the conditions under which the Court exercises its power to manage
legal change. And the Court exercises its power most effectively when the
Justices take these conditions self-consciously into account.
At any particular time in the Court's history, one could discern a
number of law-changing projects in the making. Certainly this is true of
the Court's recent history. For example, a majority of Justices on the
Warren Court, with greater and lesser degrees of enthusiasm and self-
conscious desire for change, pursued reform strategies in criminal proce-
dure6 and habeas corpus. The gradual expansion of the right to privacy,
from Griswold" to Roe 9 and beyond, straddled the Warren and Burger Court
periods." With respect to sex discrimination, a plurality of four Justices on
to the extent they cooperate effectively, they can act for the Court in selecting and deciding law-
changing cases. The idea of "the Court" may be a legal construction, produced and maintained by
the very legal communications it structures, but nonetheless-or rather, for that very reason-
legal theory cannot simply "unmask" it as mere fiction. Fiction it may be, with respect to some
other discourse, but it is hardly a fiction without legal significance or effects.
15. 1 include the qualification "in an important sense" because, in another sense, the Court
has the power (i.e., the ability) to violate all of the constraints I described as governing the
Court's decision-making process. We can imagine the Court issuing advisory opinions apart from
anything resembling a live case or controversy, dispensing entirely with stare decisis, rendering
decisions on the merits with one-word orders, and the like. When I say these constraints define
the Court's power, I mean that they describe the set of social expectations about how the Court
will operate.
16. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs., 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 113;
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479. The story here is of course
complicated. The due process right of privacy vied, for a time, with a Ninth Amendment theory
to similar effect. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 210-11 (Douglas, J., concurring) (invoking the Ninth
Amendment as a textual warrant for the right of privacy); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87
(Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J.) (relying on the Ninth
Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause). Further, the change-favoring Justices in
Griswold likely did not foresee specifically the later extension of their theories to (for example)
abortion. In this transformation, and in others, both the choice of theory and the extent of the
theory's application changed in the course of constitutional transformation. But surely it was clear
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the Burger Court took as their project the adoption of strict scrutiny;"' when
that project stalled, a majority settled on the law-changing norm of
intermediate scrutiny.2 Members of the present Court certainly have a
number of law-reform projects of their own-pursued through various
coalitions, more or less coherently and systematically, and in varying stages
of completion. Among those projects: limiting the scope and availability of
habeas corpus relief,3 restricting (though, it turns out, not abolishing) the
constitutional right to abortion,2 4  terminating long-running school
desegregation plans and reducing the scope of federal court control over
schools," limiting (perhaps abolishing) affirmative action, 6 narrowing the
even at the beginning that the Court had undertaken an important expansion of constitutional
personal liberties, even if the future dimensions of that transformation were uncertain.
21. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (plurality
opinion).
22. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1, 5 (1992) (overruling, in part, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)); Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), offers an interesting perspective on the process I am
describing. In West, three Justices, in Justice Thomas's opinion announcing the Court's judgment,
made the case for a fundamental retrenchment in habeas corpus law, one that would have
required federal habeas courts to defer to reasonable state-court determinations on all issues-
although ultimately, perhaps for want of five votes, they concluded that the issue did not need to
be decided in West itself. See id. at 285-95 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.).
Justice O'Connor, however, who authored the Court's opinions in Teague and Coleman, did not
want to go so far. Her opinion in West decisively repudiated the Thomas opinion's law-
transforming ambitions. See id. at 297-306 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (discuss-
ing, seriatim, what O'Connor characterized as eight errors in Thomas's opinion). Justice
Kennedy, who had joined or authored all of the opinions cited at the beginning of this footnote,
likewise resisted Thomas's implications. See id. at 306-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Here, as elsewhere, the more moderate of the change-favoring Justices were able to
control the extent of the transformation. See also infra notes 24, 26.
24. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); cf. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Planned Parenthood, as in the habeas corpus cases discussed
in the preceding footnote, the Justices interested in the more moderate transformation were able
to control. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, both of whom had authored or joined opinions
sharply criticizing Roe, were able to moderate Roe, rejecting its "rigid trimester framework" but
without overruling (what they called) Roe's "central holding." Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at
869-79 (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
25. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992);
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
26. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). The interposition of Metro Broadcasting between Croson and Adarand is a further illustra-
tion that the most moderate member of a law-changing coalition can control the reach of the law-
transforming project. In Metro Broadcasting, Justice White-who had joined the Court's opinion
in Croson, striking down a municipal affirmative action plan-cast a deciding vote to uphold a
federal affirmative action plan. The event that led to Metro Broadcasting's overruling in Adarand
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use of race-based remedies under the Voting Rights Act,27 placing con-
stitutional controls on awards of punitive damages," limiting the federal
government's power vis- -vis the states,29 increasing the level of con-
stitutional protections available to property owners under the Takings
Clause," and finally-the project I examine in this Article-transforming
was the replacement of Justice Marshall with Justice Thomas. Here, as elsewhere, the scope of a
law-transforming project depended upon changes in the Court's personnel.
27. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Although the Court's case-selecting discretion is limited in the
Voting Rights Act context, where cases come to the Court on appeal rather than on writ of cer-
tiorari, the order in which the Court considered these cases was important for its strategy of
lawtransformation. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court invalidated a plan that created two "majority-
black" districts, placing emphasis on the districts' "bizarre" shape. See 509 U.S. 630, 635-36, 646-
47, 658-59 (1993). The Court thus was able to consider, first, a case in which race seemed
to have been the only significant factor in drawing district lines before addressing-and
invalidating-a plan in which other objectives at least arguably competed with race. The Court
explained in Miller that Shaw v. Reno's emphasis on the districts' bizarre shape was only to
underscore that the plan had violated more general principles. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 912-14.
28. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (invalidating a punitive dam-
ages award under a substantive due process theory); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415
(1994) (invalidating an award under a procedural due process theory); cf. TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (upholding an award against substantive and
procedural due process challenge); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (same);
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that the Excessive
Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages in civil cases). The punitive damages issue is an
interesting one. As the above citations indicate, over a seven-year period the Court regularly took
cases in which one federal constitutional limit or another was suggested, until finally, in BMW
and Honda, the Court was able to find that a constitutional limitation had been violated. The
Court's recurring attention to the issue illustrates that a coalition of Justices found "runaway"
punitive-damages awards constitutionally troubling. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 ("We note once
again our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild."'); id. at 9-12 (recounting statements by
various Justices expressing constitutional concern over punitive damage procedures and awards).
The special concern for this issue appears, further, in the fact that the issues in some of the cases
were highly fact-specific. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 562-63 (describing the facts and stating that
"(t]he question presented is whether [the award involved in the case] exceeds the constitutional
limit"); TXO, 509 U.S. at 446 (describing the award and stating that "[tihe question we granted
certiorari to decide is whether that punitive damages award violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"). Ordinarily, the Court does not take cases to decide only whether
there has been a constitutional violation on the facts presented.
Further, at least on the facts, BMW was well selected to serve as the first case in which the
Court found an award of punitive damages constitutionally excessive. The party who had
received punitive damages was a physician whose harm was only a bad paint job on his BMW.
Originally he had received $4 million in punitive damages (cut to $2 million by the state supreme
court), though his compensatory damages amounted only to $4,000.
29. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); cf. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it
incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am
confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court.").
30. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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Establishment Clause doctrine to lower the "wall of separation" earlier
Courts had erected between church and state.
Two clarifications are necessary. First, I do not assume that the Jus-
tices' law-changing strategies take the form of explicit agreements, pacts, or
contracts to change the law in particular directions. Instead, my sense and
working assumption is that communication among Justices about Court
matters ordinarily is minimal, outside of officially scheduled conferences
and memoranda circulated generally among members of the Court. None-
theless, on many issues a thoughtful Justice will have a strong sense of what
his or her colleagues think the law should be. In such circumstances,
Justices who agree with one another may be in a position to cooperate on
a law-transforming project without express discussions of strategy and
tactics, or any discussion beyond the official channels of Court communica-
tion. This Article does not depend upon any conspiracy theory of Court-
managed change.
Second, by using the terms "management," "project," and "strategy," I
do not mean to suggest that all of the Court's legal reforms are necessarily
nefarious or illegitimate. A legal order without change is impossible, and
resisting change is not inherently a social good." This Article is not a
hymn to abstract values of stare decisis. In my view, it is entirely proper for
Justices of the Supreme Court to have, and to pursue self-consciously,
visions of what the law should be. Rather than criticize the present Court,
or past Courts, as "agenda-driven," the more pertinent lines of criticism for
any particular reform strategy seem to me the following: Are the changes
substantively desirable, and does the Court pursue those changes effectively
and legitimately?
In this Article I do not follow the first line of criticism. The substan-
tive merits of the Court's attempted transformation of Establishment Clause
doctrine are well debated elsewhere." Instead, my interest is in whether the
31. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395, 396 (1995) ("Readings of the Constitution change.... No theory that ignored these
changes, or that presumed that constitutional interpretation could go on without these changes,
could be a theory of our Constitution. Change is at its core.").
32. 1 will mention here only a few of the many contributions that defend a general
approach to the Establishment Clause, selected to represent a range of views. See Daniel 0.
Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113 (1988)
(defending the Lemon test, described infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text); Daniel
0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993) (same); Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1304-12 (1994) (defending,
for cases involving "official prayers and publicly sponsored religious displays," an "anti-affiliation
principle" that would bar government from affiliating itself with a particular religious sect or
religion generally, but recommending different principles for other cases); Douglas Laycock, The
Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 68, 70 (1997) [hereinafter
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Justices have pursued their law-transforming strategies in an effective and
legitimate way. "Effective" and "legitimate," in this context, are partly dis-
tinct and partly overlapping. In asking whether the Justices' transformation
is "effective," I mean to inquire whether they have selected an appropriate
"vehicle" for their project (or projects) and whether they have employed
that vehicle skillfully. Relevant here is the extent to which the change-
favoring Justices have considered and negotiated any differences in their
visions of what the law should be.33 In asking whether the transformation is
legitimate, I mean to investigate whether the Court has successfully negoti-
ated the various constraints imposed by the rules and norms governing the
Court's exercise of its decision-making power. When it overrules prece-
dent, has the Court dealt adequately with stare decisis issues34 Has it
Laycock, Underlying Unity] (advocating "substantive neutrality," or, "minimizing government
influence over religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice"); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) [herein-
after Laycock, Neutrality] (same); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105
HARV. L. REV. 2061, 2077-78 & nn. 71-72 (1992) (advocating invalidation of "use of the state
apparatus to declare theological positions or otherwise infuse an overtly religious sensibility into
public life," but defending, largely on equality grounds, voucher and tax-credit programs of aid to
schools, including religious schools); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991) (defending an
equality theory and criticizing permissive accommodations of religion); William P. Marshall, "We
Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 550
(1986) (identifying, as an unconstitutional establishment, "a governmental action [that] symbol-
izes improper state endorsement of religion"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 169 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom] (advo-
cating a "pluralist" approach under which government action violates the Establishment Clause if
its "purpose or probable effect [is] to increase religious uniformity... by forcing or inducing
a contrary religious practice.., without sufficient justification"); Michael W. McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986) [hereinafter
McConnell, Coercion] (emphasizing government coercion as the criterion of constitutionality);
Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1989) (using economic theory to defend a notion of religious
neutrality); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 825-61
(1993) (defending the coercion test, discussed infra notes 231-256 and accompanying text);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 205 (1992)
(arguing that government may not "put its imprimatur of approval on religion through any official
action" and may not fund religion).
33. In cases of disagreement among the Justices about the particulars of legal change, see
supra note 14 and accompanying text, the criteria for effectiveness are difficult to determine. I
assume, however, that if the disagreement had the effect of blocking any change, the attempted
transformation would be (at that point) a failure. If the disagreement led to some change, but
either without a majority endorsing a particular law-changing standard, or with a hopelessly inco-
herent replacing standard, the transformation would be at that point less than a success, though
not entirely a failure. Criteria for success are difficult to specify in these circumstances; they
depend upon a choice between or among the competing views of the change-favoring Justices.
34. For an account of the relation between stare decisis and court-managed legal change,
see Monaghan, supra note 8, at 739-73.
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provided a satisfactory explanation of its decision? Has it observed the
procedural rules that condition the Court's law-changing power?
The story of the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine
begins with the Court's 1971 ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 Lemon set out
a three-part test for evaluating government aid to religious institutions.
Under that test, to avoid invalidation a challenged program "must have a
secular legislative purpose; [its] ... primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion," and the program and its administration
"must not foster an 'excessive government entanglement with religion."'3
As I recount in Part II.A of this Article, the Court for a time used the
Lemon test aggressively to enforce a strict separation between church and
state, particularly in cases involving government aid to religiously affiliated
elementary and secondary schools. 7 The decisions from this period in
which I am most interested include the Court's 1975 ruling in Meek v.
Pittenger,"s and its 1985 decisions in School District v. Ball39 and Aguilar v.
Felton.4 ° The latter two decisions, invalidating programs that provided
supplementary and remedial education programs in religious schools, mark
the outer limit of the Burger Court's expansion of the Establishment
Clause. They mark also the last occasion on which the Court invalidated
an aid program under the Lemon test.
I discuss in Part IL.B the Rehnquist Court's growing disenchantment
with the Lemon test-both its form (or formlessness) and also the results
reached under that test. Beginning around the time Ball and Aguilar were
decided, various Justices began to develop new Establishment Clause theo-
ries that could displace the Lemon test. While they reached no consensus
on a replacement test, a group of five Justices dissatisfied with Lemon
seemed to have coalesced. These Justices, in three separate opinions filed
in the 1994 Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet
case, 41 seemed to signal Lemon's demise.4 Even more clearly, they indicated
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
36. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)).
37. See, e.g., Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 32, at 54-55 (noting that the strictest
application of Lemon principles has been in cases involving aid to what the Court has called "per-
vasively sectarian" institutions, a term that "in practice ... seems to be a synonym for [religiously
affiliated] elementary and secondary education").
38. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
39. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
40. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
41. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
42. See infra Part II.C.
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their desire to overrule Aguilar and Ball.43 These Justices, constituting a
majority of the Court, seemed to be inviting a petition that could serve as a
vehicle for overruling Aguilar and Ball at a minimum, and likely for replac-
ing the Lemon test as well.
For more than two years, the Court waited. Then, in January 1997,
the Court granted certiorari in Agostini v. Felton44-the very same case as
Aguilar, though newly recaptioned. In Agostini, the New York City Board of
Education sought, under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,45 to vacate the injunction imposed as a result of Aguilar. According to
the Court's most recent interpretation of Rule 60(b)(5), the board had to
show "a significant change ... in law"46 that justified relief from the Aguilar
judgment. The lower courts found no such change in the law, reasoning
that Aguilar, though clearly imperiled, had not yet been overruled and
therefore was still binding precedent. While the Supreme Court agreed
that the lower courts were correct to follow Aguilar, it held also that cases
post-Ball and post-Aguilar had rendered those decisions "no longer good
law."41' Accordingly, the Court formally overruled Aguilar and significant
portions of Ball. It did not, however, overrule Lemon. Instead, for reasons
to be explained, the Court ended up, in effect, reaffirming a modified ver-
sion of Lemon as "current law. 48
I argue in Part IV of this Article that in deciding to pursue the trans-
formation of Establishment Clause doctrine in Agostini, the change-favoring
Justices made a spectacular misjudgment. In any other case, the Court
would have been free to announce a revised, Lemon-displacing theory of the
Establishment Clause, provide reasons sufficient to justify that new theory,
43. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 717-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see id. at 730-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 750 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion.
44. 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
45. That rule provides:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud,
etc.-
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party... from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding ... [when]:
(5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective appli-
cation.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
46. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992).
47. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003, 2016 (1997).
48. Id. at 2012; see also id. at 2016 (referring to the "criteria we currently use to evaluate
whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion"); id. at 2017 (referring to "our cur-
rent understanding of the Establishment Clause").
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and then overrule both Ball and Aguilar under the new post-Lemon test. Or,
even if they could not agree on a post-Lemon test, the change-favoring Jus-
tices could have overruled Ball and Aguilar without adopting definitively a
new post-Lemon test-reasoning that the result followed from any of the
competing Establishment Clause theories those Justices preferred.
But neither of these law-changing strategies was genuinely available in
Agostini. The reason was Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) procedural context. As
the Court acknowledged, Rule 60(b)(5) prohibited the Court from chang-
ing the law in its Agostini decision. Instead, the Court had to locate the
required "significant change in the law" in its own pre-Agostini precedents.
As a result, Agostini's reasoning consists entirely in a parsing of post-Aguilar
precedent. But these precedents, I argue in Part IV.A, are not exactly fer-
tile ground: They do not expressly criticize Aguilar, Ball, or Lemon,49 and in
fact, they fit themselves into the Lemon framework in which Ball and
Aguilar operated. The Court's arguments that those precedents implicitly
overruled Ball and Aguilar, then, are necessarily unconvincing. And not-
withstanding the ambitions for change the five Justices expressed in Kiryas
Joel, the Court could not legitimately develop a law-transforming Estab-
lishment Clause theory in Agostini.
I contend in Part IV.B that Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) context exacted
further revenge, in the form of paradox. In Agostini, the Court was review-
ing a district court judgment that refused relief, reasoning that only the
Supreme Court could pronounce the not-yet-overruled Aguilar dead. The
Court agreed that it alone has this power. But that made the judgment
below legally correct, and the Court therefore had to contend with the
paradox of reversing, as an abuse of discretion,0 a correct lower-court
judgment.
Something like this pattern appears in most overruling decisions, pro-
vided that the lower courts properly have followed the precedent the Court
later overrules." But in the standard case of overruling, the apparent para-
dox is easily dispelled: The Court's overruling decision changes the law, and
so the lower courts' decisions, correct when rendered, are incorrect from the
perspective of the new rule. Accordingly, in these cases the Court properly
reverses, without paradox.
49. The separate opinions in Kiryas Joel did criticize all three cases, but the Court deter-
mined in Agostini that Kiryas Joel could not count as a law-changing decision. See infra note 305
and accompanying text.
50. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (acknowledging that "abuse of discretion" is the
standard under which district court Rule 60(b) decisions are reviewed).
51. "Something like this pattern" because generally the standard will be de novo review.
Still, when the Court overrules a governing precedent, the lower courts will be correct to have
relied on it, and the Court nevertheless will reverse their judgments.
355Managing Legal Change
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This escape strategy is unavailable to the Court in Agostini, again
because of the case's procedural context. In order to grant relief under Rule
60(b)(5), the Court must insist that its Agostini decision does not change
the law, but instead only recognizes post-Aguilar changes the Court had
effected earlier. These changes, the Court says, were complete by 1993,
four years before Agostini."2 Thus the Court, in deciding Agostini, rules that
Aguilar already is not good law. But the Court forbids the lower courts from
recognizing this change in the law. 3 Until the Court has confirmed its
transformation of Establishment Clause law by overruling Aguilar expressly,
the Court maintains, the lower courts are bound by the Aguilar decision. In
so maintaining, the Court is insisting that it, alone among courts, may
legitimately manage the transformation of Establishment Clause law. The
consequence of that insistence is incoherence in Agostini's reasoning.
Between 1993 and the Court's 1997 decision, the Court must suppose, "the
law" doubles into two contradictory bodies of law, simultaneously valid-
post-Aguilar law in the Supreme Court, and Aguilar itself in all other courts.
The Court, I argue, could have escaped this embarrassment if it had
assigned other courts even a small part in the process of legal change. The
Court need not have allowed lower courts themselves to change the law
that the Supreme Court has announced. Rather, the Court could have
escaped paradox by ceding a much more limited power: the power to follow
the Supreme Court's commands faithfully by recognizing what the Court
itself claims to recognize in Agostini-that the Court has already, though
implicitly, changed the law. Instead, the Court treats the lower courts sim-
ply as objects of Supreme Court disciplinary authority.
Agostini, in short, represents a misuse of the Court's power to manage
legal change. 4  The irony of Agostini-and what makes it, I think, a
52. The putatively law-changing decisions on which the Court relies are Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) and Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
53. The Court wrote:
We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our
more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that
"if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on rea-
sons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." ... The trial court ... was ... correct to recognize that the [Rule 60(b)(5)]
motion had to be denied unless and until this Court reinterpreted the binding precedent
[Aguilar].
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).
54. Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues'-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964) ("Constitutional interpretation
tolerates many paradoxes and rejects compulsive doctrinal neatness. Yet, if devotion to principled
356
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profoundly unsettling decision-is that the Court insists that it alone can
manage the legal change it envisions, and then proceeds to manage that
transformation so alarmingly badly.
II. THE LEMON FRAMEWORK AND THE PROLIFERATION
OF ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS
Under the Court's path-marking decision in Lemon, if a challenged
statute or government program is to avoid invalidation on Establishment
Clause grounds, it "must have a secular legislative purpose ... ; [its] primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and [it] must
not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."" In a
number of cases decided during Lemon's 1971-85 heyday, the Court used
the "effects" and "entanglement" parts of the Lemon test to invalidate gov-
ernment programs of aid to religious education. I discuss those cases and
the various doctrinal categories and distinctions the Court developed in
Part II.A below. I discuss also a second line of cases, decided between 1983
and 1993, in which the Court upheld programs that had the effect, at least
in the particular case before the Court, of providing assistance to religious
education. Until Agostini, these two lines of precedent coexisted more or
less peacefully: The Court decided particular cases by placing them in one
or the other line, based largely on the Court's characterization of the facts.
But with changes in the Court's personnel, by the early 1990s a majority of
the Justices had, at one time or another, expressed dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test. I discuss this growing dissatisfaction, and the various Lemon-
displacing tests that were suggested, in Part II.B.
This discussion of the Lemon framework, and of the Court's increasing
distaste for that framework, serves as background for my account of
Agostini's transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine. Agostini, I argue
in Part III, transforms the law by denying the distinction separating the two
lines of Lemon precedent. Without this distinction to differentiate the two
lines of cases and explain their differing outcomes, the school-aid cases are
simply inconsistent in their outcomes. The Court, then, must choose
between the two lines of precedent, and not surprisingly the Court chooses
the line upholding government aid to religious education. What makes the
Court's treatment of precedent illegitimate, I argue, is not so much the
adjudication is to be taken seriously, tolerance must have its bounds, doctrinal integrity must be
more than a sometime goal.").
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted).
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substance of the Court's choice as its pretense that the choice already had
been made before Agostini.
A. School-Aid Cases Under Lemon
In Lemon, the Court considered a Pennsylvania program that reimbursed
private schools, nearly all of them religiously affiliated,56 for expenditures
incurred in teaching secular subjects. In Lemon's companion case, Earley v.
DiCenso," the Court evaluated a Rhode Island program that provided salary
supplements to teachers in private schools, nearly all of which were relig-
ious schools. 8 The Court set out its three-part test of purpose, effect and
entanglement, and found that both programs created an impermissible entan-
glement of government and religion.59 Although the statutes authorizing
both programs prohibited state expenditures on religious indoctrination, the
Court held that to ensure that these limits were respected, "[a] comprehen-
sive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance [would] inevitably be
required."'  The surveillance would have to be "continuing," the Court
said, because "[t]he State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that
subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion,"6 and because religious-school
teachers, working in a sectarian environment, face ongoing pressures to
engage in religious indoctrination.62 Monitoring religious-school instruction
for religious content would "involve excessive and enduring entanglement
between state and church."63 Review of religious-school records to deter-
mine which expenditures were for religious instruction and which were for
secular teaching involved similar state intrusion into religion. 6 Finally, the
Court said, the potential for political divisiveness inherent in state financial
assistance to religious schools creates a "broader base of entanglement."6
56. See id. at 610.
57. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
58. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-08. 1 refer to both Lemon and Earley as "Lemon," as the Court's
opinion does in its running headers.
59. See id. at 614. The Court found that both programs had the required secular purpose,
see id. at 613, and it did not rule on whether the programs had an impermissible "primary effect,"
see id. at 613-14.
60. Id. at 619 (referring to the Rhode Island program); see also id. at 621 (referring to the
Pennsylvania program).
61. Id. at 619.
62. See id. at 618-19.
63. Id. at 619.
64. See id. at 620 (discussing the Rhode Island program); see also id. at 621-22 (discussing
the Pennsylvania program).
65. Id. at 622-24; see also id. at 623-24.
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The Court's subsequent school-aid decisions developed and extended
Lemon's analysis. For present purposes, the key decision was the Court's
1975 ruling in Meek v. Pittenger,66 which set out the basic effects and entan-
glement categories that the Court used until Agostini. The Court
considered in Meek a program under which a state loaned secular textbooks
to nonpublic school students, loaned various instructional materials and
equipment to the schools themselves, and sent state-paid teachers and other
professionals into nonpublic schools to provide on-premises "auxiliary"
services that included remedial and advanced instruction, guidance coun-
seling, and testing. The Court evaluated the two loan provisions under the
effects part of the Lemon test and the auxiliary services under the entan-
glement part.
Under the effects test, the Court upheld the textbook-loan provision,
on the authority of its pre-Lemon decision in Board of Education v. Allen,67
but it invalidated the loan of instructional materials and equipment.' The
Court explained its different treatment of the two loan provisions by
distinguishing between permissible "indirect" and "incidental" aid to relig-
ious schools, on one hand, and impermissible "direct and substantial" aid,
on the other. In upholding the textbook provision, the Court emphasized
that the challenged program loaned secular, nonideological books directly
to the students rather than to the religious schools.69 Even if the schools
received an indirect benefit from the textbook loans, "not all legislative
programs that provide indirect or incidental benefit to a religious insti-
tution are prohibited by the Constitution."7 According to the Court, the
textbook-loan program resembled other constitutionally permissible forms
of aid to religious-school students, such as "bus transportation, school lun-
ches, and public health facilities."'"
The loan of instructional materials, on the other hand, was "massive
aid" provided directly to the nonpublic schools, and as such the aid was
"neither indirect nor incidental."" The Court acknowledged that under the
challenged program the loaned instructional materials were to be secular
rather than religious in character. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized, the
"primary beneficiaries" of the loaned instructional materials were "religion-
pervasive institutions" that provided "integrated secular and religious
66. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
67. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
68. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-62 (relying on Allen, 392 U.S. at 236).
69. See id. at 361.
70. Id. at 359; see also id. at 364-65 ("Indirect and incidental benefits to church-related
schools ... do not offend the constitutional prohibition against establishment of religion.").
71. Id. at 364.
72. Id. at 365.
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education. 7 3  Because secular education and these schools' "'religious
mission... are ."inextricably intertwined,' 7 4 the Court concluded, "direct"
and "substantial" aid to these schools' "educational function" necessarily
"results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity""-
in violation of the effects part of the Lemon test.
As both then-Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan observed in their
partial dissents, Meek's distinction between the two kinds of loan is difficult
to maintain.76 The loaned textbooks seem to serve the religious schools'
"educational function" as surely as do the loaned instructional materials.
The Court later acknowledged this point, describing Meek's treatment of
the textbook-loan provision as a "unique presumption" established in Allen,
before the Court's adoption of the Lemon test. While the Court allowed
that this "presumption" was in "tension" with Meek's rationale, it held that
Allen should be followed "as a matter of stare decisis,"" though Allen's "pre-
sumption" should not be expanded." Notwithstanding this stare decisis-
driven quirk in its analysis, however, the Court's distinction between
permissible "incidental and indirect" aid, on one hand, and "direct and
substantial" aid to religious schools' educational function, on the other,
became its central effects criterion. This test, with elaborations shortly to
be explained, governed the effects issue until the Court repudiated the test
in Agostini.
Meek's other contribution to Establishment Clause doctrine concerned
the entanglement test, under which the Court analyzed the program pro-
viding on-premises "auxiliary services" in religious schools. The Court
focused particularly on the parts of the program providing remedial
instruction, accelerated instruction, and guidance counseling. The lower
court had upheld these parts of the program as permissible "incidental and
indirect aid," on the ground that the instruction was, secular and
nonideological and only supplemented the schools' basic curricula. The
lower court had emphasized also that the "good faith and professionalism of
73. Id. at 366.
74. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,657 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 388-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 378-
85 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For Rehnquist, the similarity between
the two issues meant that both loan provisions were constitutional; for Brennan, the similarity
meant that both were unconstitutional.
77. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977).
78. Id. ("When faced ... with a choice between extension of the unique presumption
[concerning textbook loans] and continued adherence to the principles announced in our subse-
quent cases, we choose the latter course.").
360
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the secular teachers and counselors" were sufficient guarantee that the state
would not fund sectarian religious instruction.79
Meek sidestepped the effects issue, refusing to decide whether "substan-
tial state expenditures to enrich the curricula of church-related elementary
and secondary schools" constitute forbidden direct and substantial aid to
religious schools' educational function." Instead, invoking Lemon, the
Court held that the teachers' and counselors' professionalism did not ade-
quately ensure that state officials would refrain from religious indoctrina-
tion. In the context of a pervasively sectarian school,"' the Court had said
in Lemon, "'al comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state sur-
veillance' would be required for the government to be 'certain ... that
[state-]subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion."'' 2  And these very
"prophylactic contacts," the Court said, again invoking Lemon, would "nec-
essarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement
between church and state." 3 The Court refused to distinguish in this regard
between supplementary and basic instruction or between basic instruction
and guidance counseling. Each context presented a constitutionally unac-
ceptable danger of state-sponsored religious indoctrination; each context,
therefore, would require impermissibly entangling state surveillance of
religious schools."
Meek's entanglement analysis is the prime basis for the Court's sUbse-
quent decision in Aguilar, and later a target of the Court's Aguilar-overruling
transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine in Agostini. Meek's effects
analysis had more systematic significance still. The distinction between
79. Meek, 421 U.S. at 369.
80. Id.
81. The Court described these schools as ones "in which education is an integral part of
the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of
religious belief is constantly maintained." Id. at 371.
82. Id. at 369-70 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971)).
83. Id. at 370.
84. The Court wrote:
That [the challenged statute] authorizes state funding of teachers only for remedial and
exceptional students, and not for normal students participating in the core curriculum,
does not distinguish this case from [Earley] and [Lemon]. Whether the subject is "reme-
dial reading," "advanced reading," or simply "reading," a teacher remains a teacher, and
the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction per-
sists. The likelihood of inadvertent fostering of religion may be less in a remedial arithm-
etic class than in a medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability of
impermissible conduct is not sufficient: "The State must be certain, given the Religion
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion." And a state-subsidized guid-
ance counselor is surely as likely as a state-subsidized chemistry teacher to fail on occa-
sion to separate religious instruction and the advancement of religious beliefs from his
secular educational responsibilities.
Id. at 370-71 (citations omitted).
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constitutionally impermissible "direct and substantial" aid to religious
schools and permissible "indirect and incidental" aid is the distinction on
which the Court developed the two lines of precedent I mentioned in
introducing this part. In one line of cases, running from Meek, to Wolman
v. Walter,8" to Ball and Aguilar, the Court invalidated systematic aid
programs as forbidden "direct and substantial" aid. In the other line,
including the Court's decisions in Mueller v. Allen, 6 Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,87 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District,8" the Court upheld other programs by classifying them as "indirect
and incidental" aid. The Court's law-transforming technique in Agostini
will be to treat the second line of precedent as repudiating the first.
1. The Wolman, Ball, and Aguilar Line
a. Wolman
Wolman, decided two years after Meek, followed Meek's rationale in
determining the constitutionality of various forms of aid provided, under a
state statute, to religious education. As in Meek, the Court upheld, again
on the strength of Allen, a textbook loan provision, 9 and it disapproved,
again, a provision for loaning instructional materials-although in Wolman,
unlike Meek, the provision was styled as a loan to students and their parents
rather than a loan directly to religious schools.9" Wolman also involved
types of aid not considered in Meek, and accordingly it provided some guid-
ance as to the limits of Meek's rationale.
The Court's treatment of the new items of aid was mixed in its results.
The Court approved the state's provision and scoring of standardized tests
used also in the public schools. Because the tests were prepared and evalu-
ated by the state, the Court contended, they could not be used for religious
indoctrination. For that reason, the testing program did not violate the
effects test by providing "direct aid" to religion.9 And because the program
presented no serious risk of indoctrination, no entangling supervision of the
85. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
86. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
87. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
88. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
89. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236-38.
90. See id. at 249-5 1; see also id. at 250 (noting that the instructional materials were indis-
tinguishable in kind from those involved in Meek, and stating that "it would exalt form over sub-
stance" if the program's different legal form "were found to justify a result different from that in
Meek"). The remark is ironic because the distinction between direct and indirect aid is, at least
on its face, one of form rather than substance.
91. Id. at 240.
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religious schools would be necessary.92 The Court further approved speech
and hearing diagnostic services, and psychological diagnostic services, to be
conducted by state personnel in the nonpublic schools."3 These state
employees' tasks would not be educational in nature, the Court said, and
accordingly their services, unlike teaching or counseling, offered no occa-
sion for "the transmission of sectarian views."9  For that reason, the
program did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.95 Further,
because the diagnostic services offered no opportunity for religious indoc-
trination, the state would not need to engage in entangling supervision. 9'
The Court disapproved, however, a provision authorizing bus transpor-
tation for field trips by nonpublic school students. The Court distinguished
its holding in Everson v. Board of Education,97 which had approved state
reimbursement for bus transportation to and from schools, including relig-
ious schools. Unlike the transportation approved in Everson, the Court
explained, field trips were "an integral part of the educational experience,"98
and the planning and direction of those trips offered the opportunity for the
religious-school teachers who directed the trips to engage in religious indoc-
trination. Accordingly, for the state to fund these trips would be
impermissible "direct aid" to religious schools' educational function. 9
Moreover, monitoring the field trips to ensure religious neutrality would
require entangling government supervision.'°°
The part of Wolman that will be directly relevant in Agostini concerns
the Court's treatment of "auxiliary services" to be performed in neutral
locations off religious-school premises. Some of these "auxiliary services"-
therapeutic psychological and speech and hearing services, guidance services,
"remedial services," and services for the handicapped-resemble those at
issue in Aguilar and Agostini. The Court noted in Wolman that "the -pro-
grams are not intended to influence the classroom activities in the non-
public schools."'"' Further, because state personnel would provide these
92. See id. at 238-41. Justice Blackmun's opinion with respect to these services was for a
plurality of four only, but three other Justices concurred in the judgment on this point.
93. See id. at 241-44.
94. Id. at 244.
95. See id. at 242.
96. See id.at 244. Meek had invalidated a similar provision, but only because that provision
was not severable from the otherwise unconstitutional statute. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 371 n.21 (1975).
97. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
98. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 254.
99. Id. at 252-55.
100. See id. at 254.
101. Id. at 246 n.13. For further analysis of this issue, see infra notes 456-462 and accompa-
nying text.
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services off religious-school premises, away from the pressures of a "perva-
sively sectarian" environment, the Court found the risk of state-funded
religious indoctrination to be insignificant.' For that reason, there would
be no need for entangling supervision. ' ("
Wolman, then, is simply a matter of applying Meek to a new set of facts
and evaluating the constitutionality of a laundry list of statutory provisions
authorizing aid to nonpublic schools. The Court's decision eight years later
in Ball, however, develops Meek's effects rationale by deciding the effects
question Meek left open: whether "substantial" government expenditures to
enrich religious schools' curricula are unconstitutional "direct and substan-
tial" aid. Ball's elaboration of Meek's effects analysis has central significance
for purposes of this Article because it is the prime target of the Court's law-
transforming decision in Agostini.
b. Ball
In the two programs at issue in Ball-the "Shared Time" and "Com-
munity Education" programs-the City of Grand Rapids offered courses to
nonpublic school students on the premises of nonpublic schools.'" Of the
forty-one participating schools, forty were "pervasively sectarian."'' 5 Com-
munity Education classes were taught after school to elementary-school
students, mostly in subjects included also in the public school curriculum. 6
The teachers generally were full-time employees of the nonpublic schools.0 7
The Shared Time program offered "remedial" and "enrichment" courses in
reading and mathematics, as well as courses in art, music, and physical edu-
cation. Public school teachers taught the challenged courses during the
regular school day to nonpublic elementary-school students.'8 For each
program, the public school district "leased," for a nominal fee, classrooms
from the nonpublic schools."° Religious symbols were removed from the
102. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 246-47.
103. See id. at 248.
104. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v.
Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
105. Id. at 379.
106. See id. at 376-77 (listing "Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Gymnastics,
Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model
Building, and Nature Appreciation").
107. See id. at 377. For purposes of the program, these teachers were classified as part-time
public-school employees. See id.
108. See id. at 375-76. About 10% of the teachers had taught before in nonpublic schools.
109. See id. at 377. The fee was $6 per classroom per week. The quotation marks around
the word "leased" appear in the Court's opinion, suggesting the Court's skepticism that the
arrangement was genuinely an arms-length lease transaction.
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rooms, and a sign was posted outside declaring the room a public-school
classroom.
110
The Court held that both programs violated Lemon's effects test in
three ways. First, relying upon Meek, the Court found in both programs a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that government-subsidized teachers
would engage in religious indoctrination. This risk was most apparent in
the Community Education program, in which most of the instructors taught
the very same students, in the same religious schools, during the regular
schoolday."' The argument was more difficult for the Court with respect to
the Shared Time program, in which the instructors were mostly full-time
public school teachers. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized the effects of
the pervasively sectarian environment, in which, as Meek had observed,
secular and religious education were intertwined. Shared Time teachers,
the Court observed, taught "academic subjects in religious schools in
courses virtually indistinguishable from the other courses offered during the
regular religious schoolday.""' The fact that the programs' challengers had
identified no instances of actual indoctrination was irrelevant for two rea-
sons: First, the school district did not monitor the program for religious con-
tent, and second, neither the teachers themselves, nor religious-school
students, nor the parents who placed their children in religious schools,
would be likely to report religious indoctrination if it occurred."' Following
Meek, the Court took the "substantial risk" of state-funded indoctrination
to be sufficient to invalidate the program-although in Ball, on effects
grounds, rather than the entanglement grounds on which Meek had
relied."'
Ball's second theory of unconstitutional effect was one not mentioned
in Meek but discussed, the Court said, in other cases:"15 the danger of
110. See id. at 378. The sign read: "Grand Rapids Public Schools' Room. This room has
been leased by the Grand Rapids Public School District, for the purpose of conducting public
school educational programs. The activity in this room is controlled solely by the Grand Rapids
Public School District." Id. at 378 n.2.
111. See id. at 386-87.
112. Id. at 388 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975)). The Court's observa-
tion seems to me more relevant to its other two theories of unconstitutional effect, discussed later
in the text.
113. See id. at 388-89.
114. The Court rejected the argument, offered by Shared Time's defenders, that the program
merely supplemented but did not supplant the religious schools' existing course offerings. In so
holding, the Court noted that the same argument had been made and rejected in Meek. See id. at
388 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 371). The Court rejected this same argument also under the
heading of its "subsidization" theory of unconstitutional effect. See infra notes 126-132 and
accompanying text.
115. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 390-91. The Court relied most heavily on Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952), but mentioned also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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"symbolic union" between church and state. In the Court's words, "[g]ov-
ernment promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close identifica-
tion of its powers and responsibilities with those of any-or all-religious
denominations as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doc-
trines.""6 A "core purpose" of the Establishment Clause, the Court said,
would be frustrated if such an identification conveyed a "message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.". 7
Ball based its finding of "symbolic union" largely on the location of
Shared Time and Community Education classes: pervasively sectarian
schools, in which secular and religious education were ordinarily inter-
twined. In that setting, the Court reasoned, the "students would be
unlikely to discern" the difference between the religious school's regular
classes and the government-sponsored Shared Time classes."' According to
the Court, even the school district's attempt to distinguish between church
and state-the sign proclaiming the classrooms to be public-school
classrooms-would stand as "a powerful symbol of state endorsement and
encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some
other time during the day.""..9 Perhaps the best statement of what the Court
meant by "symbolic union" is its quotation from Judge Friendly's statement
in Aguilar, companion case to Ball:
Under the City's plan public school teachers are, so far as appearance
is concerned, a regular adjunct of the religious school. They pace the
same halls, use classrooms in the same building, teach the same stu-
dents, and confer with the teachers hired by the religious schools,
many of them members of religious orders. The religious school
appears to the public as a joint enterprise staffed with some teachers
paid by its religious sponsor and others by the public.'
The Court found a third unconstitutional effect in Ball-governmental
subsidization of religion. This notion of subsidization was an attempt to
explain what Meek had meant by "direct and substantial aid." The Court
acknowledged that in classifying programs as permissible "direct and sub-
stantial" aid, or impermissible "indirect and incidental" aid, the Court had
not always given the terms "direct" and "indirect" the most straightforward
significance. In particular, the Court had not drawn the constitutional dis-
tinction simply by looking to the aid program's legal form. In Wolman, for
116. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 391.
119. Id. at 392.
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ.,
739 F.2d 48, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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example, the Court gave no constitutional significance to the fact that the
challenged instructional materials were loaned to students and parents
rather than directly to the religious schools."' Following Meek and
Wolman, the Court held that because "pervasively sectarian" schools unite
religious and secular education,22 substantial aid to "the educational func-
tion of the religious school" has the unconstitutional effect of advancing
religion.' 3 By taking over a substantial function of the religious schools'
educational function, the Court explained, the government in effect sub-
sidized the parochial schools' religious mission,"4  And if the loans of
instructional materials considered in Meek and Wolman amounted to a
subsidy to sectarian schools, the Court concluded in Ball, then "[it follows
a fortiori that the aid here, which includes not only instructional materials
but also the provision of instructional services by teachers in the parochial
school building, 'inescapably [has] the primary effect of providing a direct
and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise."2 5
Defenders of the Community Education and Shared Time programs
argued that because the challenged courses were supplementary to the
schools' curricula, the programs did not subsidize the religious schools. The
Court rejected this argument for four reasons. First, the same argument had
been made, without success, in Meek. 6 Second, the Court said, "there is no
way of knowing" whether the religious schools would have offered the
challenged courses without the public support, and "[t]he distinction
between courses that 'supplement' and those that 'supplant' the regular cur-
riculum is therefore not nearly as clear as [the programs' defenders]
allege."'' v Third, the Court maintained:
[A]lthough the precise courses offered in these programs may have
been new to the participating religious schools, their general subject
matter-reading, mathematics, etc.-was surely a part of the cur-
riculum in the past, and the concerns of the Establishment Clause
may thus be triggered despite the 'supplemental' nature of the
128
courses.
121. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
122. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401-02 (1983); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)).
123. Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 364 (1975)).
124. Id. at 394-95.
125. Id. at 396 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250).
126. See id. (citing Meek, 421 U.S. at 368).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Fourth, "and most important," the notion of "supplemental" classes is suffi-
ciently elastic as to pose no real limit. The Court suggested that a religious
school could drop a course from the curriculum, only to replace it a year or
so later with a supplemental course in the Shared Time or Community
Education program. 9 The Shared Time program, as implemented at the
time of the Ball decision, occupied 10% of the typical student's school
day.'
30
But there is no principled basis on which this Court can impose a
limit on the percentage of the religious schoolday that can be subsi-
dized by the public school. To let the genie out of the bottle in this
case would be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school
curriculum to be turned over to the public school system, thus vio-
lating the cardinal principle that the State may not in effect become
the prime supporter of the religious school system.'
3
1
The Community Education and Shared Time programs, then, had the
unconstitutional effect of "subsidiz[ing] the religious functions of the paro-




In Aguilar, the Court invalidated another program of aid to religious
education, this time under Meek's entanglement rationale. Aguilar is par-
ticularly significant for purposes of this Article: Twelve years later, recap-
tioned Agostini v. Felton, that same case provided the Court occasion to
transform its Establishment Clause doctrine by renouncing the principles
established in Ball and Aguilar.
The statutory scheme at issue in Aguilar and later in Agostini, originally
enacted as Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, 33 provides federal funds to states, and through the states to "local
educational agencies" (LEAs), for remedial education and for guidance and
129. Id. at 396-97.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 397.
132. Id.
133. Pub. L. No. 89-10, §§ 1001-14802, 79 Stat. 27 (1965). The program, which has been
modified in ways immaterial to the Court's decisions in Aguilar and Agostini, see Agostini v.
Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 n.* (1997), is presently codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (1994).
1 call it "Title I" throughout this Article, notwithstanding the fact that with amendment and
recodification its name has changed. In this matter of nomenclature, I follow Agostini. See
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 n.*.
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counseling services. To be eligible for these services, students must both
reside in a low-income area and be either failing or at risk of failing to
meet the state's performance standards. 36 LEAs must distribute Title I
services "equitabl[y]" to public and private schools, including sectarian
religious schools. With respect to private school students, the courses and
services must be "secular, neutral, and nonideological,' 37 and the Title I
funds must "supplement," not "supplant," the "amount of funds that
would ... be made available from non-Federal sources."'38  Title I further
requires private-school services to be rendered by public employees or oth-
ers "independent of [the] private school and of any religious organization."'
39
In its original Title I plan, the New York City Board of Education tran-
sported private-school children-of whom probably about 90% attended
sectarian schools 4---to public schools after school hours. Soon after,
however, the board abandoned that plan because of poor attendance, wear
and tear on students and teachers; safety concerns, and difficulties in
communication between the children's regular and Title I teachers.''
Instead, the board decided to provide Title I services on the private schools'
premises during school hours. Public school employees taught classes in
remedial reading and remedial arithmetic, and provided speech-therapy and
guidance-counseling services." The shift to on-premises services saved sig-
nificant amounts of money and was more effective educationally.' In the
revised program, the public-school personnel were instructed that they
answered only to the public school system, that they should avoid involve-
ment in religious activity at school, and that they should keep their contact
with religious-school teachers professional. Religious symbols had to be
134. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6315(c)(1)(A), (E), 6314(b)(1)(B)(i),
(iv)).
135. See id. at 2003-04 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6313(a)(2)(B)).
136. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(b)(1)(B)).
137. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(a)(2).
138. Id. § 6322(b)(1).
139. Id. § 6321(c)(2)(A), (B).
140. "Probably" because the earliest figure mentioned in the various Aguilar/Agostini opin-
ions is from 1981-82. That figure is 92%: 84% of the nonpublic schools students attending
schools affiliated with the Catholic Church and 8% attending Hebrew day schools. See Felton v.
United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 406 (1985) (same figures), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
141. See Felton, 739 F.2d at 51.
142. See id. The Supreme Court described the programs as "includ[ing] remedial reading,
reading skills, remedial mathematics, and English as a second language, and guidance services."
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406.
143. See Felton, 739 F.2d at 51 (noting that a study commissioned for the 1977-78 school
year found that the change saved transportation and other expenses that would have been "more
than 42% of the budget for the nonpublic school Title I program").
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cleared from the classroom before Title I instruction could begin. Finally,
New York City's program provided for unannounced visits by field supervi-
sors to check for compliance with these rules."'
The Court began by noting its decision in the companion case, Ball,
which had invalidated programs "very similar" to New York City's Title I
plan.' s "In both cases," the Court noted,
publicly funded instructors teach classes composed exclusively of pri-
vate school students in private school buildings. In both cases, an
overwhelming number of the participating private schools are relig-
iously affiliated. In both cases, the publicly funded programs provide
not only professional personnel, but also all materials and supplies
necessary for the operation of the programs. Finally, the instructors
in both cases are told that they are public school employees under
the sole control of the public school system.16
Defenders of the city's plan attempted to distinguish Ball, by pointing out
that New York, unlike Grand Rapids, had adopted a "system for monitoring
the religious content" of instruction and counseling.'47 But this monitoring,
the Court maintained, did not fully distinguish Ball and its holding of
unconstitutional effect: "At best," the Court said, "the supervision in this
case would assist in preventing the Title I program from being used, inten-
tionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding
parochial school."'48 Apparently, then, even if the city's monitoring eased
concern about state-sponsored indoctrination, the program still would have
the unconstitutional effects of creating a symbolic union between church
and state and subsidizing religious activity. The Court confirmed this
interpretation by noting, in the opinion's closing paragraph, that the city's
Title I program violated Lemon's effects test." 9
144. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004-05; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406-07; Felton, 739 F.2d at 53.
145. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408-09.
146. Id. at 409.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. In the Court's words:
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, the program remains
constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the
aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate-that neither the State nor
Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through
the advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of church and state
in the administration of those benefits.
Id. at 414.
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, understood the Court's opinion to rest entirely on an entangle-
ment basis. "Recognizing the weakness of any claim of an improper purpose or effect," O'Connor
wrote, "the Court today relies entirely on the entanglement prong of Lemon to invalidate the New
370 46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 343 (1998)
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The Court, however, did not analyze in any detail how Ball's effects
reasoning applied to the "very similar" but not identical program in Aguilar.
Instead, the Court simply carried over Ball's effects premise-that the chal-
lenged plan created a substantial risk that public employees would engage in
religious indoctrination-and then, as in Meek, focused on the impermissi-
ble entanglement that supervision of these employees in parochial schools
would cause.
As in prior cases that raised entanglement concerns, the Court noted,
the environment in which government provided aid was "pervasively sec-
tarian," and the aid came in the form of services rendered by teachers and
counselors, who would require "ongoing inspection ... to ensure the absence
of a religious message."'' 0 Further, the Court said, the values behind the pro-
hibition on entanglement were implicated in New York City's Title I pro-
gram. State supervision of Title I instruction in parochial schools threatened
to impose bureaucratic control upon religious activity through ongoing
governmental monitoring, judgments by government employees as to what is
and is not a religious symbol, and ongoing administrative contacts between
government and religious schools to work out details of the bureaucratic
intervention."' As the Court put it (undoubtedly hyperbolically):
[Tihe religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advance-
ment and preservation of a particular religion must endure the
ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to
monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the
infiltration of religious thought.
[Tihe detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required
to maintain New York City's Title I program can only produce "a
kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neu-
trality seeks to minimize." . . . The numerous judgments that must be
made by agents of the city concern matters that may be subtle and
controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to the con-
trolling denominations .... At the same time, "[t]he picture of state
inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing class-
room instruction surely raises more than an imagined specter of gov-
ernmental 'secularization of a creed."" 2
York City Title I program." Id. at 426 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This reading is mistaken,
though perhaps understandably in light of the Court's terseness regarding unconstitutional effect.
150. Id. at 412 (opinion of the Court).
151. Seeid. at 414.
152. Id. at 413-14 (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 349, 650 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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In the Court's view, the Title I program implicated, also, the risk of state
favoritism toward a particular denomination, presenting "the dangers of
political divisiveness along religious lines."' While the Court did not
specify which religious lines it had in mind, presumably it was considering
the overwhelming percentage of private schools receiving Title I funds that
were affiliated with the Roman Catholic church."'
Thus, in sum, the Court held the following in Aguilar. The program of
monitoring, offered as a distinction between the Title I program in Aguilar
and the "very similar" programs in Ball, unconstitutionally entangled gov-
ernment and religion. Further, New York City's Title I program had the
unconstitutional effect of advancing religion-although whether only
through symbolic union and subsidization or also through indoctrination
remains unclear.
d. The Effect of Ball and Aguilar
The outcomes in Ball and Aguilar follow straightforwardly from Meek.'5
The reasoning in those cases, however, works two changes on prior doc-
trine: one concerning the entanglement test, and the other concerning the
effects test.
The change with respect to the entanglement test is the correction of
a conceptual difficulty in the Court's prior uses of that test. Put simply, the
difficulty is that Lemon and Meek invalidated government aid programs by
finding only a hypothetical entanglement between church and state. Con-
sider, first, Lemon. In that case, the Court said that providing salary sup-
plements to religious-school teachers is unconstitutional because state
monitoring of religious education would be required, if the state were to be
certain that it did not support religious indoctrination. And this monitor-
ing would entangle church and state impermissibly. But no actual state
monitoring took place. How, then, can state and church be entangled by
monitoring that never took place? Similarly, in Meek's treatment of the
auxiliary services provision,"' the Court said that the state, in sending its
employees into religious schools to perform teaching and counseling serv-
ices, would need to monitor those employees to ensure that they did not
engage in religious indoctrination. This monitoring, too, would entangle
153. Id. at 414.
154. Cf. id. at 412 (noting that Catholic schools "constitute the vast majority of the aided
schools").
155. Justice O'Connor acknowledged as much in her dissenting opinion. For that reason,
she argued that Meek and Wolman should be overruled, at least in part. See id. at 427 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
156. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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church and state. But here, too, no actual monitoring took place. Why,
then, is the entanglement test the basis for invalidation?
Ball and Aguilar, in combination, resolve this difficulty by revising the
relation between the two tests. The Community Education and Shared
Time programs evaluated in Ball, like the auxiliary services provision
invalidated in Meek, sent public employees into religious schools to teach
and counsel. In both cases, the Court found a substantial risk that the pub-
licly employed teachers and counselors would engage in religious indoctri-
nation if they were not closely monitored. And in both cases, no actual
monitoring took place. But Ball answers the question that Meek ducked in
its reliance on the entanglement test: Does this kind of program provide
direct and substantial aid to the religious schools' educational function, in
violation of the effects test? Ball answers that question in the affirmative.
According to Ball, then, if no actual monitoring has occurred, the effects
test, not the entanglement test, is the relevant Establishment Clause crite-
rion. Only if monitoring (or other administrative connection between
church and state) actually has taken place-as in Aguilar-is the entangle-
ment test the relevant criterion.
Ball also makes modest adjustments in the effects test. Meek and
Wolman had suggested that the sole criterion for an effects violation is
whether the government has provided direct and substantial aid to religious
institutions. Ball adds "symbolic union" as an effects criterion. While the
Court attributes this idea of symbolic union to pre-Lemon precedent, 57 it
likely had another source in mind. As shortly to be discussed, the year before
Ball, Justice O'Connor had suggested government "endorsement" of religion
as an Establishment Clause criterion.55 The Court seeks to incorporate
O'Connor's suggestion by noting that its "symbolic union" criterion would be
violated if the government "convey[ed] a message of... endorsement or
disapproval of religion."' 9
The other two effects criteria Ball employs-state-sponsored or state-
financed religious indoctrination, on one hand, and state subsidization of
157. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
158. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688
(O'Connor, J., concurring)), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997); id. at
390 ("Ain important concern of the effects test is whether the symbolic union of church and
state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a dis-
approval, of their individual religious choices."); id. at 392 ("[Elven the student who notices the
'public school' sign temporarily posted would have before him a powerful symbol of state endorse-
ment and encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other time dur-
ing the day.").
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religion or religious institutions, on the other-sound indistinguishable,
and on their face they bear an uncertain relation to Meek's criterion of
"direct and substantial aid to the educational function of religious schools."
Consider first the question whether the Court's two criteria are distinguish-
able. By state-sponsored or state-financed religious indoctrination, the
Court seems to focus on whether the state itself is directly engaged in relig-
ious indoctrination. In the context of school-aid cases, the core instance is
when state personnel-primarily teachers or guidance counselors-
themselves participate in religious instruction or counseling. The Court,
through its Ball and Aguilar decisions, did not require proof that state
employees actually were performing religious indoctrination. Rather,
presumably for prophylactic purposes and to ease problems of proof," a
substantial risk that they would do so sufficed.
With its subsidization criterion, however, the Court seems to focus on
a different way in which government aid could have the effect of advancing
religion. Even if state personnel do not themselves directly engage in
indoctrination, state financing of religious-school activities could have the
subsidizing effect of freeing up the religious school's resources for sectarian
purposes. In Meek and Wolman, for example, providing secular instruc-
tional materials did not present the risk that those materials themselves
would be used for religious indoctrination.' What the Court found objec-
tionable, instead, was that this form of aid to the religious school's "educa-
tional function" relieved the religious school of the burden of providing
similar materials itself. As a result of the government aid, the religious
school was better able to expend its scarce resources on specifically religious
education.
So understood, both of these effects criteria express the "direct and
substantial aid" formulation of Meek and Wolman, though with different
focus and emphasis. When state personnel actually engage in religious
indoctrination, they provide direct assistance to the religious school's
sectarian mission."2 When the government provides direct and substantial
aid to a religious school's educational function, whether or not through the
indoctrinating activity of its own personnel, the state on Ball's view has sub-
sidized the religious schools' sectarian activity. In either way, Ball
160. The main problem of proof is the one mentioned in Ball: Without monitoring, no one
has sufficient incentive to report instances of religious indoctrination. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 72-75, 90 and accompanying text.
162. Ball does not require programs' challengers to show actual indoctrination. The Court's
challenger-friendly formulation of "substantial risk" of indoctrination operates as a prophylactic
rule and eases problems of proof. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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maintains, the government has advanced religion by providing direct and
substantial aid to the religious school's educational function.
2. The Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest Line
Two years before Ball and Aguilar were decided, the Court inaugurated
a second line of precedent that ran alongside the Meek, Wolman, Ball, and
Aguilar line of cases. In these cases-Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest-the
Court classified the challenged government aid as indirect and incidental
and upheld the program against Establishment Clause challenge. One
might wonder why I treat these cases as occupying a line separate from the
Meek to Aguilar line, when they, too, operate with the same effects criterion
used in Meek. The first reason is that these cases reach the "indirect and
incidental aid" conclusion by using principles not used in the Meek line.
The second reason is that the Court in Agostini takes these cases themselves
to have effected a fundamental transformation in Establishment Clause
doctrine. Witters and Zobrest, the Court argues in Agostini, have in effect
overruled the line of cases from Meek to Aguilar.
a. Mueller
The statute considered in Mueller was a state tax provision allowing
deductions for primary and secondary educational expenses, including tui-
tion, transportation, textbooks, instructional materials, and the like. The
challengers to this statute argued that the only significant deductions were
for tuition expenses, and that the overwhelming majority of persons who
could claim those deductions were parents of children in religious schools.'6
For that reason, they argued, the statute's primary effect was to advance
religion.
In an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court posed the question
narrowly, as whether the statutory scheme bore "greater resemblance to
those types of assistance to parochial schools we have approved, or to those
we have struck down.""' Several considerations indicated that the statute
resembled the former, approved kind of assistance. First, the Court noted,
past cases "consistently have recognized that traditionally '[liegislatures
have especially broad latitude in creating classifications ... in tax
statutes.".6. As a tax provision, the challenged statute was "entitled to
163. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400-07 (1983).
164. Id. at 394.
165. Id. at 396 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983)).
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substantial deference."'"6 Second, the Court observed that the statute was
facially neutral, making the benefit 'available generally without regard to
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited.",167 A statute that "neutrally provides state assistance to a broad
spectrum of citizens," the Court said, "is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause."' 6 Third, the Court found it significant
that the state had "channelled] whatever assistance it may provide to paro-
,,169 ichial schools through individual parents. Even f religious schools
received "attenuated financial benefits""'7 because of parents' greater ability
to afford tuition expenses, still, funds reached religious schools only indi-
rectly, "as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of
school-age children."'' In this way, the Court distinguished the cases that
had found impermissible direct aid.'
b. Witters
Witters was decided one Term after Ball and Aguilar, and three years
after Mueller. The issue in Witters was whether the Establishment Clause
barred a state agency from providing a tuition grant, under a general statute
authorizing vocational assistance to blind persons, to a particular student
who planned to use the grant at a Christian college for the purpose of
becoming a pastor, missionary, or youth director. The sole question was
whether such a grant would violate the effects standard of the Lemon test.
The Court decided unanimously, with the opinion authored by Justice
Marshall, that the grant was permissible.'73
166. Id.; see also id. at 397 n.6 (referring to "the traditional rule of deference accorded legis-
lative classifications in tax statutes").
167. Id. at 398 n.8 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 782-83 n.38 (1983)).
168. Id. at 398-99.
169. Id. at 399. In so doing, the Court said, the state had "reduced the Establishment
Clause objections to which its action is subject." Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. The Court also questioned whether the taxation scheme actually benefited par-
ents of private-school students. Such parents, who paid both taxes to support the public schools
and tuition to private schools, yet did not use the public schools' services, were perhaps receiving
a "rough return" from the state through the tax deduction provision. See id. at 401-02. The
Court further questioned the challengers' statistical analysis, see id. at 400 n.9, and it noted that
the Court "would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law
on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits
under the law." Id. at 401.
173. Eight Justices joined the full opinion. Justice O'Connor did not join the section that
contained the effects analysis, noting in a short concurrence that she reached the same result
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Although the Court did not rely expressly on Mueller,' its opinion
tracked Mueller's reasoning. The Court noted that the grant went directly
to the student, who chose the institution at which to spend it. Thus, as in
Mueller, '[any aid provided under [the state's] program that ultimately flows
to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independ-
ent and private choices of aid recipients."'75 Benefits were "available gener-
ally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature of the institution benefited."'76 The program created no incentive to
undertake religious education, the Court noted, and in fact the secular
alternatives were more numerous.'77 For these reasons, the Court said, "the
fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support religious
education is made by the individual, not by the State."'7
"Further and importantly," the Court said, "nothing in the record
indicates that ... any significant portion of the aid expended under the
[state] program ... will end up flowing to religious education."'79 No other
person, on the record presented, had used one of the program's grants for
religious education. For these reasons, the Court held, distinguishing Ball,
the program did not operate as a subsidy to religious education."S "The
combination of these factors," the Court concluded, made the connection
between the state and the religious institution at which the grant was used
"a highly attenuated one." The aid did not reach a religious school because
of "a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion.''.
under her recently announced endorsement test. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Justice Marshall had dissented strenuously in Mueller, see 463 U.S. at 404 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), and presumably for that reason he refused to cite the case for any substantive
proposition. Five concurring Justices in Witters, however, wrote separately to suggest Mueller's
relevance. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Court's omission of Mueller
v. Allen... from its analysis may mislead courts and litigants by suggesting that Mueller is
somehow inapplicable to cases such as this one. I write separately to emphasize that Mueller
strongly supports the result we reach today." (citation omitted) (footnote omitted)); id. (White, J.,
concurring) ("I agree with most of Justice Powell's concurring opinion with respect to the
relevance of Mueller v. Allen ... to this case." (citation omitted)); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Justice Powell's separate opinion persuasively argues" that Mueller establishes the
grant's constitutionality). Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's
concurring opinion.
175. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
176. Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-
83 n.38 (1973), but refusing to acknowledge that Mueller had quoted the same language).
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c. Zobrest
Zobrest, like Witters, involved the question whether the Establishment
Clause bars the government from providing aid, under a general and neutral
statute, to a disabled person seeking educational assistance. The statute at
issue in Zobrest was the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).'82 The assistance sought was an interpreter for a deaf student who
attended a Catholic high school. The constitutional difficulty was that the
state-paid interpreter would be relaying all of the instruction offered in the
sectarian school, including specifically religious instruction.
The Court upheld the provision of an interpreter, relying on Mueller
and Witters. As did the programs in both those cases, IDEA makes benefits
'available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or pub-
lic-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited."...3 The statute provides
"parents freedom to select a school of their choice," and "a government-
paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the
private decision of individual parents."'' In fact, the Court said, the case
was "even easier" than Mueller and Witters. Because the aid came in the form
of services rather than cash, "no funds traceable to the government ever find
their way into sectarian schools' coffers." 8 ' While a school might receive
the "indirect economic benefit" of a particular student's tuition, this con-
clusion rests on a number of assumptions: "that the school makes a profit on
each student; that, without an IDEA interpreter, the child would have gone
to school elsewhere; and that the school, then, would have been unable to
fill that child's spot.' '
The Court distinguished Meek and Ball. Meek involved "massive
aid"'87 to religious schools, and the "direct grants of government aid" in
both Meek and Ball "relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would
have borne in educating their students."'8 But in Zobrest, the school would
not have provided an interpreter without the IDEA assistance, and thus the
aid did not have the effect of subsidizing the religious school by relieving it
of costs it otherwise would have borne.'89 The aid, moreover, did not go
directly to the religious school, and "any attenuated financial benefit that
182. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1994 & Supp. 1996).




186. Id. at 10-11.
187. Id. at 11 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-65 (1975)).
188. Id. at 12.
189. See id.
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parochial schools do ultimately receive from the IDEA is attributable to 'the
private choices of individual parents,""" not to "state decisionmaking.'.'.
With this reasoning, the Court held that the provision of aid did not
offend Ball's subsidization theory of unconstitutional effect. The Court fur-
ther rejected the argument that providing a government-paid interpreter
would violate Ball's first effects standard-the prohibition on state employ-
ees' participation in religious indoctrination. The Court reasoned that "the
task of a sign-language interpreter" is "quite different from" the tasks of the
teachers and guidance counselors whose services were at issue in Ball.' 92
The Establishment Clause "lays down no absolute bar to the placing of a
public employee in a sectarian school,"'93 the Court said, and the religious
indoctrination whose content the interpreter faithfully conveyed would be
independent of state action. The student's parents chose the sectarian
environment, and "[tihe sign-language interpreter they have requested will
neither add to nor subtract from that environment."'94  Accordingly, no
state employee was responsible for religious indoctrination.
d. Implications of the Mueller, Witters, Zobrest Line
In one sense, the line of cases running from Mueller to Zobrest coexists
peacefully with Meek, Wolman, Ball, and Aguilar. Ball and Aguilar, decided
two years after Mueller, do not refer to Mueller for any substantive purpose,
nor did any of the Ball and Aguilar dissents argue that the decisions in those
cases were inconsistent with Mueller. Viewed from the other side, Witters,
decided the Term after Ball and Aguilar, specifically distinguishes Ball,95 as
well as Meek'96 and Wolman' 97 Zobrest, decided seven years later, distin-
guishes both Meek and Ball.9s The two lines of precedent establish and
190. Id. (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983)).
191. Id. at 10.
192. Id. at 13.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 n.4 (1986)
("This is not the case described in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball .... "); id. at 489
("[Wihile ... aid to a religious institution unrestricted in its potential uses, if properly attributable
to the State, is 'clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause,' [Ball, 473 U.S.] at 395,
because it may subsidize the religious functions of that institution, that observation is not apposite
to this case.").
196. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
197. See id. at 487 n.4.
198. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 11-13. Zobrest relies on Wolman's approval of forms of aid that
Wolman classified as "indirect and incidental." Id. at 10, 13 n.10.
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maintain their coexistence with their mutual use of the basic constitutional
distinction, expressed in Meek, between permissible "indirect and incidental
aid" and forbidden "direct and substantial aid."199
Nonetheless, a Court interested in transforming Establishment Clause
law could find promising possibilities in the line of precedent that began
with Mueller. The Court said in Mueller that a statute that "neutrally pro-
vides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause."2" In that case, as well as in
Witters and Zobrest, the Court considered the program's generality and neu-
trality to be only one of several factors pointing to the program's constitu-
tionality.20 1  But if the Court were to make this principle a sufficient
condition for a program's constitutionality, and not merely a necessary con-
dition, then the Court could validate a wide range of aid programs-
including a comprehensive school voucher plan, such as the one recently
upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.22 Generality and neutrality do
199. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 24 (1996) ("MueUer, Witters, and Zobrest show that the Court treats indirect benefits to religious
institutions differently from direct benefits.").
200. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983).
201. In one sentence in Zobrest, the Court suggested that it might be a sufficient condition.
The Court wrote: "When the government offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian
school as part of a general program that 'is in no way skewed towards religion,' it follows under our
prior decisions that provision of that service does not offend the Establishment Clause." Zobrest,
509 U.S. at 10 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 488). The rest of the opinion, however, takes care to
distinguish the cases that invalidate direct and substantial aid to religious schools' educational
function. And elsewhere in the opinion, as in its use of the passage from Mueller quoted above in
text, the Court takes the generality and neutrality of a challenged program to be only one factor
in determining the program's constitutionality. For these reasons, I do not take the sentence
quoted at the beginning of this footnote to be a law-changing statement. Neither, incidentally,
does Agostini rely on the unusual strength of this sentence in deciding that Zobrest, together with
Witters, so changed the law as to render Ball and Aguilar no longer good law.
202. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 2184
(U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-376). In Jackson, the court upheld a tuition grant program against an
Establishment Clause challenge. Under that program, up to 15% of Milwaukee's public school
students whose family income does not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty level are eligible to
attend private schools, including sectarian schools, with the state paying at least some of the
tuition costs-either the average per-pupil expenditure in the Milwaukee public schools or the
private school's per-student costs, whichever is lower. The payment takes the form of a check,
given to the student's parents, that may be used only toward tuition at the relevant private school.
The program allows participating students to opt out of any religious exercises at the private
school. The state aid given to Milwaukee public schools is reduced by the amount paid to parents
under the program. See id. at 608-09. In upholding this program, the Wisconsin court relied
heavily on the Mueller to Zobrest line of cases, as well as on Agostini-the case, discussed in Part Ill
below, that finds that line of cases effectively to overrule the Meek to Aguilar line. See Jackson,
578 N.W.2d at 613-19. The Court emphasized the generality and neutrality of the program's
eligibility criteria, see id. at 617-18, as well as the principle, discussed in the next paragraph of
text, that state money flowed to private schools only as a result of private decision making, see id.
at 618-19.
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not themselves place a significant constitutional limit on programs that
benefit religious schools. These programs always can be cast so as to make
aid available on equal terms to all educational institutions-both public
203and private, sectarian and nonsectarian.
Similarly, a transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine could
emphasize, as did the cases in the Mueller line, the mediating role that pri-
vate decision making plays in determining whether and how state aid
reaches religious institutions. All students who attend private schools are
there by private choice. If it were made sufficient, to establish a challenged
program's constitutionality, to show that religious schools would not have
received any benefits from state aid absent private decision making, then
any program of aid to religious schools could be made constitutionally valid.
The technique would be simply to make aid available on a per-pupil basis,
so that the religious school would not receive aid but for private decisions
by students' parents. This kind of transformation of Establishment Clause
doctrine, too, would lead to the upholding of voucher programs."
Such transformations, however, would require some work on the
Court's part. The Court would need to explain why the criteria of "gener-
ality and neutrality," or "private decisionmaking," should be sufficient con-
ditions for a program's constitutionality. Or if the Court were to stop short
of making these conditions sufficient, it would have to explain why they so
strongly favor constitutionality that the principles in the Meek to Aguilar
line no longer operate. Further, reliance on the Mueller line would have to
acknowledge the peculiarities in each of the cases that arguably distinguish
them from the Meek to Ball line: the tax context in Mueller, in which the
Court relied upon a principle of "substantial deference 2 11 to legislatively
established taxation systems, and the fact that both Witters and Zobrest
involved aid only to a negligible-or in Meek's term, "insubstantial"-
number of students. Or if the Court decided to transform Establishment
Clause doctrine more fundamentally-by, for example, overruling Lemon
and adopting some other theory of the Establishment Clause's limits,
Courts pre-Agostini had struck down similar plans. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No.
96APE082-982, No. 96APE08-991, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1766, at *27 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1,
1997).
203. Cf. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,
263-64 (.1994) (distinguishing between broad and narrow readings of Zobrest and suggesting that
"it may prove to be extremely difficult to distinguish in practice aid to the families of disabled stu-
dents from financial aid-via tuition vouchers or otherwise").
204. See supra note 202.
205. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396; see also id. at 396-97 n.6 (referring to "the traditional rule of
deference accorded legislative classifications in tax statutes").
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independent of the Lemon precedents-then the Court would have to jus-
tify such a theory from first principles.
Any transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine would require
also a will to change. But in fact, as the next section demonstrates, dissat-
isfaction on the Court with Lemon had begun to deepen even before Ball
and Aguilar were decided, and by the late 1980s a majority of Justices had
either proposed or endorsed a test that could serve as an alternative to
Lemon. For reasons to be explored, however, general agreement that trans-
formation was desirable did not soon translate into agreement on a particu-
lar strategy of transformation.
B. Alternative Tests and Lemon's Uncertain Status
The Meek to Aguilar line of cases was vulnerable from the start.
Probably the most apparent weakness is that these cases rested the constitu-
tionality of aid programs on fine distinctions whose constitutional relevance
was hardly obvious. According to the Court's decision in Meek, for exam-
ple, government could provide textbooks to religious-school students, but
not instructional materials."6 And under the Court's decision in Wolman,
government could provide bus transportation to and from religious schools,
but not bus transportation for religious schools' field trips."7 One can
fashion explanations for these distinctions-stare decisis, in the case of
textbooks," 8 and the closer relation of field trips to religious schools' "edu-
cational function," in Wolman.2 9 But even if these explanations were suffi-
cient, the Court's underlying constitutional theory would face deeper
difficulties, even on its own terms.
One difficulty is that the logical scope of the various effects standards,
as presented in Ball, seems to exceed the Court's actual application of those
206. See supra notes 68-78, 89 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
208. As explained above, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text, the Court permitted
textbook loan programs before adopting the Lemon test. The permissibility of such loans survived
because of a peculiar coalition: Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell adhered to the pre-Lemon
decision for reasons of stare decisis, and on this issue they joined the Justices who were generally
untroubled by any of the aid programs the Court considered. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
359-62 (1975) (Stewart, J., joined by Blackmun and Powell, JJ.); see also id. at 385-87 (Burger, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 388-91 (Rehnquist, J., joined by
White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, the Court
remained committed to a constitutional distinction between books and, for example, maps. This
distinction is easy to lampoon. See, e.g., Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., A Case for Vouchers,
WASH. POST, June 29, 1998, at A15 (recounting Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's question
whether "an atlas, a book of maps," would be constitutionally permissible).
209. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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standards. This difference in scope suggests that the Court applied its stan-
dards selectively and without a coherent theory. The subsidization theory
provides a good example. In invalidating the Community Education and
Shared Time programs, Ball takes a strong view of subsidization. By pro-
viding secular instruction in religious schools, the Court explains, the gov-
ernment frees up the schools' resources for specifically religious use and thus
subsidizes religious education. This is so, the Court maintains, even if the
challenged programs did not supplant existing courses at the religious
schools. If the Court were to follow this theory to its logical conclusion, it
would have to forbid all government assistance to religious schools, includ-
ing the "indirect and incidental" aid previously permitted. Any such assis-
tance either subsidizes an existing expenditure at religious schools-thus
freeing up the school's resources for specifically religious use-or, if it does
not supplant an existing expenditure, it nevertheless would subsidize the
religious school by allowing it to offer a new and a better service.
As Ball notes, however, the Court has never consistently taken such a
strong view of subsidization. Instead, from Meek to Ball, the Court used the
notion of "aid to the religious schools' educational function" as a, limiting
device, invalidating some forms of aid as impermissible "subsidies" but per-
mitting others. Still, if the constitutional evil is government subsidization
of religious institutions, the "educational function" limitation seems ad hoc.
Whether the aid goes to the school's educational function or to some other
account, in either event the school would be "subsidized"-either in the
sense that its resources would be freed up for specifically religious use, or in
the sense that it could offer new and more attractive services. Ball's subsidi-
zation theory thus seems logically to extend beyond the Court's application
of that theory.
A similar difficulty afflicts Ball's "government indoctrination" theory
of unconstitutional effect. From Meek to Ball, the Court approached the
indoctrination issue by invoking its statement in Lemon: "The State must
be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not
inculcate religion.""2 ' The Court used this statement to invalidate aid pro-
grams in which the risk of indoctrination seemed slight-for example, the
Shared Time program in Ball, in which most of the state-paid teachers were
public school employees, teaching secular subjects. The weakness in this
approach is that the state never can be certain that its employees will
refrain from religious indoctrination-in public schools as well as private
schools. As Justice O'Connor observed, dissenting in Ball, if the Court were
210. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,619 (1971).
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to take Lemon's pronouncement literally, government would have to close
the public schools."'
The Court, of course, did not apply Lemon's pronouncement literally.
Instead, it distinguished among different kinds of public employees accord-
ing to the risk that they would engage in religious indoctrination. But the
Court's attentiveness to the different degrees of risk attributable to different
professions only underscored the Court's refusal to ask-when it came to
teachers and guidance counselors-whether, under the circumstances pre-
sented, the public employees were genuinely likely to engage in religious
indoctrination.
The Court's indoctrination theory thus both overenforces and under-
enforces the Establishment Clause, even by its own criterion of proper
enforcement. It overenforces by invalidating, wholesale, programs that
involve state-paid teachers and guidance counselors, even those in which
the actual instances of indoctrination likely would be few. It underenforces
by approving programs involving other kinds of public employees, even
though in those instances government cannot be certain that its employees
will not engage in religious indoctrination. The Lemon "certainty" pro-
nouncement operates as a convenient invalidating device in cases involving
teachers and guidance counselors, but it is quickly forgotten when the
activities of other kinds of public employees are at issue.
Moreover, the Lemon framework is vulnerable to more systematic criti-
cism. First, even if we think government is barred from "advancing"
religion, as Lemon maintains, from what baseline do we measure
advancement? Lemon assumes that the constitutional baseline is no aid, so
that any direct or substantial aid to religious schools unconstitutionally
advances religion. This baseline might have been uncontroversial in the
eighteenth century, before the rise of government-funded public schools.
But under present conditions, with massive government aid given to public
schools, invalidating all aid to religious schools is at least arguably a form of
discrimination against religion rather than a refusal to advance religion.
Perhaps a more appropriate baseline is the level of aid given to secular
alternatives to religious institutions-public schools, in the present context.
Such, at any rate, has been the argument of many commentators.2
211. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 428-29 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
212. See, e.g., Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 32; McConnell & Posner, supra note
32, at 10-20; McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 32, at 183-86; Paulsen, supra note 32, at
804-08 (noting that the no-aid baseline logically should bar any aid to religion, even indirect and
incidental aid).
384
HeinOnline -- 46 UCLA L. Rev. 384 1998-1999
Managing Legal Change
More fundamental objections still have been made against the Lemon
test. Why would one think that the tripartite Lemon approach-even apart
from its particular specification in the Meek to Aguilar line of cases-accu-
rately expresses the Constitution's theory of impermissible establishment?
Why is a law "advancing" religion the same thing as a law "respecting an
establishment of religion"? By what standard does entanglement become
"excessive entanglement"? Why would the Court choose a test that is
worded in terms of a conclusion ("excessive entanglement")? The original
explanation of the Lemon test was that it stated the factors the Court's
developing case law had applied. But if one calls that case law into
question, asking whether the Court had erred even in its pre-Lemon cases-
a question most naturally asked from an originalist or historicist position in
constitutional theory-then the Lemon framework would be more vulner-
able still.
With changes in the Court's personnel,"' the Justices grew more
inclined to ask such questions and to criticize the difficulties in the Lemon
approach. By the mid-1980s, a number of systematic alternatives to Lemon
began to appear."4 The first was one I have mentioned already: Justice
O'Connor's endorsement theory, announced in 1984, the year before Ball
and Aguilar were decided."' 5 On that theory, first suggested as a "clarifica-
tion" of Establishment Clause doctrine,"6 courts should inquire under the
purpose part of the Lemon test "whether the government intends to convey
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.""2 ' Under the effects
part, the question is whether a challenged practice has "the effect of com-
municating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
213. In 1981, Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart, who had authored Meek. That, it
turned out, left only five votes for the Meek approach. When Justice Scalia joined the Court in
1986, the Meek/Aguilar approach had only four remaining adherents.
214. 1 omit the views of former Chief Justice Burger, author of the Lemon test but soon a fre-
quent dissenter from later invalidating decisions, and the views of Justice White, who did not join
the Lemon opinion and disagreed fundamentally with its approach. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at
661-71 (White, J., concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part).
215. See supra notes 116, 119, 157-159 and accompanying text.
216. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (offering the endorsement test as a
"clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine"); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703, 710 (1985) (stating that because the statute conveyed a message of endorsement, it had the
"effect of advancing religion" and was therefore unconstitutional). I say "first suggested as a clari-
fication" because later, in the Kiryas Joel case, O'Connor seems to recognize differences between
the endorsement test and the Lemon approach. See infra notes 271-277 and accompanying text.
217. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 690 ("The purpose
prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion.").
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religion,""' 8 judged from the standpoint of an "objective observer." '
O'Connor's first presentation of the endorsement test preserved, by its side,
a revised version of the Lemon entanglement test. The test was revised in
the sense that O'Connor understood it to reach only "institutional entan-
glement," or excessive entanglement between government and religious
institutions; it did not include the more diffuse considerations of "political
divisiveness" mentioned in the Court's early applications of the entangle-
ment inquiry."0
O'Connor enjoyed particular power on the Court in Establishment
Clause matters. Her endorsement theory placed her in a middle position
between those who would maintain the aggressive Lemon approach
exemplified in Ball and Aguilar-a group that by 1986 comprised less than a
majority of the Court-and the soon-increasing group of Justices who
preferred a far more lenient test.2 ' O'Connor's vote, then, was much in
demand, and her endorsement test quickly achieved significant success. As
noted above, endorsement was one basis for the Court's holding in Ball
that the challenged programs had unconstitutional effect.2 The endorsement
test appeared in other opinions for the Court as well-though, consistent
with O'Connor's presentation of the endorsement test as a "clarification,"
it appeared alongside or within, rather than instead of, the Lemon test.2 As
will become clear, however, O'Connor did not gain support for her theory
from the other Justices most critical of Lemon.
The year after O'Connor announced her endorsement theory, then-
Justice Rehnquist filed a lengthy dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,2 4 denouncing
the Lemon test and the "wall of separation" metaphor on which the Court's
modern Establishment Clause precedent is founded. Rehnquist maintained
that "[t]he true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its
history," and specifically in the historical record of the Framers' inten-
225 ttions. What that record disclosed, he argued, was that "[the Framers
218. Id. at 692.
219. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
see also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
220. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221. The relevant 1986 event was Justice Powell's replacement by Justice Scalia. Later, in
1991, the Lemon opponents picked up another seat when Justice Thomas replaced Justice
Marshall.
222. See supra notes 116-117, 157-159 and accompanying text.
223. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395
(1993); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94, 595-97 (1989); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585, 593 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985).
224. 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 113.
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intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any
church as a 'national' one" and "to stop the Federal Government from
asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others." '26
With the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth,
"[sItates are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating
between sects. 227  The Establishment Clause does not "requir[e] govern-
ment to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that
Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular
ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.22 . In announcing this
standard, Justice Rehnquist differentiated his nonpreferentialist approach
not just from the Lemon framework,2 but from O'Connor's endorsement
test as well. 3
Justice Kennedy weighed into the Lemon controversy with his opinion
in County of Allegheny v. ACLU."' Kennedy proposed a "coercion" test
that would invalidate actions that "further the interests of religion through
the coercive power of government," either by "compelling or coercing par-
ticipation or attendance at a religious activity" or by "delegating govern-




229. Particularly striking was Rehnquist's statement that "the Lemon test has never been
binding on the Court." Id. at 112.
230. See id. at 113-14.
It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a
large number of thoughtful Americans today to learn that the Constitution, as construed
by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature from "endorsing" prayer.... Nothing
in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, properly understood, prohibits
any... "endorsement" of prayer.
Id.
231. 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part and joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Scalia, JJ.).
232. Id. at 660; cf. id. at 659.
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hos.
tility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-52, 260-62 (1990) (same).
The Chief Justice's decision to join Kennedy's opinion is interesting in view of the significant
differences between the coercion test and the nonpreferentialist approach the Chief Justice
defended in Wallace v. Jaffree. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 32, at 936 ("It is easy to
imagine forms of nonpreferential aid, short of establishing a national church, that nonetheless
would have the effect of coercing a religious observance."). The Chief Justice's willingness to join
Kennedy's opinion suggests that he is interested not so much in the details of the test, or its com-
plete fidelity to the history he invokes in Wallace, as in ensuring simply that the governing test
would invalidate only a very few governmental actions.
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criticism" of the Lemon framework... and the fact that some of the Court's
cases had rejected his coercion theory, 34  Kennedy suggested that
'Islubstantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in
order." 3' That task of revision, Kennedy said, was "unnecessary to under-
take" in Allegheny."' But while Kennedy was "content for present purposes
to remain within the Lemon framework," he noted pointedly that he did
"not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as [the]
primary guide." '37 Kennedy's rejection of O'Connor's endorsement test was
more definitive: He described it as "novel," "flawed in its fundamentals and
unworkable in practice," 3s insufficiently respectful of longstanding histori-
cal practice,3 "trivializ[ing]" of constitutional adjudication in its fact-
specificity, 40 and tending in its application to favor larger over smaller
denominations. 1
Kennedy's coercion test had its moment in the spotlight in Lee v.
Weisman,"'2 when a majority of the Court joined his opinion invalidating, as
unconstitutionally coercive, a clergy-led prayer at a public-school gradua-
tion. 43 The key to Kennedy's ability to gain a majority for this approach lay
in the retirement of Justice Marshall at the end of the preceding Term.244
With the ascension of Justice Thomas to the Court, only four Justices
remained who were committed to either the Lemon or the endorsement
approach. 45 That put Kennedy in a powerful position. He authored the
Court's opinion, and the other four members of the Lee majority signed it,
writing separately to note that the same result could be reached on either
Lemon or endorsement grounds. 46
233. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
234. See id. at 661.
235. Id. at 656.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 655.
238. Id. at 669.
239. See id. at 669-74.
240. Id. at 674; see also id. at 674-76.
241. See id. at 677. But see McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 32, at 162-65 (arguing
that there may be little practical difference between Kennedy's and O'Connor's tests, though
Kennedy's is probably slightly narrower).
242. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
243. See id. at 599.
244. See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 819 n.97.
245. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and-it turned out-Souter.
246. See Lee, 505.U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that "proof of government
coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation" and finding the challenged
prayer to violate both Lemon and endorsement principles); id. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring)
(rejecting Rehnquist's nonpreferentialist theory; arguing that coercion, "over and above state
endorsement of religious exercise or belief," is not a "necessary element of an Establishment
46 UCLA LAw REVIEW 343 (1998)388
HeinOnline -- 46 UCLA L. Rev. 388 1998-1999
389
But the coercion test's victory in Lee was at best equivocal. Presuma-
bly to secure the votes of the four Justices who joined him as to the out-
come, but not as to the desirability of the coercion test, Kennedy expressly
refused the solicitor general's request that Lemon be overruled. 47 And given
the position of his fellow majority members, Kennedy did not have the
votes both to establish that the coercion test was the reigning Establish-
ment Clause standard and to invalidate the challenged prayer."' Instead,
he wrote, whatever "the definition and full scope" ''4 of the Establishment
Clause might be, the Clause guarantees "at a minimum.., that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise.""O
Kennedy's conclusion that the prayer challenged in Lee involved
"indirect coercion," '' and his reliance on social-psychological theories of
"peer pressure," ' brought predictable scorn from Justice Scalia, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices White and Thomas."'3 Scalia, who had both
authored an earlier opinion critical of the purpose part of the Lemon test"5 '
and signed Kennedy's announcement of the coercion theory in Allegheny,"'5
made clear in his Lee dissent that he would support Lemon's overruling.
Indeed, he suggested that the Court's failure to apply Lemon in Lee might
have signaled Lemon's demise already: "[Tihe interment of that case," Scalia
wrote, "may be the one happy byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamenta-
ble decision. '56
Clause violation"; and finding forbidden endorsement). Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined
both the above concurrences.
247. Id. at 586-87 (opinion of the Court).
248. As Michael Stokes Paulsen points out, he did have five votes to adopt the coercion test
and five votes to invalidate the prayer. See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 824-25. But the four
Justices who joined as to the outcome did not accept the coercion theory, and the four who agreed
with the coercion theory disagreed with Kennedy as to the outcome.
249. Lee, 505 U.S at 586.
250. Id. at 587.
251. Id. at 592.
252. Id. at 593-94.
253. See id. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Still, Paulsen, who defends the coercion test,
agrees with Kennedy as to the result in Lee. See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 820 n.10 0 , 821, 828-
3 1. Paulsen disagrees, however, with Kennedy's invocation of indirect coercion and peer pressure.
See id. at 832-38.
254. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
256. Lee, 505 U.S. at 644.
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But Lemon was not yet dead."' In the Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District... case the next Term, the Court invoked
Lemon in rejecting a school district's defense that it was required by the
Establishment Clause to deny after-school access by a religious group.
Scalia responded:
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuf-
fles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again .... Its most recent
burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our
decision in Lee v. Weisman ... conspicuously avoided using the sup-
posed "test" but also declined the invitation to repudiate it.
2 59
Scalia went on to note that six (now five2") sitting Justices had written or
signed opinions criticizing Lemon."' And he vowed for the future: "I will
decline to apply Lemon-whether it validates or invalidates the government
action in question." '262 Scalia noted further that he could not join the
Court's opinion in Lamb's Chapel because of its suggestion that endorse-
ment was an Establishment Clause standard. 63
But despite the general dissatisfaction with Lemon, the very prolifera-
tion of alternative tests had prevented a majority of Justices from agreeing
upon any particular Lemon-replacing standard. The issue of Lemon's status
remained unsettled. The Court seemed to be temporizing, deciding the
Zobrest case, for example, by employing the particularized categories devel-
oped under Lemon's aegis, but studiously avoiding, to the extent possible,
reference to Lemon itself.
When the Justices next addressed the issue of Lemon's status, they did
so in a context that, on one point, encouraged greater agreement among
those who had criticized Lemon. The case was Kiryas Joel, and the point on
which Lemon's critics agreed was that, at a minimum, the Lemon-following
257. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 32, at 821-25 (arguing that Lemon is dead and the coercion test
has replaced it). Paulsen likely would have been right, had Justice White, the fifth member of the
Lee "doctrinal majority" that favored the coercion test, id. at 825, not retired at the end of the
Term. See id. at 862 (recognizing the effect that White's departure might have on "The Coercion
Five").
258. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
259. Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
260. The number went from six to five with Justice White's retirement.
261. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
262. Id. at 399-400.
263. See id. at 400. Justice Thomas joined Scalia's opinion, and Justice Kennedy stated his
agreement on both points that Scalia mentioned: "ITihe Court's citation of Lemon," as well as its
"use of the phrase 'endorsing religion,"' was "unsettling and unnecessary." Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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decisions in Ball and Aguilar should be overruled. This agreement, it will
turn out, gave the Court at least a modest agendum for transforming Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine-the agendum pursued, three years later, in
Agostini.
C. Kiryas Joel and the Justices' Law-Transforming Agenda
The Kiryas Joel case arose out of attempts to provide special education
services to the handicapped children of the Satmar Hasidim, a sect of
Hasidic Jews who had established a religious enclave in Orange County,
New York.2" The enclave, a 320-acre village within the town of Monroe,
was occupied entirely by Satmars. The Satmars' practice was to avoid
assimilation into the surrounding community and to educate their children
in religious schools. These schools, however, did not provide services for
handicapped children. Instead, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District offered such services at an annex to one of the religious schools
until, after Aguilar and Ball, the district terminated that arrangement. The
affected Satmar children then enrolled in the Monroe-Woodbury public
schools, but assimilation into the secular world proved too traumatic and
disorienting. In response to the plight of these Satmar children, the New
York legislature created a special school district, coextensive with the vil-
lage of Kiryas Joel, that could provide special education for the handicapped
children of the Satmar community.65 The Court, in the Kiryas Joel case,
declared the creation of this school district unconstitutional.
Thus although neither Ball nor Aguilar figured in the reasoning that
decided Kiryas Joel, they were the decisions that had prompted the legisla-
tive act declared unconstitutional. That connection provided the occasion
for the critical comments directed at Ball and Aguilar in three of the Kiryas
Joel opinions. Each opinion noted that the case would not have arisen but
for Ball and Aguilar; each asserted, or at least strongly suggested, that those
decisions were mistaken and should be overruled.
Justice O'Connor stated her belief that the arrangement terminated in
response to Aguilar was entirely constitutional:
The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring relig-
ion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.
264. I take this account of the facts in Kiryas Joel from the Court's opinion. See Board of Ed.
of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690-93 (1994).
265. Political pressures, too, likely motivated the legislature. See Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the
Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 118-19 (1996) (detailing the political influence of
village leaders and concluding that the creation of the special school district "showed all the
marks of insider politics").
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All handicapped children are entitled by law to government-funded
special education .... If the government provides this education on-
site at public schools and at nonsectarian private schools, it is only
fair that it provide it on-site at sectarian schools as well.
I thought this to be true in Aguilar, ... and I still believe it today.
The Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to religion,
religious ideas, religious people, or religious schools .... It is the
Court's insistence on disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led New
York to favor it here. The Court should, in a proper case, be pre-
pared to reconsider Aguilar, in order to bring our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence back to what I think is the proper track-
government impartiality, not animosity, toward religion.266
Although Justice O'Connor spoke of "reconsider[ing]" Aguilar, her remarks
made plain enough that she meant "reconsider and overrule."
Justice Kennedy noted that the problem considered in Kiryas Joel was
"attributable in no small measure to what I believe were unfortunate rulings
by this Court. '2 67 He elaborated:
The decisions in [Bail] and Aguilar may have been erroneous. In light
of the action before us, and in the interest of sound elaboration of
constitutional doctrine, it may be necessary for us to reconsider them
at a later date .... But for [Ball] and Aguilar, the Satmars would have
had no need to seek special accommodations or their own school dis-
trict. Our decisions led them to choose that unfortunate course, with
the deficiencies I have described.268
Still, Kennedy concluded, "[olne misjudgment is no excuse.., for com-
pounding it with another. We must confront this litigation as it comes
before us, without bending rules to free the Satmars from a predicament
into which we put them.2 69
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, noted
Kennedy's and O'Connor's criticisms of Ball and Aguilar. "I heartily agree,"
Scalia wrote, "that these cases, so hostile to our national tradition of
accommodation, should be overruled at the earliest opportunity....""o
266. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 717-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice O'Connor mentioned Aguilar also in the course of discussing the Lemon test's
shortcomings as a "unitary test," id. at 719: "Entanglement' is discovered in public employers
monitoring the performance of public employees-surely a proper enough function-on parochial
school premises, and in the public employees cooperating with the school on class scheduling and
other administrative details." Id. (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)).
267. Id. at 730 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
268. Id. at 731.
269. Id. at 731-32.
270. Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The statements of these five Justices indicated that the Court had set
itself at least a limited agendum for transforming Establishment Clause law:
overrule Ball and Aguilar. The question, though, was under what
framework? Would the Court go further and overrule Lemon as well? And
if so, could the Court reach agreement on a test to replace Lemon?
Justice O'Connor's Kiryas Joel concurrence addressed these questions,
though her answers were far from clear. On one hand, she seemed no
longer to understand her own approach as merely a "clarification" of
Lemon.27 Understood as a "unitary" Establishment Clause standard, she
said, Lemon had "with some justification" been criticized as "so vague as to
be useless.""27 While the impulse toward "a single test, a Grand Unified
Theory that would resolve all the cases" is in one sense "appealing," '73
O'Connor wrote, at the same time the use of Lemon as unitary standard had
directed the Court's attention away from relevant differences among various
Establishment Clause contexts. 74 It had led the Court, further, to create an
increasingly arcane set of distinctions that had "deform[ed] the language of
the test" and had departed from everyday understandings of the relevant
Lemon terms (such as "primary effect" and "entanglement").25 The "bad
test," O'Connor suggested, had begun to "drive out the good," and by the
"good" tests she meant inquiries that were "narrower" and more "precise"
than the "bad," "broad," "amorphous and distorted" Lemon test.2 76 For these
reasons, O'Connor seemed to say farewell to Lemon. "[T]he slide away from
Lemon's unitary approach is well under way," O'Connor wrote, and "[a]
return to Lemon, even if possible, would likely be futile, regardless of where
one stands on the substantive Establishment Clause questions.,
277
But what, in O'Connor's view, should replace Lemon? One might
have thought, before reading her criticism of "unitary" frameworks, that her
answer would be the endorsement test. Yet neither could that test,
O'Connor indicated, provide a "unitary" approach valid in all Estab-
lishment Clause contexts. 278 The endorsement test, she suggested in Kiryas
271. This was her characterization of the endorsement test when she introduced it in Lynch.
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
272. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 718-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
273. Id. at 718.
274. See id.
275. Id. at 719.
276. Id. at 720.
277. Id. at 721.
278. Christopher Eisgruber points out that O'Connor may always have understood endorse-
ment principles as something other than a unitary test. As Eisgruber observes, she applied the
endorsement test in cases involving "public sponsorship of religious displays and observances," but
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Joel, was most appropriate for "[clases involving government speech on
religious topics," such as the cases involving religious holiday displays on
government property.2 79 In other contexts, however-such as the Kiryas Joel
context itself, in which the question involved "[g]overnment delegations of
power to religious bodies"-other non-Lemon, nonendorsement principles
would be appropriate."' While perhaps one day "a unified, or at least more
unified" test might "distill" from future cases, until then, she said, a plurality
of more fact-specific tests would be appropriate."8 Establishment Clause
law, O'Connor concluded, "will better be able to evolve... [if] freed from
the Lemon test's rigid influence" and "distorted framework. '82 Yet for
O'Connor, "abandoning the Lemon framework need not mean abandoning
some of the insights that the test reflected, nor the insights of the cases that
applied it.
2 3
Justice Scalia could not let O'Connor's remarks on Lemon go without
comment. Scalia might have been encouraged by O'Connor's sharper criti-
cisms of, and past-tense references to, the Lemon approach. But the sugges-
tion that it be abolished and "replace[d] ... with nothing," or at least
nothing more than "a series of situation-specific rules," only recapitulated
the error of Lemon:
The problem with (and the allure of) Lemon has not been that it is
"rigid," but rather that in many applications it has been utterly
meaningless, validating whatever result the Court would desire.... To
replace Lemon with nothing is simply to announce that we are now so
bold that we no longer feel the need even to pretend that our hap-
hazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any
principle.
not in Ball or Aguilar-decided one year after she had announced the endorsement test. See
Eisgruber, supra note 32, at 1310-11.
279. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 720 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citing, inter alia, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)); see also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying the
endorsement test, post-Kiryas Joel, in a case involving the Klu Klux Klan's request to display a
cross on a statehouse plaza).
280. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 720 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
281. Id. at 721; cf. Eisgruber, supra note 32, at 1304-12 (defending a modified version of the
endorsement test for cases involving "official prayers and publicly sponsored religious displays").
282. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 721 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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The "principle" with which Scalia would replace Lemon was "fidelity to the
longstanding traditions of our people.""2 5 This Establishment Clause inquiry,
Scalia insisted, would not (unlike O'Connor's "evolving" standards) leave the
Court to its "own devices."2
For present purposes, then, Kiryas Joel is significant in three respects.
First, it made explicitly clear that a majority of the Justices were prepared,
at a minimum, to overrule Aguilar and significant parts of Ball. Second,
after O'Connor's Kiryas Joel concurrence, five Justices now were on record
clearly opposing not just the way in which Aguilar and Ball had applied
Lemon principles, but the Lemon framework itself-at least when under-
stood as a "unitary test." But third, the difference between the O'Connor
and Scalia opinions in Kiryas Joel made clear that the five Justices most
interested in transforming Establishment Clause law still had not settled
upon a Lemon-replacing standard. The Court had agreement on one lim-
ited agendum of transformation, but not on the broader principles by which
Establishment Clause doctrine should be transformed.
D. Response to the Kiryas Joel Invitation
Kiryas Joel's pointed statements about Ball and Aguilar read like an
invitation for a request that those cases be overruled. Perhaps the five Jus-
tices who issued that invitation intended to address it to the New York
legislature or to local Kiryas Joel officials, who could have responded to the
Court's invalidation of the special school district by reinstituting the origi-
nal plan terminated because of Ball and Aguilar."7 But the invitation was
answered instead by the New York City Board of Education, still operating
under the twelve-year-old injunction entered in Aguilar. Just shy of one
year after the Court's Kiryas Joel decision, the board authorized its counsel
to seek Aguilar's reconsideration. The form in which the board sought relief
was a motion, under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
relief from the Aguilar judgment. The board invoked, in particular, clause
(5) of the Rule, which provides:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, etc.-
285. Id.
286. Id. But see Paulsen, supra note 32, at 839-41 (criticizing, as a "classic example of result-
oriented reasoning," the idea "that a legal test must be wrong if it would invalidate longstanding
traditional practices").
287. The legislature did respond, but to another "invitation ... within the Court's opin-
ions." Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 347, 404 (1995). The legislature drafted a statute authorizing municipalities gen-
erally to secede from school districts and form their own districts. See id. at 404-05.
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On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding... [when]:
(5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time .. 88
In seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(5), the board relied on the Supreme
Court's gloss in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail:2 9 Relief from an
injunction is appropriate if the moving party can show "a significant change
either in factual conditions or in the law.""z  The board's argument for a
"significant change ... in the law" depended, the district court recognized,
"most heavily on the opinions in Kiryas Joel."' 9' Although the board argued
that the district court itself had authority to "pronounce Aguilar dead" and
to grant relief from the judgment, 9 ' the court interpreted this argument to
seek, "at bottom," only a "procedurally sound vehicle to get the issue back
before the Supreme Court."'93
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
289. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
290. Id. at 384; see also id. at 388 ("[Mlodification ... may be warranted when the statutory
or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent."). Rufo
speaks in terms of a consent decree rather than an injunction, but the statement applies to both
kinds of order. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (1997); see also System Fed'n No. 91
v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) ("There is... no dispute but that a sound judicial discretion
may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether of
law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, or new ones have since arisen.").
291. Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ., No. 78-CV-1750 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 1996)
(unpublished memorandum and order), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at
15, Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 1997 (No. 96-552); see also Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006 (arguing that
the law had changed, the board "pointed to the statements of five Justices in [Kiryas Joel] calling
for the overruling of Aguilar").
Although the board relied, also, on other post'Aguilar Supreme Court decisions, its submission
to the district court made clear that the Court's Kiryas Joel opinions were what prompted its request
for a reconsideration of Aguilar. This connection is evident in the way the board replied to the
argument that its motion was not filed "within a reasonable time," as Rule 60(b)(5) requires. The
board had "acted as expeditiously as could reasonably be expected," it said, given the difficulties of
the issues, both legal and political. Felton, No. 78-CV-1750, reprinted in Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, Appendix at 19, Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 1997. The clear implication is that the event the
board needed to "digest and discuss," id. at 18, and to which it responded "as expeditiously as could
reasonably be expected," was the Court's decision just less than a year before in Kiryas Joel.
292. See Felton, No. 78-CV-1750, reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at
17, Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 1997.
293. Id. The federal secretary of education supported the board's underlying legal position
but argued that only the Supreme Court had authority to declare Aguilar's demise:
[Tihe Secretary states that although the motion cannot be granted, "we should not
be understood to suggest that a reconsideration of [Aguilar] would be inappropriate in the
Supreme Court .... We preserve our right to support a request by the [Board] that the
Supreme Court reconsider its ruling in this case."
Id. at 17 n.3.
46,UCLA LAW REVIEW 343 (1998)396
HeinOnline -- 46 UCLA L. Rev. 396 1998-1999
Managing Legal Change
The district court acknowledged that Rule 60(b) responds to competing
concerns. On one hand, the rule is designed to do justice in particular cases,
when the circumstances that once justified the original judgment have
changed. On the other hand, application of the rule must respect also the
principle of finality, and for that reason, "Rule 60(b) may not be used as a
substitute for appeal." '94 The court resolved this tension in favor of the board.
"ITIhere could have been no further appeal from the adverse decision by the
Supreme Court in 1985," the court pointed out, and "it is at least unusual, if
not extraordinary, that the losing parties to a Supreme Court case can point
to such promising indicia that they would win the case now."'295 In these
circumstances, the district court concluded, "allowing the defendants to
resuscitate pursuant to Rule 60(b) the issue they lost in 1985 strikes the
proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation should have
finality and that justice should be done." '296 For these reasons, the district
court held, the board's Rule 60(b)(5) motion was "procedurally firm.2 97
The district court, however, proceeded to deny the motion on the
merits. The court stated:
There may be good reason to conclude that Aguilar's demise is immi-
nent, but it has not yet occurred. More importantly, it is not so cer-
tain an event that this Court could properly anticipate it by affording
the relief sought here. However, it does seem clear to me that the
Board should be permitted to seek the reconsideration of Aguilar that
a majority of the Supreme Court appears willing, if not anxious, to
undertake. In addition, there could scarcely be a more appropriate
vehicle for that review than the same case, in which, eleven years
later, the same school board is struggling with the consequences of
the Supreme Court's decision. 298
The Second Circuit affirmed without opinion, "substantially for the reasons
stated" in the district court's memorandum and order.299 The board, joined
294. Id. at 18.
295. Id.; see also id. at 16 (stating that "[tihe life expectancy of Aguilar itself is, to put it
mildly, subject to question," and citing the various opinions in Kiryas Joel).
296. Id. at 18.
297. Id. at 19. The district court also held that the law of the case doctrine did not apply
because, under Second Circuit precedent, the doctrine was "limited by discretion and should be
discarded for a compelling reason such as an intervening change of law .... " Id. at 18 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
298. Id. at 19. The district court noted also that challenge under Rule 60(b)(5) was "far
preferable to contemptuously defying the injunction by placing teachers back in the parochial
schools, the course that, according to counsel for plaintiffs at oral argument, is the only proper
means of obtaining appellate review of the continuing validity of the injunction." Id.
299. Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ., Nos. 96-6160, 96-6180, 96-6181, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22981, at *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 1996).
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by a group of parochial school parents who wanted Title I services restored
on-premises, and also by the federal secretary of education, petitioned for
certiorari and asked the Court to overrule Ball and Aguilar.
For reasons I suggest in Part IV, the prudent course of action-even
from the point of view of the five Justices committed to overruling Ball and
Aguilar and revising Establishment Clause doctrine-would have been for
the Court to deny review. The Rule 60(b) context, I argue, kept the Court
from getting a clear shot at Ball and Aguilar in particular, and kept it from
being able to reform Establishment Clause law more generally.
But perhaps impatient to reach the issues it had flagged two-and-one-
half years before, the Court granted certiorari in the case, now captioned
Agostini v. Felton,"° and pursued its transformation of Establishment Clause
law in that case's inhospitable context.
III. AGOSTINI: FINDING A CHANGE IN THE LAW
A. The Rule 60(B)(5) Problem
Thus, by the time the Court considered Agostini, five Justices had
come to agree that Aguilar and significant parts of Ball should be overruled,
and they agreed also that the principles governing this school-aid branch of
Establishment Clause doctrine should be revised. They agreed, further, that
the Lemon test was no longer satisfactory-though they disagreed as to what
test should replace it.
Had the Court undertaken its law-reform activities in a case untrou-
bled by Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) complications, it would have had a rela-
tively free hand in completing its most particular project: overruling Ball
and Aguilar. Toward this end, any of the various theories that had come to
compete with Lemon would have sufficed-whether Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test, Justice Kennedy's coercion test, or the tests defended by
the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Alternatively, without
definitively adopting one of these tests, the Court could have explained
that the principles of the Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest line of Lemon-
inspired cases should be extended in the way I suggested above3"'-by
taking the principle of a program's generality and neutrality, and the
mediating role of private decision making, to be sufficient conditions for
300. 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997). The first-named member of the parents' group that sought relief
from the Aguilar injunction was Rachel Agostini, replacing Yolanda Aguilar-thus the case's
changed name.
301. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
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the program's constitutionality. 2 Or the Court could have postponed
adoption of a definitive, Lemon-replacing test, holding only that Ball and
Aguilar were wrongly decided under any of the theories that competed with
Lemon. In short, if the Court had reconsidered Ball and Aguilar outside of
the Rule 60(b) context, it could have overruled those cases unproblemati-
cally, even if no single Establishment Clause test could have commanded a
majority's allegiance.
The Rule 60(b)(5) context, however, complicated the Court's law-
transforming strategy immensely. That Rule sharply limited the Court's
freedom to adopt a Lemon-replacing test, and it restricted even the Court's
ability to overrule Aguilar and Ball. As the Court acknowledged, the
change in the law that could justify relief under Rule 60(b)(5) had to pre-
cede the Court's decision in Agostini-or, as the Court put it, Agostini could
only "recogniz[e]" a change in the law worked by pre-Agostini cases; it could
not itself "effect[]" that change."3 The Court, therefore, could not decide
simply that, from its present perspective, it would like to change the law
and overrule Ball and Aguilar. Instead, the Court had to parse its decisions
post-Aguilar and pre-Agostini to determine whether any of those decisions
had, in the Court's phrase, already "so undermined Aguilar that it is no
longer good law.""°
This task of searching the Court's precedents for a law-changing deci-
sion was not easy. The most obvious candidate was Kiryas Joel-the only
case in which a majority of Justices had criticized either Ball or Aguilar. Yet,
relying on the distinction between holding and dictum, the Court noted
that "the question of Aguilar's propriety was not before" the Court in Kiryas
Joel. Accordingly, "[tihe views of five Justices that the case should be
reconsidered or overruled cannot be said to have effected a change in
Establishment Clause law.""3 ' The next most obvious candidates were the
cases in the Mueller to Zolrrest line. These, indeed, were the cases in which
the Court, in Agostini, chose to find the required change in the law. As my
earlier discussion of those cases already has suggested, however, the deci-
sions in the Mueller to Zobrest line certainly do not explicitly overrule Ball
and Aguilar, but instead distinguish them and operate within the same
Lemon framework. The Mueller line provides opportunity for a Court inter-
ested in changing the law, but finding them already to have changed the
law, I argue, is untenable. 6
302. See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
303. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2018 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
304. Id. at 2007.
305. Id.
306. See infra Part IV.A.
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The Rule 60(b)(5) context presented the Court with an additional
difficulty. The Court in Agostini was reviewing the Second Circuit's affir-
mance of a district court judgment denying relief. The basis for the lower
courts' action was that Aguilar was the controlling Supreme Court
precedent-it was, after all, a ruling in the very same case, not yet overruled
by the Court. To reverse the Second Circuit's decision, one would think,
the Court would have to determine that the lower courts erred in denying
relief. That, however, would seem to mean that the lower courts had power
to determine that Aguilar, an obviously applicable Supreme Court case not
expressly overruled, was so undermined by subsequent Court decisions as to
be no longer good law. And the Court had disavowed that possibility eight
years earlier, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.307 In
Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court had said that "if a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions. ' The combination of the Rule 60(b)(5) context, together
with the Rodriguez de Quijas stricture, ensnared the Court in an insoluble
paradox.3"
The Court recognized these difficulties, at least in some measure, from
the outset. In granting certiorari, the Court, sua sponte, asked the parties to
brief not just the merits questions, but also the question '[w]hether Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper vehicle for
obtaining the relief Petitioner seeks.""'3" In the following sections, I sketch
the Court's argument that post-Aguilar and pre-Agostini cases undermine
Ball and Aguilar, then turn to the way in which the Court tries to answer
the Rule 60(b)(5) question.
B. The Court's Theory of Post-Aguilar Legal Change
The Court began its account of post-Aguilar legal change by acknowl-
edging a general continuity with the Lemon framework: The "general prin-
ciples" of Establishment Clause doctrine, the Court maintained, "have not
changed since Aguilar was decided '2" The Court still inquires whether the
challenged statute or program has the purpose or effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and the purpose part of the Lemon inquiry "has
307. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
308. Id. at 484.
309. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
310. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 759, 759 (1997) (mer. granting cert.).
311. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
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remained largely unchanged."3"' But "[wihat has changed since ... Ball and
Aguilar," the Court said, "is our understanding of the criteria used to assess
whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect." '
As the Court recognized, whether the law has changed in this respect
since Ball and Aguilar depends upon what those cases are taken to hold. On
the Court's reading in Agostini, Ball's conclusions of impermissible effect
rested on three assumptions: (i) any public employee who works on
the premises of a religious school is presumed to inculcate religion in
her work; (ii) the presence of public employees on private school
premises creates a symbolic union between church and state; and (iii)
any and all public aid that directly aids the educational function of
religious schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination,
even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private
decisionmaking." 4
The Court's holding in Aguilar added a "fourth assumption": "that New
York City's Title I program necessitated an excessive government entan-
glement with religion because public employees who teach on the premises
of religious schools must be closely monitored to ensure that they do not
inculcate religion.""3 ' These four "assumptions," the Court said in Agostini,
were the basis for the judgments in Aguilar and Ball. And according to the
Court, "more recent cases"-post-Aguilar and pre-Agostini-had so "under-
mined" 6 these assumptions that "Aguilar, as well as the portion of Ball
addressing Grand Rapids' Shared Time program, are no longer good law."3 7
The post-Aguilar decisions on which Agostini relied were Witters3t 8 and
Zobrest." Zobrest, the Court maintained in Agostini, undermined Aguilar's
first two assumptions-concerning state-sponsored indoctrination and
symbolic union. On the indoctrination issue, Agostini emphasized Zobrest's
statement that "the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the
placing of a public employee in a sectarian school.""32 In this pronounce-
ment, Agostini reasoned, Zobrest "expressly rejected the notion-relied on in
312. Id. The Court does not mention Lemon expressly in this context, but it does cite cases





317. Id. at 2016.
318. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
319. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). On the Court's decisions
in Witters and Zobrest, see discussion supra Part II.A.
320. Id. at 13, quoted in Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010. Zobrest buttressed this claim by citing
Wolman, which allowed public employees to perform speech and hearing diagnostic services on
sectarian school premises. See id. at 13 n.10.
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Ball and Aguilar-that, solely because of her presence on private school
property, a public employee will be presumed to inculcate religion in the
students."32' In fact, according to the Court, Zobrest reversed the pre-
sumption: "In the absence of evidence to the contrary," the Court wrote
in Agostini, "we assumed ... that the interpreter would dutifully discharge
her responsibilities as a full-time public employee and comply with the ethi-
cal guidelines of her profession by accurately translating what was said. 32
And further, through its silence on the point, Zobrest also "implicitly
repudiated" the second "assumption" on which Ball and Aguilar turned-
that "the presence of a public employee on private school property creates
an impermissible 'symbolic link' between government and religion." '
Witters, the Court said in Agostini, undermined the third "assumption"
of Ball and Aguilar: The principle that direct aid to religious schools' educa-
tional function "impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if the
aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private decisionmaking." '324 In
fact, Agostini maintains, Witters upheld the challenged aid-a vocational-
education grant to a blind student at a religious school-precisely because
state funds reached the religious school only as a "consequence of private
decisionmaking."32 In so holding, Agostini noted, Witters emphasized two
factors: the neutrality of the program's eligibility criteria, and the fact that
the grant was paid directly to the student, who could choose the school-
public or private, sectarian or nonsectarian-at which he would spend the
grant. For these reasons, Witters held, "any aid... that ultimately flows to
religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of aid recipients. '  Accordingly, any religious indoc-
trination the grant recipient received would not be attributable to the
state.327
Zobrest, the Court declared, was to similar effect. Zobrest attributed the
challenged aid-i.e., "the interpreter's presence in a sectarian school"-not
to state action, but instead to "the private decision of individual parents." '328
321. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011; see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13 (noting that the interpreter
was ethically bound to do no more than "accurately interpret whatever material is presented to
the class as a whole").
322. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 2010.
325. See id. at 2010-12.
326. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986), quoted
in Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012.
327. See id. at 488 ("[Tlhe fact that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to sup-
port religious education is made by the individual, not by the State.").
328. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993), quoted in Agostini, 117
S. Ct. at 2012.
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Zobrest emphasized, further, that because the parochial school would not
have paid for the interpreter on its own, absent the aid, the school was for
that reason "not relieved of an expense that it otherwise would have
assumed in educating its students." ' The aid did not operate as an imper-
missible subsidy to religious activity. The Agostini Court thus understood
both Zobrest and Witters to "depart[] from the rule relied on in Ball" that
would invalidate all direct government aid to sectarian schools' "educa-
tional function."
That left only Aguilar's final "assumption": that the Title I program
created an excessive entanglement "because public employees who teach on
the premises of religious schools must be closely monitored to ensure that
they do not inculcate religion.""' 1 The Court began its analysis of theentanglement issue by incorporating Justice O'Connor's suggestion, in her
Aguilar dissent, that entanglement be treated as part of the effects inquiry,
not as a separate test.332 The Court's conclusion that programs like Title I
do not effect an excessive entanglement followed from its rejection of Ball's
first "assumption." If public employees no longer are presumed likely to
inculcate religion, then close monitoring of those employees no longer will
be required." Finally, Agostini concluded, the other forms of entanglement
found in Aguilar-the need for administrative cooperation between gov-
ernment and religious schools, and the danger of political divisiveness-
were not by themselves sufficient to invalidate a program on entanglement
grounds."'
For the Agostini Court, then, the post-Aguilar decisions in Zobrest and
Witters undermined the four crucial assumptions of Ball and Aguilar and
changed "the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an imper-
missible effect.335 That, however, is to say only that the Ball and Aguilar
criteria are no longer in effect. Two questions remain. First, what are the
new effects criteria? And under those criteria, is the Aguilar injunction no
329. Id. at 12.
330. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011.
331. Id. at 2010.
332. Id. at 2015 (noting the similarity of the factors considered in the effects and entangle-
ment inquiries and concluding that "it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant
and treat it ... as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect"); cf. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 422 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I question the utility of entanglement as a separate
Establishment Clause standard in most cases."), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997
(1997); id. at 430 ("Pervasive institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant
in deciding the effect of a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause...
333. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2015-16.
334. See id. at 2015; cf. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 415-16 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing
political divisiveness as a risk "additional" to the risk of entanglement).
335. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
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longer legally correct? Agostini answers both questions by looking to the
changes that, in the Court's view, Zobrest and Witters worked on Ball's three
effects inquiries.
According to Agostini, Zobrest and Witters changed, first, Ball's
government-indoctrination inquiry-in ways that demonstrate that New
York's Title I program did not impermissibly indoctrinate. Whereas Ball
and Aguilar presumed indoctrination, considering "the lack of evidence of
any specific incidents of religious indoctrination as largely irrelevant," '336 the
Zobrest Court searched the record for evidence of translator-introduced
indoctrination."' In Agostini, the record disclosed no evidence that any
New York City teacher had ever attempted to proselytize students in the
Title I program's nineteen-year history.33 Without such evidence, a con-
clusion of impermissible indoctrination would not follow.
Second, Agostini reiterated, Zobrest repudiated Ball's presumption that
the presence of Title I teachers on parochial school property creates a sym-
bolic union of church and state. Even if the Title I program established a
stronger connection between church and state than the mere presence of a
public employee in a sectarian school, Agostini maintained, no court had
found that Title I services may not be provided to sectarian-school students
off premises.339 Nor is the "difference in the degree of symbolic union
between a student receiving remedial instruction in a classroom and one
receiving instruction in a van parked just at the school's curbside" even
"perceptible (let alone dispositive)."'34  New York City's Title I program
therefore did not fail on symbolic-union grounds.
Zobrest further established, the Court said in Agostini, that New York
City's Title I program did not "impermissibly finance" or subsidize religious
instruction.' As in Zobrest, the services provided to religious-school stu-
dents are "by law supplementary to the regular curricula," and thus they do
not "'reliev[e] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in
educating their students.""'34 According to the Court, the fact that New
York City distributed Title I services to thousands of sectarian-school stu-
336. Id. at 2008-09. The Court did explain that the Ball Court "reason[ed] that potential
witnesses to any indoctrination.., might be unable to detect or have little incentive to report the
incidents." Id. at 2009.
337. See id. at 2011.
338. See id. at 2012.
339. See id.; see also id. at 2015 (noting that Aguilar's holding extended only to on-premises
services and citing cases from the federal courts of appeals upholding off-premises delivery of Title
I services to sectarian-school students).
340. Id. at 2012.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 2013 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12 (1993)).
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dents, whereas Zobrest involved aid to only one such student, did not
distinguish Zobrest.343 Further, the Court maintained that "[w]hat is most
fatal to the argument that New York City's Title I program directly subsi-
dizes religion is that it applies with equal force when those services are
provided off-campus, and Aguilar implied that providing the services off-
campus is entirely consistent with the Establishment Clause." 4
Agostini found Zobrest and Witters instructive in another respect,
related to but distinct from the subsidization inquiry. Apart from the ques-
tion whether a challenged program subsidizes a sectarian institution and its
activities of indoctrination, Agostini maintained, Zobrest and Witters focused
on whether the program gives potential recipients a financial incentive to
undertake religious indoctrination. The Court observed that both Zobrest
and Witters, as well as cases decided before Ball and Aguilar, had emphasized
that the nature of a challenged program's eligibility criteria is relevant in
this respect.34 If "aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria
that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both relig-
ious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis," Agostini
explained, then potential recipients have no financial incentive to select
religious activity. 46 Accordingly, Agostini concluded, "the aid is less likely
to have the effect of advancing religion. '4 7
Zobrest and Witters relied on this factor in upholding the programs
challenged in those cases. Ball and Aguilar, by contrast, gave this factor "no
weight.""34 On the facts of the Agostini case, the Court found, the Title I
program, like the programs sustained in Zobrest and Witters, allocates aid
"on the basis of criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion., 349 Thus in
this respect, too, the post-Zobrest effects test points toward the Title I pro-
gram's constitutionality.
In concluding that the Title I program was constitutional under post-
Aguilar cases, Agostini moved from its initial position-that the "assumptions"
of Ball and Aguilar had been undermined-to a fuller account of the changes
it believed Witters and Zobrest had worked on Establishment Clause doctrine.
In the course of announcing its conclusion that New York's Title I program
343. See id. (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) ("We would be loath to
adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the
extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law.")).
344. Id.
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was constitutional, the Court stated its post-Zobrest effects criteria as
follows:
New York City's Title I program does not run afoul of any of three
primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid
has the effect of advancing religion: it does not result in government
indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create
an excessive entanglement.350
Some aspects of this revised effects test are clear. For one thing, the
Court has converted Lemon's entanglement test from a separate inquiry,
alongside purpose and effect, into a part of the effects test. Further, as men-
tioned, Agostini makes clear that only "institutional entanglement"-and
that now means something more than routine administrative contacts or
ordinary workplace supervision-will count as impermissible excessive
entanglement. Also clear is the disappearance from the effects test of the
symbolic-union theory on which Ball relied."' Further, Agostini makes
apparent that the Court no longer will find an impermissible risk of gov-
ernment indoctrination whenever state-paid teachers or counselors work in
the "pervasively sectarian" environment of a religious school. Finally, the
Court's second effects criterion-that a program may not "define its recipi-
ents by reference to religion"-also seems clear (as well as easy for gov-
ernment to avoid).
In other respects, however, Agostini's revised effects test is difficult to
interpret. For example, the Court does not specify whether, as in the old
Ball effects test, a plaintiff can prevail on effects, and thus prevail in the
case, by prevailing on any of the three effects criteria. I assume, in the
absence of any statement to the contrary in the Agostini opinion, that this is
SO. Unclear, also, is what a plaintiff would have to show to demonstrate
that the challenged program "result[s] in government indoctrination." The
Court collapses, under the heading of "government indoctrination," two
separate inquiries prescribed by Ball: the question whether-public employees
are likely themselves to engage in religious indoctrination, and the question
whether government aid advances religion by subsidizing the educational
function of sectarian schools.353 I assume that a plaintiff may prevail on this
effects criterion, and thus prevail in the case, by showing either. But the
350. Id. at 2016.
351. It seems to survive, however, in the form of the endorsement test, which in Agostini has
an uneasy status alongside the purpose and effects tests. See infra notes 358-360 and accompany-
ing text.
352. All of the factors are phrased in terms of effects that were prohibited under prior law,
and the Court's opinion takes care to demonstrate that Title I violates none of the three criteria.
353. These were the two parts of the effects test that Ball had distinguished. See supra notes
160-162 and accompanying text.
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criteria the Court prescribes for these two government-indoctrination
factors are not at all clear.
Agostini's discussion of the first government-indoctrination subcrite-
rion-the participation of public employees in religious indoctrination,
when this participation may be charged to the state-changes the Ball
inquiry in two ways. First, as mentioned, Agostini insists upon genuine evi-
dence that a public employee is likely to engage in religious indoctrination.
Second, and potentially more important, Agostini emphasizes Zobrest's point
that even when public employees actually participate in religious teaching,
the government nonetheless may not be responsible. In discussing this
second point, Agostini relies upon Zobrest's conclusion that, because the
challenged program's eligibility criteria were neutral, the fact that James
Zobrest received aid in a religious rather than a public school was a 'result
of the private decision of individual parents' and '[could] not be attributed
to state decisionmaking."'"" 4
The question after Agostini will be how broadly to interpret these
notions of "neutral criteria" and "private decisionmaking." Any aid pro-
gram can be outfitted with eligibility criteria that make aid "available
generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature of the institution benefited."3" ' A comprehensive tuition voucher
program, such as the one recently upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court,356 is the most obvious example. If the neutrality of a program's eligi-
bility criteria guarantees that the availability of aid to parochial schools is
always the result of private, not state decision making-and that for that
reason the resulting religious teaching is not attributable to the state-then
any aid program whose eligibility criteria are neutral will survive the first
part of the government-indoctrination inquiry.
What the Court means with its second criterion for impermissible gov-
ernment indoctrination-state subsidization of religious education-
likewise is unclear. On one hand, Agostini's account of the subsidization
inquiry emphasizes the distinction between programs that "supplement" and
those that "supplant" religious schools' existing curricula, and the Court
seems to adopt, as a criterion of subsidization, Zobrest's "relieve sectarian
schools of costs they otherwise would have borne" formulation. The Court
mentions also that "[n]o Title I funds ever reach the coffers of religious
schools." If these are the subsidization criteria, then a voucher program
354. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1, 10 (1993)).
355. Id. at 2011 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487 (1986)).
356. See supra note 202.
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would subsidize religious schools impermissibly-both because state funds
would reach religious schools' "coffers," and because the tuition grants likely
would relieve religious schools of costs they otherwise would have borne.
On the other hand, the Court could extend its "private decisionmaking"
rationale to the issue of subsidization. In a voucher program, for example, if
aid were available neutrally, on a per-pupil basis, the Court could maintain
that government funds reach religious-school coffers only as a result of pri-
vate, not state, decision making. The Court, then, would uphold the chal-
lenged program.
This latter interpretation of Agostini's effects test is plausible, and it
would allow the Court to uphold virtually any aid program with neutral eli-
gibility criteria. But reading Agostini in this way leaves other features of the
opinion unexplained. For example, if the subsidization test really does
reduce to the issue whether the program's eligibility criteria are neutral,
why would the Court have bothered to discuss the supplant/supplement dis-
tinction? And why would it emphasize that New York's Title I program did
not relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne?
Why, also, would the Court mention that no government funds reach
religious schools' coffers? Why, for that matter, would the Court even sug-
gest that subsidization was an issue separate from the issue of the program's
neutrality?
In short, the Court leaves its revised effects test unclear-perhaps
because of disagreements within the Agostini majority, perhaps in order to
leave room open in later cases for further changes, and most likely for both
reasons. The Court, in some future case-perhaps one involving a voucher
program-will have to resolve the uncertainties of Agostini's "current
law." '357 The best that can be said for Agostini's statement of current effects
357. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager interpret the revised effects test similarly.
They see in Agostini both a broad and a narrow rationale. The broad rationale lies in the Court's
emphasis on the generality and neutrality of the program's eligibility criteria, and the two conse-
quences the Court draws: (1) the program creates no incentive to undertake religious rather than
secular education, and (2) the program channels benefits to religious schools only as a result of
private decisions. As Eisgruber and Sager point out, if the Court takes these to be the decisive
Establishment Clause criteria, then it would uphold, for example, a comprehensive voucher
program that provides equal benefits to public- and private-school students. See Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v.
Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 79, 125-27. The narrower rationale, they say, emphasizes that New
York's Title I program did not send money directly into religious-school coffers, nor did it relieve
sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne. If these features of Title I are a sine
qua non for surviving an Establishment Clause challenge, Eisgruber and Sager argue, then a
voucher program would be unconstitutional because "there is no doubt" that it would "add public
money to the accounts of religious educational programs." Id.
408
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law is that whatever the Court decides in the future will not be inconsistent
with what the Court said in Agostini.
Alongside the revised effects inquiry the Court places the endorsement
test. "The same reasons that justify" holding that New York City's Title I
program survives the effects test, the Court wrote, "require us to conclude
that this carefully constrained program also cannot reasonably be viewed as
an endorsement."' s The Court seemed to base this conclusion on its earlier
position that the program established no symbolic union of church and
state.59 Perhaps Justice O'Connor had in mind also her earlier position
about the endorsement test-that it expresses and specifies the purpose and
effects parts of the Lemon inquiry.' 6° But the Court did not make clear what
relation it meant to establish between the endorsement test and the revised
Lemon test.
The Court concluded: "[W]e must acknowledge that Aguilar, as well as
the portion of Ball addressing Grand Rapids' Shared Time program, are no
longer good law., 36' This conclusion, the Court maintained, removed any
barrier that stare decisis might be thought to impose. Here the Court relied
on the usual pro-overruling decisions and language, noting that .'"[stare
decisis is not an inexorable command,' 362 and that the force of stare decisis
is "at its weakest" in constitutional cases, in which the Court's decisions
"can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling. 363 In
particular, the Court noted, various decisions have held that overruling is
proper when intervening decisions have '"erod[ed]"' the precedent's
"'underpinnings.""'" Accordingly, the Court announced, in a curious for-
mulation: "We therefore overrule Ball and Aguilar to the extent those
decisions are inconsistent with our current understanding of the Establish-
,,365ment Clause.
Daniel Farber, too, suggests that on the voucher question, after Agostini, "it would be far from
impossible to write an opinion going either way." DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
278 (1998).
358. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016.
359. See supra Part lll.A.2 (discussing the Court's symbolic-union conclusion); Agostini, 117
S. Ct. at 2016 (citing, as support, one case finding no endorsement and another case finding no
symbolic link).
360. See supra notes 215-223 and accompanying text.
361. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2016.
362. Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
363. Id.
364. Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)); see also id. at 2016-
17 (citing other cases to the same effect).
365. Id. at 2017. For similar reasons, the Court decided that the law-of-the-case doctrine
did not bar relief:
The doctrine does not apply if the court is "convinced that fits prior decision] is clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." In light of our conclusion that Aguilar
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C. The Court's Treatment of the Rule 60(b)(5) Problem
The Court's journey did not end with its conclusion that Aguilar and
the relevant parts of Ball were "no longer good law." One further obstacle
remained-the question whether the New York City School Board, having
demonstrated successfully a change in the law, could obtain relief under
Rule 60(b)(5).
The difficulty, as I mentioned earlier, arose from the Court's decision
in Rodriguez de Quijas.366 If a Supreme Court precedent "has direct applica-
tion in a case," the Court wrote in Rodriguez de Quijas, and "yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court]
should follow the case which directly controls. 367 Only the Supreme Court
has "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."3 And when the dis-
trict court acted in Agostini, Aguilar had "direct application": It was the
Supreme Court's ruling in the very same case. Thus even if Aguilar "rest[ed]
on reasons rejected" in Witters and Zobrest, as the Supreme Court later
contended, still, Rodriguez de Quijas required the district court, and later
the court of appeals, to follow Aguilar and deny relief. How, then, could the
Supreme Court reverse the lower courts' decisions-particularly under the
abuse-of-discretion standard that governs denial of Rule 60(b)(5)
motions?3 69  How could a decision that the Court acknowledged was
correct"70 be an abuse of the district court's discretion?
would be decided differently under our current Establishment Clause law, we think
adherence to that decision would undoubtedly work a "manifest injustice," such that the
law of the case doctrine does not apply.
Id. (citations omitted). For support, the Court cited Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342
(1974), in which the "Court of Appeals erred in adhering to [the] law of the case doctrine despite
intervening Supreme Court precedent." Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017. Reliance on Davis is odd: As
we will see, the Court's theory in Agostini is that the lower court was correct in following Aguilar
rather than the "intervening precedent[s]" of Witters and Zobrest. See supra notes 307-308 and
accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
366. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see
supra notes 307-309 and accompanying text.
367. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.
368. Id.
369. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (acknowledging that the abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard applies).
370. See id. at 2017.
We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our
more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that
"if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on rea-
sons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions." Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484. Adherence to this teaching by the District
Court and Court of Appeals in this case does not insulate a legal principle on which they
relied from our review to determine its continued vitality. The trial court acted within
410
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The Court answered these questions by reframing them. Its strategy was
to make the Court's use of Rule 60(b)(5) look like a routine application of
standard and settled legal principles. The Court's general practice, it said, is
to "apply the rule of law we announce in a case to the parties before us."37'
The Court "adhere[s] to this practice," it said, even when it overrules a case
on which the lower courts properly have relied.72 The fact that Agostini
arose in the Rule 60(b)(5) context, the Court suggested, did not take the
case out from under these basic principles. While "the trial court has
discretion" in deciding Rule 60(b)(5) motions, "the exercise of discretion
cannot be permitted to stand if we find it rests upon a legal principle that
can no longer be sustained.... The standard of review we employ in this
litigation does not therefore require us to depart from our general prac-
tice.""' Because the controlling legal principles are those of Zobrest and
Witters, not Aguilar and Ball, the district court's exercise of discretion could
not be permitted to stand.
In framing its decision as a routine application of settled principles, the
Court responded to arguments in Justice Ginsburg's dissent37 that the Court's
action was anything but routine. Unsurprisingly, the Court presented those
arguments as pleas for an exception to general Rule 60(b)(5) principles.7
Ginsburg's suggestion that the Court was "effecting" changes in the law,
rather than "recognizing" them,376 failed, the Court said, because the Court
in fact had identified a "bona fide, significant change" '377 that Zobrest and
Witters already had worked on the law. Further, because Rule 60(b)(5)
applies, by its terms, only to judgments with prospective application, the
its discretion in entertaining the motion with supporting allegations, but it was also cor-
rect to recognize that the motion had to be denied unless and until this Court reinter-
preted the binding precedent.
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
371. Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485).
372. Id. The Court's examples:
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, for example, the District Court and Court of
Appeals rejected the argument that racial classifications in federal programs should be
evaluated under strict scrutiny, relying upon out decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC. When we granted certiorari and overruled Metro Broadcasting, we did not hesitate
to vacate the judgments of the lower courts. In doing so, we necessarily concluded that
those courts relied on a legal principle that had not withstood the test of time. See also
Hubbard v. United States (overruling decision relied upon by Court of Appeals and
reversing the lower court's judgment that relied upon the overruled case).
Id. (citations omitted).
373. Id. at 2018 (citations omitted).
374. Id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, fl.).
375. See id. at 2018 (opinion of the Court) ("Respondents nevertheless'contend that we
should not grant Rule 60(b)(5) relief here, in spite of its propriety in other contexts.").
376. See id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 2018 (opinion of the Court).
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Court's decision would "have no effect outside the context of ordinary civil
litigation where the propriety of continuing prospective relief is at issue." '
For these reasons, the Court maintained, fears of a "deluge of Rule 60(b)(5)
motions" were unfounded, and Justice Ginsburg's pointed concern that
litigants would be encouraged to "'speculat[e] on chances from changes"' 79
in the Court's membership was, the Court said, "overstated. '3s
The Court replied also to Justice Ginsburg's observation that other
cases already in the Court's pipeline might present the issue of whether to
overrule Aguilar, but without the complications that Agostini's Rule
60(b)(5) context created.3 1' The Court rebuffed Ginsburg's implication
that the Court had departed from "integrity in the interpretation of proce-
dural rules""3 2 with the assertion that "Rule 60(b)(5) specifically contem-
plates the grant of relief in the circumstances presented here."3 3 The Court
378. Id. The Court cited here Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which limits the ability
of federal habeas corpus petitioners to take advantage of favorable "new rules" announced after
their convictions have become final. Nothing in Agostini, the Court was suggesting, would change
the Court's usual practice of treating cases whose outcomes were not "dictated by precedent," see,
e.g., id. at 301, as cases that establish "new rules" unavailable to habeas petitioners (except in rare
and exceptional situations). The Court's sensitivity to the possibility that Agostini might be read
to modify existing habeas corpus jurisprudence might help explain its insistence, at the opening of
the opinion, that post-Aguilar cases "dictate" the conclusion that "Aguilar is no longer good law."
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003.
379. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018 (quoting id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, ]., dissenting)). In referring
to changes in the Court's personnel, Justice Ginsburg presumably had in mind the fact that Justice
Stevens was the only member of Ball's and Aguilar's five-member majorities still on the Court. See
id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
380. Id. at 2018 (opinion of the Court).
381. Id.; see also id. at 2026, 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (mentioning cases pending in
the lower courts).
382. Id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg emphasized that Aguilar had
not been overruled before the Court's Agostini decision. See id. at 2027; id. at 2028 ("INJothing
can disguise the reality that, until today, Aguilar had not been overruled. Good or bad, it was in
fact the law."). "Lacking any rule or practice allowing us to reconsider the Aguilar judgment
directly," Ginsburg wrote, "the majority accepts as a substitute a rule governing relief from judg-
ments or orders of the federal trial courts." Id. at 2026. But this rule, Ginsburg argued, "had no
office to perform in the District Court," given the Court's conclusion that Aguilar was still binding
on lower courts. Id. at 2028. Accordingly, Ginsburg contended,
[all[ the lower courts could do was pass the case up to us. The Court thus bends Rule
60(b) to a purpose-allowing an "anytime" rehearing in this case-unrelated to the gov-
ernance of district court proceedings to which the rule, as part of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, is directed.
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1)
383. Id. at 2018 (opinion of the Court). I read the words "specifically contemplates" to be
an ill-considered rhetorical flourish. Even if one agrees with the Court that its Agostini decision is
permissible under Rule 60(b)(5), it can hardly be said that the Rule "specifically contemplates the
grant of relief in the circumstances presented." The text of the rule, see supra text following note
287, speaks in general terms, authorizing relief from a final judgment when "it is no longer equita-
ble that the judgment should have prospective application." Even the Court's decisions glossing
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closed its opinion by invoking the plight of the City of New York and its
affected children:
[I]t would be particularly inequitable for us to bide our time waiting
for another case to arise while the city of New York labors under a
continuing injunction forcing it to spend millions of dollars on
mobile instructional units and leased sites when it could instead be
spending that money to give economically disadvantaged children a
better chance at success in life by means of a program that is perfectly
consistent with the Establishment Clause.'S
IV. MISMANAGING LEGAL CHANGE
The Court's opinion in Agostini marks the only path the Court could
have taken to the conclusions it reaches: the Court's declaration that
Aguilar and the relevant parts of Ball are no longer good law, and its ruling
that relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is appropriate under Agostini's circum-
stances. For reasons explained below, however, neither of the Court's
conclusions is ultimately convincing. Even taking the Court's goal of
overruling Aguilar and revising Establishment Clause doctrine as a fixed
destination, I argue, both the Court's selection of Agostini as a vehicle, and
the way in which it operates that vehicle, represent a misuse of the Court's
power to effect legal change.
The Court reaches its conclusion that the law changed, post-Zobrest
and pre-Agostini, by relying on readings of the two lines of Lemon school-aid
precedent I distinguished in Part II: the line that runs from Meek to Ball and
Aguilar, and the line extending from Mueller to Witters and Zobrest. These
two lines of precedent, I argued, coexist through their mutual employment of
Meek's basic constitutional distinction: the distinction between uncon-
stitutional "direct and substantial" aid to religious schools' educational
function, on one hand, and constitutionally permissible "indirect and insub-
stantial" aid, on the other. Agostini's interpretive technique is to read the
post-Aguilar cases in the second line of precedent-Witters and Zobrest-as
undermining the "assumptions" of the Aguilar/Ball line, and as substituting
new constitutional principles that govern the issues of unconstitutional
effects and entanglement. Accordingly, the Court maintains, relief under
Rule 60(b)(5) is proper, because the Court has identified a significant change
in the law, post-Aguilar but pre-Agostini.
this rule do not "specifically contemplate" relief in the circumstances Agostini presents, where the
Supreme Court has concluded that its earlier ruling-a ruling controlling the very same case-has
been undermined by its later decisions.
384. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018-19.
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I argue in Part IV.A that Agostini misreads both lines of precedent. As
Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, the Court interprets Aguilar and Ball
to stand for "exaggerated propositions""38 that the Court never endorsed in
Aguilar, Ball, or any other case. Thus, while demonstrating that Witters and
Zobrest rejected those propositions was easy work for the Court, it also was
not at all to the point. Further, in its reading of the other line of precedent,
Agostini exaggerates the holdings of Witters and Zobrest, reading them as
categorical repudiations of Ball and Aguilar, complete with a new and
revised theory of the Establishment Clause's limits. A more plausible
reading of Witters and Zobrest, however, would see them not as path-altering
rulings, but as decisions that still operate within the Ball and Aguilar frame-
work-even if, as I suggested above, their reliance on "generality and neu-
trality" and on "private decisionmaking" could be a resource for a future
law-changing decision."" That, at any rate, is my argument in Part IV.A
below.
I consider, in Part IV.B, the Court's second general conclusion: that
relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is appropriate under the circumstances of
Agostini. This conclusion, too, I argue, is mistaken-albeit in more inter-
esting ways than the Court is mistaken in its reading of precedent. Among
other problems, the Court's decision generates a paradox: It reverses a cor-
rect decision, on the theory that the deciding court abused its discretion in
deciding the case correctly. This paradox does not disappear so readily as
the Court hopes. Agostini's escape strategy, I argue, depends upon the
incoherent view that two contradictory bodies of law held sway at the same
time. Moreover, the Court's attempt to transform Establishment Clause law,
in a case in which it cannot admit to changing the law, prevents the Court
from developing an independent, normatively justifiable theory of the
Establishment Clause. And by locating the change in Establishment Clause
law in Witters and Zobrest, the Court attributes a change in the law to
decisions that contain not a word of explanation for the change-not even
a recognition that the law is being changed. Thus, whichever decision
one takes to have changed the law-Witters, Zobrest, or Agostini-the
Court never provides the sort of reasons one would expect from a law-
transforming, precedent-overruling decision.
In Part IV.C, I suggest a way in which the Court could have avoided
the paradox of reversing a legally correct decision without lapsing into
incoherence. The Court does not choose this path because it would require
ceding some of its interpretive authority, and some of its management
385. Id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
386. See supra Part lI.A.2.d.
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powers over legal change, to the lower courts. I argue that, contrary to the
Court's view, this strategy of resolving Agostini's paradox is normatively
defensible-certainly more defensible than the path the Court actually
chose in Agostini. Adopting this strategy still would have left the Court
vulnerable to criticism for its use of precedent, and the Court still would
not have been able to effect the changes that the Agostini majority would
have desired. But the Court's account of the process of legal change at least
would have been coherent and consistent with the procedural norms that
partially define the Court's authority to manage legal change.
A. The Court's Use of Precedent
Agostini's argument for a post-Aguilar change in the law begins with its
interpretation of the Meek to Aguilar line of precedent. The four "assump-
tions" Agostini "distill[s] '387 from the Ball and Aguilar opinions have only a
loose connection to what the Court actually said in those cases. And
Agostini's arguments for how Witters and Zobrest both undermined those
assumptions and established new effects criteria are no more persuasive.
Because the Court's theory of pre-Agostini legal change is its sole basis for
overruling Aguilar, any significant missteps in the Court's use of precedent
are fatal.
1. Indoctrination by Public Employees
Consider the Court's rendition of Ball's first assumption: that "any
public employee who works on the premises of a religious school is pre-
sumed to inculcate religion in her work." The Ball opinion, however, does
not speak of "any public employee," but specifically of teachers-the only
public employees whose services on sectarian-school premises were at issue
in the case."s Ball relied on the Court's earlier decision in Meek v.
Pittenger,89 and, slightly buttressing the Agostini Court's interpretation, Ball
387. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
388. The Court described the issue in Ball as follows:
The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs in which
classes for nonpublic school students are financed by the public school system, taught by
teachers hired by the public school system, and conducted in "leased" classrooms in the
nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic schools involved in the programs are sectarian
religious schools. This case raises the question whether these programs impermissibly
involve the government in the support of sectarian religious activities and thus violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct.
1997 (1997).
389. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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did describe Meek as "invalidat[ing] a statute providing for the loan of state-
paid professional staff-including teachers-to nonpublic schools" for on-
premises teaching and other services. 39 But Meek specifically distinguished
between the activity of teachers and counselors, and the activities of the
other professionals whose activities were challenged. The teachers and
counselors were "performing important educational services" in sectarian
schools, the Court said.39  The other professionals-speech and hearing
specialists-were not. Of their activities, the Court wrote that "[tihe
speech and hearing services authorized by [the statute], at least to the
extent such services are diagnostic, seem to fall within that class of general
welfare services for children that may be provided by the State regardless of
the incidental benefit that accrues to church-related schools. 392
Similarly, in Wolman, the Court drew a constitutional distinction
between the activities of teachers and guidance counselors, on one hand,
and the activities of other state-employed professionals, on the other:
The reason for considering diagnostic services to be different from
teaching or counseling is readily apparent. First, diagnostic services,
unlike teaching or counseling, have little or no educational content
and are not closely associated with the educational mission of the non-
public school. Accordingly, any pressure on the public diagnostician
to allow the intrusion of sectarian views is greatly reduced. Second,
the diagnostician has only limited contact with the child, and that
contact involves chiefly the use of objective and professional testing
methods to detect students in need of treatment. The nature of the
relationship between the diagnostician and the pupil does not
provide the same opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views
as attends the relationship between teacher and student or counselor
and student. 3'
For these reasons, the Court concluded, "providing diagnostic services will
not create an impermissible risk of the fostering of ideological views."'94
In light of Meek and Wolman, then, it can be no surprise that Zobrest
could announce-citing rather than rejecting the discussions in Meek and
Wolman395 -that "the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to
390. Ball, 473 U.S. at 386.
391. Meek, 421 U.S. at 371.
392. Id. at 371 n. 2 1. The Court invalidated the provision of the statute authorizing speech
and hearing services, but only because it found the provision unseverable from the otherwise
unconstitutional statute. See id.
393. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977).
394. Id.; see also id. at 242 ("This Court's decisions contain a common thread to the effect
that the provision of health services to all schoolchildren-public and nonpublic-does not have
the primary effect of aiding religion.").
395. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 n.10 (1993).
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the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school." '396 That, in fact, was
one proposition those cases had established. Zobrest tracks the distinction
established in Meek and Wolman, explaining that "the task of a sign-
language interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or
guidance counselor." '397 The interpreter, unlike the teacher or guidance
counselor, simply relays the material to the student who relies on her serv-
ices; she does not contribute any content herself, religious or otherwise. 9
Accordingly, on the Court's view, the state is not responsible for any
religious indoctrination that occurs.399
Thus from Meek, to Wolman, to Ball and Aguilar, and finally to Zobrest,
the Court consistently distinguished among kinds of public employees and
the correspondingly different risks that they would engage in state-
sponsored indoctrination. When the challenged program involved publicly
employed teachers or counselors working on religious-school premises, the
Court consistently invalidated the program. When the challenged program
involved other kinds of public employees, the Court upheld the program if
it found the service sufficiently distinguishable from teaching or counseling.
Ball thus did not depend upon an "assumption" about public employees
generally. And Zobrest, rather than upsetting the distinctions established in
Meek and applied in Ball, works within them.
Agostini tries to fend off this conclusion, with the suggestion that
Zobrest could not have depended on the view that "signers had no 'oppor-
tunity to inject religious content into their translations.""'4  If Zobrest had
rested on that basis, the Court says, then the Court "would have had no
reason to consult the record for evidence of inaccurate translations. 01
Both the interpreter and the teacher had the opportunity to inject religious
content, the Court maintains, and so "there is no genuine basis upon which
to confine Zobrest's underlying rationale-that public employees will not be
presumed to inculcate religion-to sign-language interpreters. 4 2  Further,
the Court contends, "even the Zobrest dissenters acknowledged the shift
Zobrest effected in our Establishment Clause law when they criticized the
396. Id. at 13.
397. Id.
398. See id.
399. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2011 (1997) ("Because the only government aid
in Zobrest was the interpreter, who was herself not inculcating any religious messages, no govern-
ment indoctrination took place and we were able to conclude that 'the provision of such assistance
(was] not barred by the Establishment Clause."' (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13)).
400. Id. (quoting id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
401. Id. at 2011 (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13).
402. Id.
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majority for 'straying... from the course set by nearly five decades of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. ''4 3
Agostini is right that Zobrest presumed, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that interpreters would follow their profession's ethical guide-
lines.4' And Agostini is right, also, that an interpreter, like a teacher, could
inject new religious content into classroom instruction. Nonetheless,
Zobrest followed Meek and Wolman in treating teachers as a special case.
Far from repudiating the assumption that publicly employed teachers
present a special danger, Zobrest located the interpreters' services on the
permissible side of the line only by distinguishing them from teaching.
405
This strategy would make no sense if, as Agostini suggests, Zobrest had
treated teachers and interpreters as equally unlikely to engage in religious
indoctrination.406
Finally, the argument based on the Zobrest dissent is mistaken. The
opinion for the Court in Zobrest operates within the Meek and Ball frame-
work, distinguishing teachers from other professionals. And the Zobrest
dissent reads the Court's opinion in just this way, stating that "[tihe
majority's decision must turn ... upon the distinction between a teacher
403. Id. (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
404. Zobrest did not, however, "consult the record for evidence of inaccurate translations."
Zobrest says only that "[niothing in this record suggests that a sign-language interpreter would do
more than accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the class as a whole." Zobrest,
509 U.S. at 13.
405. See id. ("[T]he task of a sign-language interpreter seems to us quite different from that
of a teacher or guidance counselor.").
406. Zobrest's basis for distinguishing between teachers and interpreters, while hardly
unchallengeable, is readily apparent. It was unquestionably true in Zobrest that the religious-
school classroom teacher would be generating, and the publicly paid interpreter would be
conveying, religious content to James Zobrest. The question was only whether to attribute to the
government the religious indoctrination that undoubtedly would occur. The Court focused not
on the government's role in conveying religious material to Zobrest in particular, but instead on
whether the government had a role in conveying religious content to the class as a whole. The
Court's theory was that because indoctrination already would be occurring in the classroom, the
presence of the interpreter "neither add[ed] to nor subtract[ed] from" the "pervasively sectarian
environment" that already would be in place, independent of the government's assistance. Id.
The government, then, could not be held responsible for the generation of religious indoctrina-
tion in that environment.
Certainly one could argue that the appropriate focus should have been on the particular stu-
dent receiving assistance, not on the classroom as a whole. By providing Zobrest an interpreter,
the argument would go, the government participated in the religious indoctrination of at least one
student. That was, in effect, the argument pressed by Justice Blackmun's dissent in Zobrest. But
that is simply to say that the Court could have held that the interpreter is more like a teacher, for
Establishment Clause purposes, than like (for example) a diagnostic specialist. Whether or not
the Court correctly applied the distinction between teachers and other public employees, the
Zobrest opinion is very clear that one important difference between Zobrest and Ball is the differ-
ence between "the task of a sign-language interpreter" and "that of a teacher or guidance
counselor." Id.
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and a sign-language interpreter.""4 7 The dissent's point was that the Court
had "stray[ed] from the course" in failing to recognize that a state-paid
interpreter, working in a sectarian school, necessarily would be engaged
in religious indoctrination." The dissent did not read the Court's opinion
in Zobrest to hold that teachers, as well as interpreters, were unlikely to
become instruments of religious indoctrination-the point Agostini would
like to attribute to Zobrest.4°
In sum, then, Zobrest did reject the first "assumption" Agostini attrib-
utes to Ball-that "any public employee who works on the premises of a
religious school is presumed to inculcate religion in her work. 4 0  But Ball
never endorsed this proposition, and it was rejected not just in Zobrest, but
in the cases on which Ball relies. Zobrest, no less than Meek, Wolman, or
Ball, operated by distinguishing between teachers and counselors, on one
hand, and other publicly employed professionals, on the other. Nothing in
Zobrest questions the notion that teachers and counselors-those connected
with a religious school's educational function-present a particular danger
of government-sponsored indoctrination. Only by distinguishing interpret-
ers from teachers does Zobrest distinguish the holdings in Meek and Ball.
2. Symbolic Union
According to Agostini, Ball assumed that "the presence of public
employees on private school premises creates a symbolic union between
church and state.""' By upholding the provision of an interpreter on pri-
vate school premises, the Agostini Court reasons, Zobrest "implicitly
repudiated" Ball's assumption."2
407. Id. at 21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 22 (opinion of the Court) ("[lit is beyond question that a state-employed sign-
language interpreter would serve as the conduit for [Zobrest's] religious education, thereby assist-
ing [the school] in its mission of religious indoctrination.").
409. Further, the strategy of relying on the dissent for propositions not defended in the
Court's opinion is, while familiar, inherently suspect. One standard strategy of dissent writing-
though perhaps not the wisest-is to criticize the Court by emphasizing, and sometimes exagger-
ating, the degree to which it has departed from precedent. In these cases, when the Court wedges
its decision into the framework of existing precedent, it is not so much that "even the dissent"
recognizes the Court's departure from precedent as that only the dissent so recognizes. Bootstrap-
ping on the dissent's hyperbole allows the later Court to take propositions as established that the
earlier Court did not have the boldness-or the votes-to establish and defend itself. See Paulsen,
supra note 32, at 821 n.102 ("One ... should be wary of a dissent's hysterical characterization of a
majority holding or of dissenting suggestions of limits to the majority's holding. Frequently, such
statements are rhetorical or tactical exaggerations.").
410. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 2011.
419
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One might well wonder whether a court could "repudiate" an assump-
tion only implicitly. But even so, the Court's argument here is vulnerable
to the same objection made to its treatment of Ball's first putative assump-
tion. The Court did not say in Ball that any public employee's presence on
private school premises effects a symbolic union. Instead, Ball's argument
for impermissible symbolic union is more nuanced. Here, too, the Court
emphasized the special significance of teachers, as opposed to other kinds of
public employees. Borrowing from Judge Friendly's opinion in Aguilar, the
Court described the public school teachers as, "so far as appearance is con-
cerned, a regular adjunct of the religious school."4 '3 The apparent fusing of
two faculties meant that "the religious school appears to the public as a
joint enterprise.""' The sign outside Shared Time classrooms, declaring
them to be public-school classrooms, would stand as "a powerful symbol of
state endorsement and encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the
same class at some other time during the day."4 5 The Court's theory of
symbolic union, then, was not based on the mere presence of a generic pub-
lic employee on parochial-school premises.
To be sure, the Court is right that Zobrest implicitly rejected the
symbolic-union theory on Zobrest's facts. This is because the Court, in
deciding Zobrest, reviewed a judgment by the court of appeals that rested its
conclusion of unconstitutionality squarely on the symbolic-union theory.416
Zobrest's silence on that point, together with its reversal of the appellate
court's judgment, implies that the Court found no unconstitutional sym-
bolic union in that case. And the Court is right, also, that the Zobrest deci-
sion implicitly rejects the "assumption" Agostini attributes to Ball-that
public employees' presence in a sectarian school necessarily creates an
impermissible symbolic union."'7 But without any analysis in the opinion,
Zobrest cannot be read to reject the more modest and more nuanced version
of the symbolic-union theory actually applied in Ball. The fusing of two
faculties, secular and religious, may well constitute a more 'graphic symbol'
of the 'concert or union or dependency' of church and state"4 ' than the
presence of a single interpreter translating for a single child.
413. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 67 (2d Cir. 1984)), overruled in part
by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
414. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Felton, 739 F.2d at 67-68).
415. Id.
416. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993).
417. See id. at 13 ("[The Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the placing of a
public employee in a sectarian school.").
418. Ball, 473 U.S. at 391 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)).
420 46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 343 (1998)
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3. Subsidization of Sectarian Education
The third "assumption" of Ball, according to the Court in Agostini, was
that "any and all public aid that directly aids the educational function of
religious schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if the
aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private decisionmaking.""
Agostini maintains that both parts of this Ball approach-the criterion of
"direct aid," and the disregard of whether aid reaches the school through
private decision making-have been undermined by Witters and Zobrest.
On the issue of "direct aid," Agostini contends, Zobrest displaces the
assumption that all direct aid to religious schools' educational function is
unconstitutional, inquiring instead whether the aid relieves "sectarian
schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating their stu-
dents.""42 When, as in Zobrest, the government aid merely supplements and
does not supplant the religious school's existing offerings, the aid does not
amount to an impermissible subsidy to religious activity.
421
The problem with the Court's argument, as with its other arguments
for a post-Aguilar change in the law, is that the Court both misstates Ball's
"assumption" and overreads the holdings of Witters and Zobrest. Ball did not
assert that "any and all public aid that directly aids the educational function
of religious schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination." Nor
did Ball rely on a simple distinction between direct and indirect aid. Instead,
Ball distinguished also between substantial and insubstantial aid. According
to Ball, following Meek, the test of an aid program's constitutionality is
whether the program provides direct and substantial aid to the educational
function of sectarian schools.422 Ball explained that this pivotal distinction
between unconstitutional direct and substantial aid, on one hand, and
permissible indirect and incidental aid, on the other, is a matter of "degree."2 3
Witters and Zobrest accept this distinction and operate within its con-
fines. In Witters, the Court emphasized that the program it upheld would not
provide substantial amounts of aid to religious institutions:
[Ilmportantly, nothing in the record indicates that, if petitioner
succeeds, any significant portion of the aid expended under the
419. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
420. Id. at 2012-13 (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12).
421. See id. at 2013.
422. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 393 (declaring that the test is whether government aid results in
the "direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise"' (quoting Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977)) (emphasis added)); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)
("Substantial aid to the educational function of [sectarian] schools ... necessarily results in aid to
the sectarian school enterprise as a whole.").
423. Ball, 473 U.S. at 394 (citing Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314).
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Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to religious
education.... The program, providing vocational assistance to the
visually handicapped, does not seem well suited to serve as the vehi-
cle for such a subsidy. No evidence has been presented indicating
that any other person has ever sought to finance religious education
or activity pursuant to the State's program."'
Zobrest was, if anything, more explicit in its acceptance of the Ball and Meek
framework. Zobrest acknowledged the Court's holdings in Meek and Ball
that "[slubstantial aid to the educational function of [religious] schools"
results in "the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity. 42 5
And the distinction between substantial and incidental aid structures much
of Zobrest's discussion. The program invalidated in Meek, the Court noted
in Zobrest, involved "'massive aid' to private schools," most of them sectar-
ian.426 Further, the Shared Time and Community Education programs,
invalidated in Ball, "'in effect subsidize[d] the religious functions of the
parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility
for teaching secular subjects.' 427  But under the program challenged in
Zobrest, by contrast, religious schools are "only incidental beneficiaries," "to
the extent [they] benefit at all. 428 In fact, the Court said,
[t]he only indirect economic benefit a sectarian school might receive
[under the program] is the disabled child's tuition-and that is, of
course, assuming that the school makes a profit on each student;
that, without an... interpreter, the child would have gone to school
elsewhere; and that the school, then, would have been unable to fill
that child's spot. 9
Zobrest, then, far from undermining the Ball framework, upholds the place-
ment of an interpreter in a religious school precisely by employing that
framework, locating the challenged aid on the indirect and incidental side
of the line.
Agostini is right that Zobrest, on the issue of subsidization, notes that
the challenged government aid did not "reliev[e] the sectarian school of
costs [it] otherwise would have borne in educating [its] students.""43 The
Agostini Court goes on, however, to draw two inferences from Zobrest's use
of this formulation. First, Agostini suggests, the Zobrest formulation
424. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).
425. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 366).
426. Id. at 11 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 364-65).
427. Id. at 12 (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at 397).
428. Id. (emphasis added).
429. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
430. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2012 (1997) (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12).
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displaces Ball's direct and substantial aid test.43' And if so, Agostini con-
tinues, then the question is whether New York City's Title I program
"relieve[s] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in
educating their students.""2  Because Title I instruction by law may
only supplement, not supplant, the instruction that otherwise would be
offered in a sectarian school, 3 Agostini concludes, then as a matter of law
the city's Title I program does not impermissibly finance government
indoctrination.
Both steps in this argument are mistaken. Zobrest does not displace
the "direct and substantial aid" test of Meek and Ball. In the passages of
Zobrest discussed above, the Court also classifies the aid to the school in
which the interpreter was to work as indirect and incidental, and therefore
permissible. Further, even if we were to accept Agostini's argument that the
"relieve of costs otherwise borne" formulation is the reigning subsidization
test, still, the Court's ultimate conclusion-that Title I does not impermis-
sibly subsidize sectarian education-would not follow from Zobrest. This is
because in Zobrest, the Court says explicitly that the aid in Ball did relieve
sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne43-in spite of
the fact that the courses provided in the Shared Time and Community
Education programs had not been offered in the sectarian schools before.436
Ball, in other words, rejected the significance of Agostini's distinction
between aid that "supplements" and aid that "supplants" a sectarian school's
curriculum.3 ' Nevertheless, Zobrest still described the aid in Ball as "relieving
the sectarian school of costs it otherwise would have borne." Thus, the
Court's conclusion-that aid that merely supplements rather than supplants a
431. Compare id. at 2011 ("[Wle have departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all gov-
ernment aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid."), with id. at
2012 ("[T]he aid in Zobrest did not indirectly finance religious education by 'reliev[ing] the sec.
tarian schoo[l] of costs [it] otherwise would have borne in educating [its] students."' (quoting
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12)) and id. at 2013 (Title I services do not "reliev[e] sectarian schools of
costs they otherwise would have borne in educating their students."' (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at
12)).
432. Id. at 2013 (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12).
433. See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
434. See id. at 2012-13.
435. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12 ("[Tlhe programs in Meek and Ball-through direct grants of
government aid-relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating
their students.").
436. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 396-97.
437. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
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sectarian school's curriculum is necessarily constitutional-is inconsistent
with, not a consequence of, what the Court said in Zobrest."3 '
The second part of Agostini's argument against Ball's subsidization
"assumption" is that Ball ignored the role of "private decisionmaking" as a
factor mediating between the state and the individual recipient of govern-
ment aid. Witters and Zobrest, the Court says, relied explicitly on this
factor-together with the related factor of the challenged programs' neutral
eligibility criteria-to uphold the challenged programs. And the Title I
program, according to Agostini, is relevantly similar. Here, too, the Court
maintains in Agostini, Title I funds go to local educational agencies, and
they distribute services "directly to the eligible students within [their]
boundaries, no matter where [the students] choose to attend school." '39
Here, too, the eligibility criteria are neutral, making aid "available generally
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of
the institution benefited.""44  And here, too, the Court emphasizes in
Agostini, aid reaches the private schools only to the extent that parents
make the "genuinely independent and private" choice to place eligible
children in religious schools.
The problem with this argument is the same problem discussed above:
Agostini discusses only half of the subsidization test applied in Witters and
Zobrest. At most, the argument shows that Title I aid reaches religious
schools only indirectly, through the effects of private choices. But both
Witters and Zobrest noted, further, that the aid at issue in those cases was
not "substantial.""44 The Court in Agostini may insist that the number of
religious-school students served is constitutionally insignificant,"' but as
438. In his Agostini dissent, Justice Souter goes on to argue that the distinction between
supplementary and supplanting services is "impossible to draw." What was "remarkable" about
New York City's Title I program pre-Aguilar, he says, was that it assumed, at public expense,
a teaching responsibility indistinguishable from the responsibility of the schools them-
selves. The obligation of primary and secondary schools to teach reading necessarily
extends to teaching those who are having a hard time at it, and the same is true of math.
Calling some classes remedial does not distinguish their subjects from the schools' basic
subjects, however inadequately the schools may have been addressing them.
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2021 (Souter, J., dissenting). In this argument, Justice Souter follows Ball
and Meek. See id. at 2022. For the Court's discussion on this point in Ball, see supra notes 126-
131. Justice Souter argues, further, that because Title I instruction covers "core subjects," the
Court's "relieve of costs otherwise borne" criteria is satisfied. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2024 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
439. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2013 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311-6312 (1994)).
440. Id. at 2011 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487 (1986)).
441. See supra notes 424-438 and accompanying text.
442. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2013 ("Although Title I instruction is provided to several
students at once, whereas an interpreter provides translation to a single student, this distinction is
not constitutionally significant."); id. ("Zobrest did not turn on the fact that James Zobrest had, at
46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 343 (1998)424
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discussed, both Witters and Zobrest upheld the challenged aid only after
classifying it as incidental or minimal. 43
Let me be clear about my argument here. I have acknowledged that
Witters and Zobrest would be helpful resources to a Court that seeks to
change the law. The Mueller to Zobrest line of cases, I have said, depends
upon notions not mentioned in the Meek to Aguilar line. These notions-
the generality and neutrality of eligibility criteria, and private decision
making as a mediating factor between state and religious school-are
potentially expansive. If these notions were made sufficient conditions of a
program's constitutionality, then the Court could validate a wide range of
programs aiding religious education, including comprehensive voucher
schemes."4
My point is simply that Witters and Zobrest did not themselves under-
take this change in the law. These cases may be in tension with the Meek
to Aguilar line, but the two bodies of precedent coexisted before Agostini.44
The mechanism of their coexistence was the distinction, invoked in each
line of cases, between unconstitutional direct and substantial aid and con-
stitutionally permissible indirect and incidental aid. It may well be that a
program's constitutionality should not turn on this distinction. But to undo
that distinction is to change the law that prevailed through Zobrest, and
that is precisely what the Rule 60(b)(5) context bars the Court from doing.
the time of litigation, been the only child using a publicly funded sign-language interpreter to
attend a parochial school.").
443. Agostini relies on the neutrality of an aid program's eligibility criteria for one further
point, apart from the subsidization issue: neutral eligibility criteria, Agostini says, give potential
recipients no incentive to undertake religious indoctrination, and to that extent, the program is
less likely to advance religion. See id. at 2014. In the course of criticizing Ball and Aguilar for
giving this consideration "no weight," Agostini elevates the "neutral criteria" factor to one part of
its three-part effects test. Giving greater "weight" to this consideration, however, would not by
itself change the Ball and Aguilar outcomes. As the Court admits, the neutrality of a program's
eligibility criteria is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constitutionality. See id. (citing,
with an "accord" signal, this point in Justice Souter's dissent). The question still would remain
whether the challenged program impermissibly indoctrinated, or impermissibly subsidized religion.
And the arguments above have suggested that the post-Aguilar decisions did not effect a pre-
Agostini legal change in these respects. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
444. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
445. Their coexistence becomes more clear when one considers also Mueller, not just Witters
and Zobrest. Mueller was decided in 1983. Ball and Aguilar were decided in 1985. Witters was
decided in 1986. The two lines of precedent were thus intertwined from the start. Focusing only
on the post-Aguilar cases in the Mueller line-Witters and Zobrest-makes apparently more plausi-
ble the Court's argument that the Mueller principles repudiate the Meek to Aguilar line.
425
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4. The On-Premises/Off-Premises Distinction
In its arguments against both the symbolic union and subsidization
theories, Agostini relies on a claim about Aguilar's limits. Aguilar, the Court
says in Agostini, "implied that providing [Title I] services off-campus is
entirely consistent with the Establishment Clause." '446 The Court here
renews an argument Justice O'Connor made in her Aguilar dissent. While
Aguilar itself considered only on-premises services, the argument goes,
Wolman, decided eight years earlier, upheld programs in which public
employees provided off-premises remedial instruction and guidance coun-
seling to parochial school children.447 O'Connor's opinion for the Court in
Agostini, like her Aguilar dissent, relies heavily on the apparent arbitrariness
of the distinction between on-premises and off-premises services. With
respect to symbolic union, the Court declares that there is no "perceptible
(let alone dispositive) difference in the degree of symbolic union between a
student receiving remedial instruction in a classroom on his sectarian
school's campus and one receiving instruction in a van parked just at the
school's curbside.""44  And with respect to the subsidization theory, the
Court maintains, the circumstance "most fatal" to this argument is "that it
applies with equal force when . . . services are provided off-campus."''
Justice Souter's Agostini dissent responds to this argument by noting,
first, that the issue of off-premises services was not presented in Aguilar (or
Agostini), and thus the question whether Aguilar's rationale should extend
that far remains open.45 Further, Souter argues, "if a line is to be drawn
short of barring all state aid to religious schools for teaching standard
subjects," the on-premises/off-premises line is "sensible."45 ' When state
officials administer classes inside the religious school, Souter maintains, the
degree of symbolic union between church and state is greater than when
the state "keep[s] its distance." ' And finally, Souter contends with respect
to the subsidization point, a religious school is "arguably less likely" to rely
on programs like Title I to supplant its existing courses when the courses
446. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2013; see also id. at 2012, 2015.
447. See id. at 2008 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977)); see also Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
448. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012.
449. Id. at 2013.
450. See id. at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
451. Id.
452. Id.
426 46 UCLA LAw REVIEW 343 (1998)
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must be offered off-premises--although Souter's reasoning here is not
entirely clear.453
Justice Souter is right that teaching Title I courses off-premises will
diminish the degree of perceptible union, and he may be right that religious
schools are more likely to turn over instruction in basic subjects when they
can do so conveniently, through on-premises instruction. Whether these
differences in degree should make a constitutional difference, however, is
not exactly obvious. Particularly with respect to subsidization, the distinc-
tion between on-premises and off-premises instruction is difficult to defend:
Either way, the government, by covering instruction in basic secular
subjects, would "make it easier for [religious schools] to... concentrate
their resources on their religious objectives." '454
The more pertinent reply to Agostini's suggestion that the distinction is
arbitrary is Souter's first observation-off-premises instruction was not at
issue in Aguilar, and thus it was not at issue in Agostini either. Given the
Rule 60(b)(5) context, the question the Court must answer in Agostini is
whether the Court's cases post-Aguilar have undermined the distinction
between on-premises and off-premises instruction, not whether the distinc-
tion, from the Court's present perspective in Agostini, makes sense. The
Court, however, does not even attempt to argue that either Witters or
Zobrest undermines the distinction between on-premises and off-premises
instruction.
Further, even if the distinction is arbitrary, the Court in Aguilar was
not clearly committed to that distinction. Agostini acknowledges this point
at least implicitly. ' And thus even if Aguilar, to avoid arbitrariness, must
be either expanded or contracted, that insight does not tell us the direction
453. See id. Justice Souter writes:
The off-premises teaching is arguably less likely to open the door to relieving religious
schools of their responsibilities for secular subjects simply because these schools are less
likely (and presumably legally unable) to dispense with those subjects from their cur-
riculums or to make patently significant cut-backs in basic teaching within the schools to
offset the outside instruction; if the aid is delivered outside of the schools, it is less likely
to supplant some of what would otherwise go on inside them and to subsidize what
remains.
Id. I read this passage to suggest that the inconvenience and inefficiency of teaching basic courses
off-premises would discourage the school from turning those courses over to public employees.
454. Id.
455. See id. at 2012 (opinion of the Court) ("Justice Souter does not disavow the notion,
uniformly adopted by loi;er courts, that Title I services may be provided to sectarian school
students in off-campus locations"); id. at 2013 ("Aguilar implied that providing the services off-
campus is entirely consistent with the Establishment Clause"); id. at 2015 (stating that "no court
has held that Title I services cannot be offered off-campus," citing Aguilar as "limiting [its] holding
to on-premises services," and citing also three decisions from lower federal courts).
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in which the Court should proceed. Nor do Witters or Zobrest speak to the
question.
The Court's best argument that Aguilar was committed to a constitu-
tional distinction between on-premises and off-premises instruction is its
suggestion that Wolman decided that very point eight years before Aguilar.
Wolman, as the Court describes the case, upheld "programs employing pub-
lic employees to provide remedial instruction and guidance counseling to
nonpublic school children at sites away from the nonpublic school."4"6 But
whereas Justice O'Connor's dissent featured this argument, contending that
unless Wolman were overruled the Court was committed to the distinction
between on-premises and off-premises services,457 Agostini invokes this
aspect of Wolman only in passing, in a "cf." citation.4"' Agostini's caution in
relying on Wolman seems to me justified. Wolman did permit publicly
funded "remedial services" and guidance counseling for parochial-school
students, when offered off-premises, but the Court's opinion does not make
clear the precise nature of those services. The Court stated its belief that
"the programs are not intended to influence the classroom activities in the
nonpublic schools."4"9 While "involvement with the day-to-day curriculum
of the parochial school would be impermissible," and while "grave con-
stitutional questions" would arise if "remedial service teachers" were to
"plan courses of study for use in the classroom," the Court did not
understand the programs it reviewed to be connected with the ongoing
operations of the religious school." These programs did not, therefore,
threaten to subsidize sectarian schools by "taking over a substantial portion
of [the schools'] responsibility for teaching secular subjects,""46 as in Ball and
Aguilar.
462
456. Id. at 2008.
457. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426 (1985) (O'Connor, I., dissenting), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
458. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2008.
459. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 246 n.13 (1977).
460. Id. But see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 87, 93 n.37 (1996) (stating that, under Wolman, the public school district in the
Kiryas Joel case could have offered "special education classes for students attending religious
schools," so long as the classes were held at a neutral site).
461. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton,
117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
462. Because Aguilar focused on entanglement rather than effects, it did not draw this sub-
sidization conclusion explicitly. Nonetheless, Aguilar noted the similarity between New York
City's Title I program and the programs invalidated in Ball. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409. And in
rejecting the argument that New York City's monitoring system distinguished Aguilar from Ball,
the Court stated that "at best" the system of monitoring would prevent direct religious
indoctrination-not, presumably, subsidization. See id.
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Thus, whether or not the distinction between on-premises and off-
premises instruction should be considered constitutionally significant, the
Court was not clearly committed to it pre-Aguilar. Neither Ball nor Aguilar
addressed the issue of off-premises instruction, nor did any post-Aguilar case
establish that the distinction between on-premises and off-premises
instruction is arbitrary. Agostini's conclusion that the distinction is arbi-
trary, then, is its own contribution, not a reflection of law already in place
pre-Agostini. In the Rule 60(b)(5) context, therefore, the Court cannot rely
on this "arbitrariness" argument to unsettle the decisions in Ball and
Aguilar.
5. Entanglement
The Court's entanglement conclusion depends heavily on its reading
of the indoctrination issue. If, as the Court maintains, Title I teachers pre-
sent no significant risk of engaging in religious indoctrination, then no
intrusive system of monitoring would be constitutionally required. The
Court's argument against Aguilar's entanglement theory, then, is no stronger
than its argument against Ball's "state-sponsored indoctrination" theory. And
for reasons expressed above, the Court fails to displace the latter theory.63
This is not to deny the accuracy of Agostini's charge that Aguilar's
indoctrination and entanglement theories might merit revision. Aguilar
doubtless does exaggerate the risk that publicly employed teachers, when
teaching secular subjects in various schools whose religious affiliations the
teachers generally do not share, will depart from their instructions and
launch into religious indoctrination."6 And as for the entanglement theory,
even Justice Souter's dissent concedes his "reservation" about Aguilar's
"emphasis on the excessive entanglement produced by monitoring religious
instructional content. 4 65 But in the context of a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for
relief from Aguilar's judgment, the Court was required to find a change in
the law in post-Aguilar cases, not to effect legal change through the Agostini
decision itself. And in that task, the Court failed.
6. Significance of the Court's Misuse of Precedent
Suppose I am right that the Court mischaracterized its own precedent
in order to reach a particular result in Agostini. The objection might be: so
463. See supra Part 11.A. 1.
464. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Lupu, supra note
203, at 244; Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 32, at 1007.
465. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2020 (1997).
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what? What can be considered so unusual about an opinion in which the
Court pretends, without adequate justification, that its present decision is
compelled by past precedent? That the Court issues such opinions is not
exactly fresh news.466 While it might be worth noting that the Court was
not, contrary to its claims, compelled by precedent to reach its present
result, this criticism would seem to amount only to the familiar call for
greater candor."7 The Court, on this well-worn story, should own up to the
fact that its present decision makes new law and is not compelled by past
decisions, and it should explain the theory that adequately justifies its pres-
ent decision.
Part of the argument against Agostini is indeed the argument for greater
candor. The Court does not take responsibility for its decision to change
the law in Agostini, and it is incorrect to attribute that change to past
decisions. The Court, also, has failed to provide a theory, independent of
precedent, that justifies the Agostini result. But Agostini is not just a garden-
variety case of the Court's disingenuous manipulation of precedent. In
standard cases, the Court's result could be justified by an independent the-
ory that it could have provided but instead left only implicit. That is not so
in Agostini. In selecting Agostini as the case in which to overrule Ball and
Aguilar, and to revise Establishment Clause law, the Court forfeited the
right to rely on a theory of the Establishment Clause that is independent of
the Court's post-Aguilar decisions. Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) context requires
the Court to locate a change in Establishment Clause law in its own post-
466. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
467. On the academic demand for judicial candor, see, for example, David L. Shapiro, In
Defense of Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).
Since they first began publication, American law reviews have seen the criticism of judi-
cial opinions as a major part of their mission. A typical law review note, or even a lead-
ing article, will address an important judicial decision, or series of decisions, in an effort
to show that the court has misconceived the problem, the solution, or both. Implicit in
the analysis is a hint that whoever wrote the opinion was too inept, or perhaps too devi-
ous, to reveal what was really at stake.
Id. at 731. This is not to say that legal scholars always have understood the same thing by judicial
candor, nor is it to deny that some scholars have questioned whether judges always must be can-
did. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307,
1316-21 (1995) (discussing different conceptions of judicial candor defended in the academic
literature); id. at 1310 ("IJludges-especially life-tenured appellate judges, such as those sitting on
the U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals-may regularly forgo candor under the principles
of logic and prudence and still retain their political legitimacy and institutional integrity."); cf.
Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) (distinguishing between candor and
"introspection" or self-consciousness and arguing that more self-conscious judicial decision mak-
ing would not necessarily be better judicial decision making).
As explained in text below, however, my argument is not simply that the Court's opinion did
not disclose its true grounds of decision, but also that its choice of Agostini as a law-transforming
vehicle made adequate justification of its decision impossible, even post hoc.
46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 343 (1998)430
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Aguilar precedents, not in a theory that was never adopted in those
precedents. The Court's misreading of precedent, therefore, cannot be
made good by specifying post hoc a constitutional theory, implicitly presup-
posed but not articulated in the Court's opinion, that would justify the
Agostini result.
The Court's mistake in Agostini, then, is more than just lack of candor
or a disingenuous manipulation of precedent. It amounts, instead, to a
more general error-the Court's failure to manage properly the process of
legal change. Even assuming that some theory of the Establishment Clause
properly would justify the transformation initiated in Agostini, the Court
was required not just to provide such a theory, but to select a case in which
such a theory permissibly could be offered. The Court's failure to do so
makes more irresistible the inference that the Court has not merely written
an unconvincing opinion, but embarked upon a more fundamentally ille-
gitimate enterprise.
Doubtless one reason the Court settled on Agostini as its overruling
vehicle was its difficulty in finding other suitable cases that presented the
Aguilar issue. The Court does not refer directly to this difficulty in its
Agostini opinion,468 but the arguments presented to the Court made the
problem clear. According to the merits brief filed on behalf of the group of
parents who challenged Aguilar:
[TIhere is [no] way for these parties, or any others, to seek Aguilar's
overruling in any other case that has arisen in its aftermath. There
have been a series of lawsuits filed across the country in which plain-
tiffs have attempted to extend Aguilar by arguing that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits the alternative arrangements that have been
implemented in its wake. These challenges have been rejected by
[various lower courts]. Yet in none of these cases have pro-Aguilar
plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari in this Court. The clear signals of
Aguilar's impending demise have produced a situation in which cases
468. Justice Ginsburg's dissent suggests that other "vehicles" for reconsidering Aguilar were
already "in motion." Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court responds,
not by denying that other cases that might present the Aguilar issue were available, but by stating:
"[Wie see no reason to wait for a 'better vehicle' in which to evaluate the impact of subsequent
cases on Aguilar's continued vitality." Id. at 2018 (opinion of the Court). According to the
Court, the Agostini decision neither "undermines 'integrity in the interpretation of procedural
rules' [nior signals any departure from the 'responsive, non-agenda-setting character of this
Court."' Id. (quoting id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Further, the Court says, delay in
reaching the issue would compound the injustices Aguilar visited on the New York City schools
and their students. Id. at 2018-19.
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that might present an opportunity to overrule Aguilar are being stra-
tegically withheld from the Court's consideration."'
But even if we assume that plaintiffs' attorneys had a stranglehold on
Title I cases pending at the time the Court considered Agostini, it does not
follow that no other case would present the Aguilar issue. The government
conceded that "a school district other than New York" could request fund-
ing for Title I services that would be offered on the premises of religious
schools, and then contest the decision by the secretary of education to deny
funding.47 While, as the government points out, "all lower courts in the
Nation would be obligated to follow Aguilar"47' in this action, still, when
the case reached the Supreme Court it would not involve Agostini's Rule
60(b)(5) complications. The Court, then, would have been free to present
all the arguments against Aguilar, not just the ones it can torture out of the
Witters and Zobrest opinions.
Similarly, the question whether Aguilar should be overruled might
arise from a challenge to a state school-aid program. The government's
Agostini brief comes close to conceding this point," but then argues that
factual differences between Title I and a state scheme might preclude the
Court from reaching the Aguilar issue.7 Both Aguilar and Agostini demon-
strate that this argument is unpersuasive. In Aguilar, the Court treated
Grand Rapids's Community Education and Shared Time programs as essen-
tially similar to New York City's Title I program, differing only in the two
programs' respective degrees of monitoring.474 The Court therefore held,
without further analysis, that Title I failed Ball's effects test, with the possi-
469. Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini et al. at 44-45, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553)
(footnote omitted). The Government's brief makes a similar argument:
It is doubtful whether, absent the avenue for relief under Rule 60(b) that petitioners have
invoked, this Court would ever be presented with a suitable vehicle for reconsideration of
Aguilar.... [Pirivate plaintiffs have challenged the provision of Title I services to religious
school students even after Aguilar as inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, but those
contentions have been uniformly rejected in the lower courts. The losing plaintiffs have
not sought this Court's review, and, because the school districts and the Secretary
prevailed in those cases, there has been no opportunity to request this Court to
reconsider Aguilar.
Brief for the Secretary of Education at 44, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553).
470. Brief for the Secretary of Education at 45, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553). The gov-
ernment adds, however, that because the secretary's position is that Aguilar should be overruled,
there might be difficulties in finding counsel to defend the pro-Aguilar position. See id. The
government does not explain why a group of intervenors or an amicus group would not take up
Aguilar's defense.
471. Id.
472. See id. at 44 n.17.
473. See id.
474. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
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ble exception that the Title I monitoring procedures might relevantly
decrease the risk that state officials would engage in religious
indoctrination.475 And in Agostini, while the Court was faced directly with
New York City's Title I program only, it did not hesitate to overrule the
portions of Ball dealing with Grand Rapids's Shared Time program."'
Establishment Clause cases may be more fact-specific than cases in many
other areas of law, but the Court never has treated each statute as wholly
incommensurable with every other.77
It seems at least likely, then, that the Court could have reached the
Aguilar issue in a case that would have allowed the Court to consider all the
reasons for Aguilar's overruling, not just those allegedly implicit in Witters
and Zobrest. Doubtless the Court was frustrated that the strategic behavior
of litigants prevented it from reconsidering Aguilar as quickly as it would
have liked. That, however, is a limit on the Court's power to manage legal
change that it ordinarily must tolerate.
B. Agostini's Paradox
Even if Agostini were correct in its reading of post-Aguilar precedent,
the Court would face one further difficulty: the problem of whether relief
under Rule 60(b)(5) is appropriate. One indication of this difficulty is the
solicitor general's concession at oral argument that he did "not know of
another instance in which Rule 60(b) has been used" to grant relief from
a judgment under circumstances similar to the Agostini case."' While lack
of precedent is not necessarily fatal to the theory, it does indicate the
extraordinary nature of the Agostini proceedings.
I have already identified one central problem in Agostini's Rule
60(b)(5) theory. The Court had said in Rodriguez de Quijas that "if a prece-
dent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court] should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' The district court complied
475. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
476. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997) ("We ... overrule Ball and
Aguilar to the extent those decisions are inconsistent with our current understanding of the
Establishment Clause.").
477. One final way in which the Court could have reconsidered Aguilar free from Rule
60(b)(5) problems: The New York City Board of Education could have obtained review by vio-
lating the Aguilar prohibition and contesting the Aguilar issue in a contempt proceeding.
478. Oral argument in Agostini at 11, cited in Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
479. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
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with this rule in Agostini, denying relief. And in reviewing this decision,"'
the Supreme Court confirmed that the district court had ruled correctly."'
Yet it reversed the trial court's decision as an abuse of discretion. And how
can a legally correct decision be an abuse of discretion? This difficulty is
one side of Agostini's paradox." '
The other side of the paradox appears when one considers what the
Court would have done if the district court had decided Agostini the other
way-accepting the theory the Court later announced in Agostini, and
deciding that Aguilar is no longer good law. Under Rodriguez de Quijas, the
Court would have denounced the district court's illegal usurpation of
Supreme Court prerogative. Nonetheless, because the district court and
Supreme Court would have shared the same Establishment Clause theory,
the Court doubtless would have affirmed the district court's judgment. But
how could a legally incorrect decision be affirmed as a proper exercise of
discretion? This difficulty is the other side of Agostini's paradox.
Agostini tries to escape the paradox by denying it, suggesting that the
Court has done nothing other than apply standard principles in granting
Rule 60(b)(5) relief. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court
observes, "an exercise of discretion cannot be permitted to stand if... it rests
upon a legal principle that can no longer be sustained." '483 That, the Court
implies, is the case in Agostini. Further, Agostini maintains, the Court's
ordinary practice is to "apply the rule of law we announce in a case to the
parties before us," even if, as in Agostini, the Court is overruling a case on
which the district court properly relied."5' In this connection the Court
invokes Adarand Constructors v. Pena,48 in which the lower courts properly
relied on a precedent that the Court proceeded to overrule. In Adarand,
Agostini notes, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, even
480. Technically, of course, the Court was reviewing the Second Circuit's unpublished order
affirming "substantially for the reasons stated" by the district court. See Felton v. United States
Dep't of Educ., Nos. 96-6160, 96-6180, 96-6181, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22981, at *2 (2d Cir.
August 30, 1996).
481. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017 (stating that the trial court was "correct to recognize that
the motion had to be denied unless and until this Court reinterpreted the binding precedent").
482. Justice Ginsburg's dissent comes to a similar conclusion. Because "the district court
made no legal error in determining that Aguilar had not been overruled," she writes, and because
the Court's "appellate role here is limited to reviewing that determination," the Court can grant
no relief under Rule 60(b)(5). Id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg focuses,
however, not so much on the paradox the Court's decision engenders as on the improper purpose
to which the Court "bends" Rule 60(b)(5). In her view, the Court converts a rule that governs
district court proceedings into a mechanism allowing "an 'anytime' rehearing" in the Supreme
Court, at least "in this case." Id.
483. Id. at 2018 (opinion of the Court).
484. Id. at 2017 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485).
485. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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though those courts were correct to rely on the precedent that the Supreme
Court subsequently overruled." 6
The Court's general observation that legal error is an abuse of discre-
tion does not address Agostini's paradox. The standard situation in which
the Court applies this general rule is one in which the lower court has com-
mitted an ordinary legal error."7 In this case of ordinary legal error, reversal
creates no paradox: The lower court decided the case incorrectly, and
accordingly its decision must be reversed. This standard case, however, is
different from the Agostini situation, in which the lower court has ruled
correctly, not incorrectly, and the Court nevertheless reverses. If Agostini is
to be defended, then, it must be with a principle more particular than the
general rule that legal error is an abuse of discretion.
More to the point is the Court's further and more particular argu-
ment-that when the Court overrules its own precedent, it will reverse a
lower court's decision that properly relied on the overruled precedent. In
Adarand, to take the Court's example, the decision below was legally correct
when rendered, and yet the Court nonetheless reversed. Agostini, the Court
suggests, follows the same pattern. Cases like Adarand, then, seem to sup-
port the Court's claim that its action in Agostini was not extraordinary.
The other side of the paradox, I said, is a case in which the Court, in
overruling, affirms a legally incorrect decision. Here the Court could men-
tion Rodriguez de Quijas, the case from which the Court takes its rule that
lower courts must follow directly controlling Supreme Court precedents,
even if those precedents seem to be undermined by later Supreme Court
pronouncements. In Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit
decision that had declared a Supreme Court precedent, Wilko v. Swan,4s
"obsolescen[t]" in light of more recent Court authority.489 Wilko, not yet
overruled by the Supreme Court, spoke directly to the specific issue that the
Fifth Circuit considered, while the more recent precedent on which the
Fifth Circuit based its "obsolescence" conclusion concerned only analogous
situations.49 The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that Wilko
486. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
487. This situation is the one envisioned in the case the Court cites for support. See id. at
2018 ('A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous
view of the law."' (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990))).
488. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
489. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th
Cir. 1988).
490. Wilko concerned the arbitrability of claims arising under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, whereas the more recent Supreme Court precedent addressed the arbitrability of
claims arising under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The relevant issue in
Rodriguez de Quijas was the arbitrability of the former kind of claim. See id. at 1296-97. The Fifth
Circuit noted the similarities between the two kinds of claims. See id. at 1299.
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should be overruled, and the Court in fact did overrule that case." On
that basis, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment. But at the same
time, the Court stated that the Fifth Circuit had no authority to do anything
other than follow Wilko, the directly controlling and not-yet-overruled
Supreme Court precedent.92 Thus in Rodriguez de Quijas, the Supreme Court,
in overruling, affirmed a decision it deemed legally incorrect. 9'
This strategy of escape from Agostini's paradox does have the benefit of
making Agostini appear to be routine rather than unprecedented. Yet, as an
initial matter, it does not so much dispel the paradox as deepen it, locating
the paradox in the ordinary case, and the very logic, of overruling. This
strategy, then, is not an appealing way of justifying Agostini's decision to
overrule.
Moreover, Adarand and Rodriguez de Quijas are not in fact on the same
footing with Agostini with respect to the paradox I have identified. As I will
suggest, the paradox is dispelled easily enough in considering Adarand and
Rodriguez de Quijas. The paradox, however, is more intractable in Agostini-
because of Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) context, not present in Adarand or
Rodriguez de Quijas.
Consider, first, the Adarand side of the paradox, in which the lower
courts correctly rely on a precedent the Supreme Court proceeds to over-
rule. In Adarand, the lower courts properly refused to apply strict scrutiny
to a federal agency's affirmative action plan, following the Court's earlier
decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. ' The Supreme Court's deci-
sion to overrule Metro Broadcasting, however, changed the relevant law.
Thus, while the lower courts' decisions were correct at the time they were
rendered, they were incorrect by the time the Court had changed the law
491. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
492. See id. at 484; see also id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court of Appeals
refused to follow Wilko v. Swan.... a controlling precedent of this Court. As the majority cor-
rectly acknowledges,... the Court of Appeals therefore engaged in an indefensible brand of
judicial activism." (citations omitted)).
493. Jack Beermann has pointed out to me that the Rodriguez de Quijas principle is dictum,
in the sense that it is unnecessary to the Court's judgment. On either side of the paradox, the
Court will affirm or reverse the lower court's judgment based on the Court's view of the substan-
tive legal issue, not the lower court's obedience to the Rodriguez de Quijas principle. In fact, the
point of the paradox is that the Court will affirm when the lower court disobeys the Rodriguez de
Quijas stricture, and reverse when the lower court obeys. Still, as Justice Scalia has noted:
Let us not quibble about the theoretical scope of a "holding"; the modern reality, at least,
is that when the Supreme Court of the federal system, or of one of the state systems,
decides a case, not merely the outcome of that decision, but the mode of analysis that it
applies will thereafter be followed by the lower courts within that system, and even by
that supreme court itself.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989).
494. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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and overruled the precedent on which the lower courts had relied. The
Court, therefore, properly reversed. The apparent paradox disappears when
we distinguish between the law as it was at the time the district court acted
and the law as it was when the Supreme Court reached its decision. At the
latter time, the lower courts' decisions, though correct when rendered,
"rest[ed]," as Agostini relates, "upon a legal principle that [could] no longer
be sustained" '495 by the time the Court acted.
Or consider Rodriguez de Quijas, the case I have taken to exemplify the
other side of Agostini's paradox. In that case, the Fifth Circuit refused to
follow Wilko, the directly controlling Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth
Circuit's decision was therefore legally incorrect when rendered, because
Wilko was then still the governing law. But when the Court overruled Wilko
and changed the law, the Fifth Circuit's judgment-though not its method of
reaching that judgment-became legally correct. On that basis, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment. Here, too, the paradox dissolves when we
distinguish between the times at which the lower court and Supreme Court
acted, and when we consider that the Supreme Court changed the law with
its overruling decision.
This strategy for escaping the paradox, however, is not available in
Agostini. The reason is Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) context. In order to grant
relief under that rule, Agostini must profess merely to recognize prior
changes in the law, not itself to effect legal change. Thus while Agostini,
like Adarand, overrules precedents on which the lower courts properly
relied, its theory is that the law had changed no later than June 1993, when
Zobrest was decided. And that means that in Agostini, unlike Adarand, the
relevant legal change already had occurred before the lower courts' deci-
sions in 1996. Thus, no change in the law post-dating the lower courts'
decisions is available to extricate Agostini from the paradox. The Court
needs some other theory to explain how the paradox may be resolved.
The theory the Court would have to articulate is the following.
Witters and Zobrest, particularly Zobrest, changed the law post-Aguilar to
establish the principles Agostini calls "current law." '496 These principles were
thus in place from the date of Zobrest forward-from June 18, 1993 to the
present. The Court's confirmation of those principles in Agostini does not,
on Agostini's story, work a change in the law, and in that sense Agostini is
unlike Adarand and Rodriguez de Quijas. But still, the Court could argue,
from the perspective of those principles, the lower courts' adherence to Ball
495. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2018 (1997).
496. Id. at 2012; see also id. at 2016 (referring to the "criteria we currently use to evaluate
whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion"); id. at 2017 (referring to "our cur-
rent understanding of the Establishment Clause").
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and Aguilar, although justified at the time the courts acted, "rest[ed]
upon.., legal principle[s] that can no longer be sustained." '497 Accordingly,
the Court reverses the lower courts' decisions as inconsistent with current
law, just as the Court determined in Adarand and Rodriguez de Quijas. And
accordingly, the paradox disappears through a distinction between the dif-
ferent rules of law that governed at the relevant times of decision.
This solution to the paradox, however, exacts a price. Although from
the point of view of the Supreme Court, the "current law" announced
in Zobrest was in place from June 1993 on, it was in place only for the
Supreme Court's consideration. The Court, under Rodriguez de Quijas, for-
bids the lower courts from declaring that Aguilar has been overruled until
the Supreme Court has said so expressly. Thus, for district courts and courts
of appeals, the governing law was not the law Agostini deems "current," but
still Aguilar-from the day Aguilar was decided until the Court's June 1997
decision in Agostini."
The effect of this theory is an extraordinary doubling of the law. For
the four years between Zobrest and Agostini, two distinct bodies of valid,
binding law coexisted-one in the lower federal courts (and presumably
state courts as well), and a contrary body of law in the Supreme Court.
During this four-year period, the principles confirmed in Agostini were the
law from the perspective of the Supreme Court. But at the same time,
Aguilar was the law in every other court. From the perspective of the
Supreme Court, Witters and Zobrest worked significant changes on the law
and bound the Supreme Court to confirm that Ball and Aguilar were no
longer good law. From the perspective of the lower courts, however, Witters
and Zobrest worked no such changes, and their binding force could not
overcome the force of Ball and Aguilar. Only the Court's decision in
Agostini, the Court's theory would have it, reconciled these two contradic-
tory bodies of law that held sway at the different levels of the judicial
hierarchy.
And for that four-year period between Zobrest and Agostini, what prin-
ciples governed those subject to the law-school boards, parent groups,
teachers, and school children? The Court might like to answer that even
before its Agostini decision, its law was supreme. From the point of view of
the parties, however, Ball and Aguilar were, at the same time, still binding
law, unless and until the Court was willing, in its discretionary exercise of
certiorari jurisdiction, to take the Agostini case and render the decision it
eventually rendered. If the Court, for whatever reasons, had denied certio-
rari or otherwise denied relief in Agostini, the parties would have remained
497. Id. at 2018.
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subject to the principles of Ball and Aguilar, even if those cases were no
longer good law from the perspective of the Supreme Court. Only the
Supreme Court itself-not other courts, and not the parties-could see the
Agostini theory as binding law before its announcement in Agostini.
Agostini thus resolves the paradox of reversing a legally correct deci-
sion, but only by transposing the paradox into a contradiction between two
bodies of simultaneously valid, but opposed, legal doctrine. In so doing, the
Court seems to join hands with the critical legal studies movement."8
Further, the Court's attempted resolution of the paradox presents a
normatively unattractive conception of adjudication and constitutional
change. In Agostini, the Court professes not to change the law but merely
to apply it. The Court locates the change in Establishment Clause law in
two prior decisions that, for their part, say nothing about changing the law.
The Court, then, changes the law, but in none of its opinions does the Court
ever assume present responsibility for the change. In Agostini, we are told, the
change was the work of past Courts. In Zobrest and Witters, the putative
law-changing decisions, we see not even a hint that the Court saw itself as
presently changing the law, and accordingly, we encounter no explanation
of the reasons for change. And in Kiryas Joel-the only pre-Agostini
decision that addressed the question whether Ball and Aguilar should be
overruled-the change is projected into the future for some later Court to
effect.49 Kiryas Joel's call to future Courts is ironic after Agostini because on
the Court's theory, the law already had changed with Zobrest-before Kiryas
Joel was decided. Thus even the Supreme Court seemed unable to see that
the law had changed before Agostini.
The inevitable consequence of the Court's strategy is its failure to pro-
vide adequate reasons for transforming Establishment Clause effects doc-
trine. Witters and Zobrest, as decisions that still move in Ball's orbit, suggest
no such reasons. And Agostini, which attributes the change in the law to
decisions already made in Witters and Zobrest, can offer only the reasons
explicit or implicit in those cases. As a result, the Agostini opinion is a kind
of ventriloquism, in which the Court attempts to project reasons for
changing the law into the silent Witters and Zobrest opinions. The more
justification Agostini purports to find in Witters and Zobrest, the less persua-
sive its reading of those cases becomes. And in that same measure, the
Agostini opinion becomes less convincing. The Court in Agostini must
either develop an independent theory of the Establishment Clause-and in
498. Cf. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 258 (1987) ("[lIt is
impossible to imagine any central or local legal institutions advocating a coherent, noncontradic-
tory body of basic rules." (emphasis omitted)).
499. See supra notes 266-270 and accompanying text (describing the Kiryas Joel opinions).
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that event, it would become evident that Agostini itself has changed the
law-or the Court must attribute, unpersuasively, such a theory to Witters
and Zobrest. Neither strategy can succeed.
Finally, and importantly, the Court's selection of Agostini as its Aguilar-
overruling vehicle sharply limited the available options in the Court's law-
reform strategy. If the Court had chosen to reconsider Aguilar in a case
outside the Rule 60(b)(5) context, it could have decided whether to retain
the Lemon test, or instead to overrule it and adopt one of the other Estab-
lishment Clause standards that the members of the Agostini majority had
proposed. But the cases on which Agostini relies to establish the principles
of "current law"-Witters and Zobrest-are modest decisions that operate
within the Lemon framework."°  The consequence of this strategy is to
freeze, as "current law," a version of the Lemon test that all members of the
Agostini majority had criticized in earlier cases."' Even if the Agostini
majority could not reach agreement on a particular Lemon-replacing test,
still, the reaffirmation of even a revised version of Lemon had to be difficult
for those five Justices to swallow-difficult, particularly, for Justice Scalia,
who in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas had
vowed never again to join an opinion that applied the Lemon test."2 And it
leaves readers wondering what the fuss about Lemon was, if that case's
sharpest critics were willing, without a word of protest, to enshrine Lemon,
even a revised version of Lemon, in "current law." To be sure, the Court
might decide in the next case that Agostini's revised effects criteria, or its
purpose inquiry, or both, are no longer "current." But that determination
would require the Court to overrule Agostini. The more direct course to
500. Witters applies the three-part Lemon test expressly. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-89 (1986). And Zobrest, as argued above, works within
the categories established for the Lemon test-even if the Court cites Lemon itself only sparingly.
See generally Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
501. See supra notes 311-313 and accompanying text. The effects standard the Court
adopts, see supra notes 350-357 and accompanying text, is more lenient than the one applied in
Ball and Aguilar. One significant difference is that the test modified the "risk analysis" of Ball and
Aguilar-that is, the Court's prior willingness to invalidate a program based upon a "substantial
risk," not necessarily documented in the record, that the program will be turned toward religious
indoctrination. (I borrow the term "risk analysis" from Greene, supra note 199, at 21.)
502. "1 will decline to apply Lemon-whether it validates or invalidates the government
action in question." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
399-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). While Agostini modifies the Lemon effects criteria,
it retains the purpose and effect inquiries, asking under both, as in Lemon itself, whether
government has advanced or inhibited religion. See supra notes 311-312 and accompanying text.
And the purpose part of the test-which Scalia rejected in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)-remains, Agostini says, "largely unchanged." Agostini, 117
S. Ct. at 2010.
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overruling or modifying Lemon would have been for the Court to have
passed on Agostini and to face the issue in a less problematic case.
All of the difficulties I have identified in the Agostini opinion arise, at
least in part, from the Court's decision to reconsider Aguilar within the Rule
60(b)(5) context. That context forces the Court-if it is to grant relief-to
misread Ball and Aguilar, overread Witters and Zobrest, posit coexisting but
contrary bodies of law post-Zobrest and pre-Aguilar, wrongly disavow
responsibility for changing the law,. and fail to present adequate reasons for
the change in the law Agostini effects. The better course would have been
for the Court to wait for another case, as Justice Ginsburg's dissent recom-
mends 03'-a case that did not involve the complications that the Rule
60(b)(5) context creates. In such a case, the Court could have decided, on
the basis of an independent and fully developed theory of the Establishment
Clause, whether to overrule Ball and Aguilar.
The Court, however, did not follow this better course. But in what
follows, I suggest that the Court could have avoided at least some of
Agostini's difficulties, even within that case's Rule 60(b)(5) context.
C. Alternate Routes
One weakness in the Court's Agostini opinion is the implausibility of
its argument that Witters and Zobrest changed the law. The Court, it seems,
might have been able to avoid this difficulty by declaring, instead, that the
various Aguilar-repudiating statements in Kiryas Joel changed the law, or at
least reflected a change in the law. Kiryas Joel, after all, was the decision
prompting the filing of the Rule 60(b)(5) motion in the first place, and the
moving parties relied most heavily on that decision in their arguments to
the district court."' Further, Kiryas Joel was the only pre-Agostini case in
which five Justices criticized Aguilar and-with differing degrees of direct-
ness-called for Aguilar's overruling. 5 While, as Agostini notes, the issue of
Aguilar's overruling was not directly presented in Kiryas Joel, still, the Jus-
tices' attention was focused on Aguilar and its consequences: the legislative
scheme declared unconstitutional originated as a response to Aguilar. Fur-
ther, if the Court had relied on Kiryas Joel to find the pre-Agostini change in
the law, Agostini's paradox would have disappeared. On that theory, the
law would have changed in 1994, before the lower courts' 1996 decisions,
and it would have changed in all courts. Accordingly, the lower courts
503. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). On the issue whether the
Court could have encountered such a case, see supra notes 314-323 and accompanying text.
504. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 266-270 and accompanying text.
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would have erred in ignoring Kiryas Joel, and their decisions properly could
have been reversed.
But although the Court is willing enough to find a repudiation of
Aguilar through creative readings of other post-Aguilar precedents, elevating
the Kiryas Joel statements to the status of a law-changing decision appar-
ently would be simply too much. None of the anti-Aguilar statements
appeared in an opinion for the Court, and finding them to change the law
would be too frontal an assault on the fundamental distinction between
holding and dictum. Piecing together the various separate Kiryas Joel
opinions to find a change in law arguably would treat the Court as an
assemblage of individual Justices whose noses are to be counted, rather than
a collective body that renders collective judgments5s° Nose-counting, or at
least vote-counting, is in some ways part of normal judicial practice: When
the Court is not unanimous, it determines which view has prevailed by
counting votes.57 But still, it may be more objectionable to find the Court
to have overruled one of its own precedents by aggregating opinions, none
of which was an opinion for the Court. And further, relying on Kiryas Joel
as the law-changing decision seems simply inconsistent with the language
of the opinions filed in that case-none of which suggest that any Justice
saw Kiryas Joel as itself changing Establishment Clause law in a Way that
could help the New York City Board of Education.0s
For some or all of these reasons, even the lawyers challenging Aguilar
in Agostini did not argue to the Supreme Court that Kiryas Joel had changed
the law. Kiryas Joel had done its work for them earlier, operating as a signal
to the lower courts that the Supreme Court would be receptive to a peti-
tion calling for Aguilar's overruling. 5' The arguments presented to the
Court referred to Kiryas Joel as the Court's "invitation" to seek Aguilar's
506. It would be ironic confirmation of the dictum often attributed to Justice Brennan: "Five
votes can do anything around here." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT DECIDES CASES 6 (1996); cf. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 651, 682-84 (1995) (describing the idea that a multimember court is the sum of its individ-
ual members as inconsistent with the rule of law).
507. And in cases without a majority opinion, one counts the number of Justices who sub-
scribed to particular results. In cases in which the Court is especially splintered (the 4-1-4 split is
the classic scenario), different methods of aggregation can produce different interpretations of the
case's holding. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1993); David Post & Steven C. Salop,
Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 750-58
(1992).
508. See supra notes 266-270 and accompanying text (discussing the separate opinions filed
in Kiryas Joel).
509. This strategy seems to have worked. The district court's opinion describes the Supreme
Court's interest in overruling Aguilar and goes on to present the Agostini case as the ideal vehicle
for such a decision-thus giving the case "special handling" treatment on its way up to the Court.
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overruling," ' not as a decision that, in effect, already had accomplished that
result."' They suggested, further, that having invited the petition, the
Court could not now withdraw that invitation in Agostini, when, as the dis-
trict court had put it, there could "scarcely be a more appropriate vehicle" '
for overruling Aguilar."' But the primary focus of these arguments was the
contention that other post-Aguilar cases, particularly Witters and Zobrest,
had changed the law.
Another and better strategy the Court could have followed would have
been to eliminate, or at least to take a relaxed view of, the restrictions on
lower courts that Rodriguez de Quijas imposes. Under Rodriguez de Quijas,
lower courts must follow a Supreme Court precedent that "directly con-
trols," even if it is undermined by later authority."' The Supreme Court, on
this theory, has a peculiar interpretive privilege or, in the Court's term,
"prerogative." Only the Supreme Court, in the situations Rodriguez de
Quijas posits, may survey the entire body of Court precedent as a body of
510. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997
(1997) (No. 96-552) (stating that "five Members of the Court have expressly called for Aguilar's
overruling or invited its reconsideration" and citing Kiryas Joel); Brief for Petitioners Rachel
Agostini et al. at 3, Agoscini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553) (same); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12,
Agostini (No. 96-552) ("This petition is a direct response to the invitation of five Justices two
years ago in [Kiryas Joel]."); id. at 13 ("[A] majority of the Court has invited reconsideration of
Aguilar in an appropriate case."); Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini et al. at 14-15, Agostini
(Nos. 96-552 & 96-553) ("A majority of this Court... invited a request to reconsider Aguilar in a
proper case."); Reply Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini et al. at 4, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-
553) (stating that in Kiryas Joel, "a majority of the Members of this Court ... explicitly criticized
or questioned Aguilar and at least implicitly invited a request for its reconsideration").
511. See Reply Brief for the Secretary of Education at 2, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553)
("Aguilar has not been overruled, and ... Kiryas Joel itself was not a 'change in the law' warranting
a grant of relief from the injunction by the district court; the lower courts were obliged to deny
relief ... since they were bound ... by this Court's directly controlling precedent in Aguilar.");
Reply Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini et al. at 4, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553) ("Contrary
to respondents' contention, petitioners do not maintain that these individual expressions of
opinion [in Kiryas Joel] themselves constituted a change in law."); see also Brief for Petitioners
Chancellor and Board of Education of the City of New York at 24, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553)
(noting that in Kiryas Joel, "five members of the Court explicitly stated their wish to reconsider
Aguilar"); Brief for the Secretary of Education at 35, Agostini (Nos. 96-552, 96-553) (indicating
that "five Justices expressly criticized Aguilar as inconsistent with the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence").
512. Felton v. United States Dep't of Educ., No. 78-CV-1750 (E.D.N.Y May 20, 1996)
(unpublished memorandum and order), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at
15, Agostini (No. 96-552).
513. See Reply Brief for Petitioners Rachel Agostini et al. at 6-7, Agoscini (Nos. 96-552, 96-
553) ("It advances no institutional interest for the Court to issue decisions that undermine
Aguilar, for a majority of the Justices to invite reconsideration of the decision, and for the Court
then to turn a deaf ear to the affected parties who seek the reconsideration that has been
invited.").
514. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
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principle and determine whether later precedents have so undermined an
earlier precedent as to have changed the law. Lower courts, by contrast, are
bound by a rule of specificity or local priority,"' as well as one of hierarchy:
A command from above that is directly on point controls, whether or not
the Court's subsequent cases are best read as countermanding the earlier
order.
Rejecting or relaxing the Rodriguez de Quias principle still would have
left all the problems associated with Agostini's use of precedent. But at least
it would have allowed the Court to avoid the difficulties that Agostini's
paradox creates. Relaxing Rodriguez de Quijas's constraint would mean that
the lower courts could have engaged in the same process of interpretation
the Court undertook in Agostini-reading Aguilar against the body of more
recent cases, and recognizing (by accepting the Court's theory) that Witters
and Zobrest had changed the law. If the Court in Agostini had allowed the
lower courts this power, then the Court unproblematically could have
reversed, as erroneous, the lower courts' decisions to follow Aguilar rather
than the law-changing decisions in Witters and Zobrest. The Court would
have had no need to suppose that two contradictory bodies of law coexisted
between Zobrest and Agostini-Aguilar in the lower courts and post-Aguilar
law in the Supreme Court-and it would have escaped the paradox of
reversing a correct judgment.
Despite the benefits this course would have had for the Court's
Agostini opinion, the Court's decision to reject it is unsurprising. The Court
remains firmly committed to the strictures for lower-court interpretation
it laid down in Rodriguez de Quijas. Both the majority and the dissent in
that case stated that the lower court had erred in declaring a Supreme
Court precedent obsolescent. If anything, the dissent in that case was more
insistent on the point than the majority, describing the court of appeals as
having engaged in "an indefensible brand of judicial activism.""5 6  The
Court did not offer justifications for the principle it announced in Rodriguez
de Quijas. But a number of reasons for the Court's commitment to that
principle are imaginable.
Doubtless one reason is the fear that "rogue" district judges otherwise
might disregard a Supreme Court precedent simply because they, for what-
517ever reasons, find it incorrect or unattractive. This concern might be
515. On the notion of "local priority" in judicial interpretation, see RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 250-54 (1986).
516. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
517. The classic example, perhaps, is Judge William Brevard Hand's decision in Jaffree v.
Board of School Commissioners, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983), holding that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not apply to the states.
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good reason to oppose, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen's theory of
"underruling," under which lower courts should refuse to enforce Supreme
Court precedents that are, in the lower court's conscientious independent
judgment, "clearly outside the range of allowable judicial interpretation of
the Constitution." ' But relaxing Rodriguez de Quijas's strictures would not
necessarily give such free rein to lower courts. The proposal I am
considering is narrower in two respects than Paulsen's theory of "underrul-
ing." First, Rodriguez de Quijas itself deals with a sharply limited class of
cases-those in which later Supreme Court authority undermines, without
expressly overruling, an earlier and directly relevant precedent. Rodriguez
de Quijas does not concern the ordinary case, in which the Supreme Court
has issued a clear command, or at least has not issued later commands that
undermine, without expressly rescinding, an earlier and clearly binding
instruction. And under the modification of Rodriguez de Quijas I am sug-
gesting, the question for the district judge is not whether she, in an
independent exercise of her judgment, would agree with the Supreme
Court's directly controlling precedent, or even find it a permissible interpre-
tation of the law. The question would be only whether the Supreme Court
itself has so undermined an earlier precedent that the better reading is to see
that precedent as implicitly overruled by the Court's later decisions.
Presenting the question this way addresses a second possible defense of
Rodriguez de Quijas: that the interpretive principle announced in that case
follows necessarily from a distinction between superior and inferior courts.
The proposal I am considering-under which lower courts would have the
authority to determine whether the Court itself has overruled implicitly an
otherwise controlling precedent-is consistent with the idea that inferior
courts must follow the Supreme Court's instruction. In order to follow an
instruction, one must interpret it first. And it does not follow from the
nature of taking instruction, or the nature of interpretation, that the earlier
and more specific command should control, when later instructions coun-
termand it or make it senseless. In these cases, after all, to follow the more
specific command is at the same time to ignore the more recent instruc-
tions. Deciding that the Supreme Court's own cases implicitly have
518. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M.
Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 87 (1989) [hereinafter Paulsen, Accusing Justice]; see
also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors
Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 386 & n.3 (1994). Paulsen suggests that "the case for
'underruling' is especially strong where it is anticipated that the Supreme Court may be prepared
to reconsider a constitutional holding." Paulsen, Accusing Justice, supra, at 87. He notes, how-
ever, that the rationale of his proposal is not necessarily limited to such situations. See id. at 86
n.142.
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overruled an earlier precedent defers to, rather than defies, the Court's
authority.5t
Another reason behind Rodriguez de Quijas might be the Court's desire
to ensure that inferior tribunals decide cases by interpreting and following
the Court's decisions, rather than by predicting whether the Court, in some
future decision, will overrule one of its own precedents. The "predictive"
mode of lower-court decision making, it may be argued, is inconsistent with
the rule of law-at least when the predictions are based upon factors such as
changes in the Court's personnel, the Justices' extrajudicial statements, or
estimations of particular Justices' ideological views."' On this theory, lower
courts should refrain from predictive, "anticipatory overruling" of Supreme
Court precedents, "leaving to th[e] Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions. 52'
One response to this defense of Rodriguez de Quijas is to note that the
Court has not always disapproved of lower courts' anticipatory overruling,
even when it has been based on factors such as changes in the Court's per-
sonnel. The most famous example is the Court's celebrated West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette522 decision, invalidating a compulsory
flag-salute in public schools, and overruling the Court's contrary decision
just three years before in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.523 The Court's
Barnette opinion affirmed, without critical comment, a lower-court decision
that had refused to apply Gobitis, based in part on a correct prediction that
the two Justices who had joined the Court since Gobitis would cast deciding
519. On the question whether a general policy tolerating outright defiance of Supreme
Court authority could be justified, see Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior"
Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 851 (1993) ("It is diffi-
cult indeed to envision an institutional judiciary that allowed its underlings in effect to ignore the
decisions of those at the top.").
520. This is Michael Dorfs conclusion. See Dorf, supra note 506, at 655 (concluding that
"as a general matter, the prediction approach undermines the rule of law," notwithstanding the
existence of some "marginal benefits"); cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) (concluding
that a predictive approach by lower courts is justified in some cases). On the sources available to a
purely predictive approach, other than written judicial opinions, see Doff, supra note 506, at 663-
64 (mentioning the Justices' "non-judicial writings and speeches" and their "general ideological
commitments"). See also Caminker, supra, at 17-19 (mentioning dicta, "law review articles,
confirmation-hearing testimony, and public speeches," as well as "particular Justices' general
ideological commitments or proclivities"); cf. Dorf, supra note 506, at 652 (describing pro se
petitions filed in the Supreme Court, seeking rehearing of denial of certiorari, and invoking as the
required "intervening circumstance" Justice Thomas's ascension to the Court).
521. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.
522. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
523. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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votes to overrule.5" Decisions like Barnette make it difficult to see the pre-
dictive method of lower-court decision making, even when used for antici-
patory overruling, as necessarily inconsistent with the rule of law.
But in any event, the modification of Rodriguez de Quijas I am consid-
ering does not depend upon approval of predictive lower-court decision
making or anticipatory overruling. On the proposal I am considering, lower
courts need not predict what the Supreme Court will do, nor need they
"overrule" Supreme Court decisions anticipatorily. Instead, they need only
interpret and follow existing Court decisions-giving no dispositive prefer-
ence to the earlier precedent simply because of its local priority. This
method of interpretation will not take the same form as a purely predictive
method, nor will it necessarily produce the same results.
Commentators have recognized this distinction between predictive
anticipatory overruling and a lower court's recognition that the Supreme
Court itself has overruled implicitly one of its earlier decisions. Evan
Caminker, writing before Agostini, reads Rodriguez de Quijas only to
"admonish[] inferior courts not to engage in anticipatory overruling.""' But
a lower court's determination that "newer precedents implicitly overrule the
old," he recognizes, does not qualify as anticipatory overruling.26 Further,
Caminker argues, so far as the lower court reaches that conclusion by
"interpreting binding precedents," rather than by anticipating a future
Supreme Court decision to overrule, the court has not engaged in
predictive decision making.527 Michael Dorf, too, distinguishes between
524. The three-judge district court noted that "[o]f the seven justices now members of the
Supreme Court who participated in [Gobitis], four have given public expression to the view that it
is unsound .... " Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W. Va.
1942), aifd 319 U.S. at 624. What the district court did not say expressly is that "Justices
Rutledge and Jackson, new appointees to the Court, were widely thought to be uncommitted to
Gobitis as a result of their opinions in other cases." Levinson, supra note 519, at 851 n.29. This
consideration, though, seems implicit in the district court's calculations, which total only four
votes against Gobitis, but indicate that two new Justices would be voting. See Caminker, supra
note 520, at 2 (classifying the district court's decision in Barnette as an example of a decision
refusing to apply a Supreme Court precedent, based on a prediction the Supreme Court would
overrule); Doff, supra note 506, at 661-63 (same).
525. Caminker, supra note 520, at 20.
526. Id. at 20 n.73; see also id. at 20. Since Caminker wrote these words, Agostini has made
clear that the Court sees its "implicitly overrule[d]" precedents as covered by the Rodriguez de
Quijas principle, not as exceptions. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997). But
Caminker may be right that in Agostini the Court could have drawn the distinction he suggests by
interpreting Rodriguez de Quijas restrictively. See infra notes 555-556 and accompanying text.
527. See Caminker, supra note 520, at 5-7 (distinguishing between the precedent and proxy
(or, predictive) methods of inferior-court decision making); see also id. at 20 n.73 (noting that if
the court concludes from examination of superior-court precedent that later decisions have over-
ruled an earlier precedent, "the court can fairly be characterized as following the precedent
model").
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decisions in which lower courts base their refusal to enforce a Supreme
Court precedent on "predictions" of "individual Justices' views"-which
Doff disapproves as undermining the rule of law 32-and decisions in which
lower courts conclude, based on "conventional legal reasoning" concerning
"impersonal legal materials," that the Supreme Court already has overruled
its own precedent sub silentio. The "troubling" aspect of Rodriguez de
Quijas, Doff says, is that it conflates the two kinds of decision and disap-
proves of both.529 Caminker and Doff thus differently interpret both
Rodriguez de Quijas's scope and the legitimacy of lower courts' predictive
decision making. But they agree that concerns about anticipatory overrul-
ing and predictive decision making should not prevent lower courts from
determining that the Supreme Court itself already has overruled a prece-
dent implicitly.
The terms "overruling" and "underruling," sometimes used to include
any lower court decision that refuses to enforce a Supreme Court precedent,
obscure one further limitation on the present theory. A lower court's
determination that the Supreme Court has abandoned or implicitly over-
ruled an earlier precedent would not have the same legal impact as a similar
decision by the Supreme Court itself. The lower court's decision in such a
case would have no more authority than any other lower court decision-
that is, it would not bind higher courts in the same jurisdiction, nor would
it bind courts from other jurisdictions. Further, if the decision were rendered
by a federal district court, it would be subject to a contrary determination by a
court of appeals panel, and that decision itself would be subject to possible en
banc review. Similar checks on lower-court interpretation are in place in
the state courts. These layers of pre-Supreme Court review likely would
insulate the Court from most "rogue" decisions-decisions that are, in any
event, always possible, with or without Rodriguez de Quijas's teaching.53
And finally, of course, the Supreme Court would have in these matters the
last and decisive word. 3'
Speaking last and decisively, however, is apparently not enough for the
Court. Rodriguez de Quijas's insistence on the Court's special "prerogative"
may rest on three additional considerations. First, the Court may believe
528. See Dorf, supra note 506, at 655.
529. See id. at 676-77 n.87. As Dorf puts it, Rodriguez de Quijas "appears to confuse the
power to declare a precedent dead with the power to kill it." Id.
530. 1 would expect, though I cannot prove the point, that courts of appeals would be reluc-
tant to declare Supreme Court precedents implicitly overruled.
531. Those who speak of lower courts "overruling" and "underruling" the Supreme Court are
of course aware that the lower court's judgment has effects different from, and less far-reaching
than, a substantively similar judgment by the Supreme Court. The terms "overruling" and "under-
ruling," however, seem to me to efface these differences unnecessarily.
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that reasons of judicial economy require limits on the lower courts' interpre-
tive freedom. Second, the Court may believe that line-drawing problems
counsel against recognizing even a small category of cases in which lower
courts permissibly could refuse to enforce a Supreme Court precedent.
Third, the Court likely prefers to retain maximum control over the timing
of legal change and maximum control over its own docket. Allowing lower
courts the opportunity to force a decision whether to overrule a precedent
arguably would interfere with the Court's power to manage the process of
legal change.532
The judicial economy point is not wholly mistaken. Admittedly,
allowing lower courts to determine that a Supreme Court precedent is no
longer applicable might marginally increase the likelihood or scope of liti-
gation in some cases. The reasons why are as follows. Under Rodriguez de
Quijas, the only chance of ultimate victory for the party seeking an over-
ruling decision lies in the Supreme Court. This still would be true if
Rodriguez de Quijas's constraints were relaxed, because the losing party
likely would seek Supreme Court review, and the Court likely would grant
it, in most cases in which a federal court of appeals or state supreme court
refused to apply a Supreme Court precedent. But the party seeking an over-
ruling decision would have a better chance of getting Supreme Court
review, and perhaps ultimately victory, if the lower courts could force the
Court to take the case by declining to apply one of the Court's precedents.
This improved chance of success might make parties more likely to chal-
lenge embattled Supreme Court precedents. Some suits likely would be
filed that would not have been filed under Rodriguez de Quijas, and in some
cases that would have been filed anyway, the additional issue whether to
follow the Court's precedent would marginally burden the courts at each
level.
Still, given the relatively small number of cases in which one can
argue credibly that the Supreme Court implicitly has overruled its own
precedent, the total effect of this burden likely would be small. And it
would be at least partly counterbalanced by speedier Supreme Court clarifi-
cation of its own messy precedent. Considerations of judicial economy,
532. One might also suppose an additional argument-that the Rodriguez de Quijas rule is
justified because it prevents the injustice of delayed victory in cases in which the Supreme Court
reaffirms its embattled precedent. Whether or not this argument supports a general requirement
that lower courts follow Supreme Court precedent, see Caminker, supra note 1, at 843-45 (arguing
that there should be an additional "normative justification"), the argument is weaker here. If the
Supreme Court arguably has overruled a precedent implicitly, then the law as the Supreme Court
would apply it does not give the party relying on that precedent a clear entitlement to victory.
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then, while not nonexistent, do not seem to me powerful support for
Rodriguez de Quijas.
The Court might believe that judicial economy concerns are height-
ened by what I supposed as a second argument for Rodriguez de Quijas-the
problem of drawing lines that will limit the number of cases in which lower
courts could deem Supreme Court precedents obsolescent. This second
argument is, of course, partly correct. Any distinction between question-
able and implicitly overruled precedents will be contestable, and thus we
can imagine a category of cases in which parties could make, and courts
might accept, nonfrivolous but nonmeritorious arguments that the Court
implicitly has overruled its own precedent. This line-drawing problem
likely would be serious for a proposal authorizing lower courts not to enforce
precedents with which they strongly disagreed. " ' But the present proposal
is much more tightly drawn: The lower court must find that the Supreme
Court itself has abandoned an earlier precedent. Thus even if the rule
would be hazy at the margins, the number of cases in which nonfrivolous
arguments could be made is relatively small.
A more weighty argument in favor of Rodriguez de Quijas, I think, con-
cerns the Court's interest in managing the process and timing of legal
change, by maintaining full control over its own docket. The Court may
have determined to overrule one of its precedents, but only in the right sort
of case. It may be interested, for example, in taking a case with a particular
kind of fact-situation, in ensuring that both sides are represented by good
counsel, in avoiding procedural quirks in the case under review, or in taking
a case in which the issue has adequately "percolated" in lower courts. Such
considerations, important in any decision to grant certiorari,534 are perhaps
more important in cases in which the Court is considering whether to
announce the overruling of one of its own precedents. Yet the Court would
feel strong pressure to take any case in which the lower court held a directly
relevant Court precedent unenforceable in light of more recent Court
authority. Relaxing the constraints of Rodriguez de Quijas, then, arguably
would interfere with the Court's management of legal change.
These considerations are genuine. But first, even if the Court would
feel pressure to take cases that held a Supreme Court precedent unenforce-
able, the Court always has the option of denying review if it deems the
533. Cf. Caminker, supra note 1, at 860-65 (suggesting that line-drawing concerns counsel
against allowing lower courts to refuse enforcement of superior court precedents "whenever they
believed those precedents to be 'outside the range of allowable judicial interpretation,' or 'lawless,'
or 'clearly wrong,' or 'not fully informed,"' id. at 863-64).
534. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 230-36 (1991).
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particular case an unsuitable "vehicle." Denial of certiorari is not a
judgment on the merits, and thus the possibility of addressing the issue in a
better case would remain. To be sure, the result of denying review would be
to let stand a decision that might have been wrong in refusing enforcement
of an embattled Supreme Court precedent. Further, denial of review likely
would leave the law uncertain and nonuniform. But the Court regularly
tolerates nonuniformity when it allows conflicts among courts of appeals to
"percolate, 35 and by hypothesis, in the cases under consideration the
Court's own precedent is already uncertain. Moreover, as to the risk that
the lower court's judgment was erroneous, the Court regularly denies review
of decisions that arguably misapply the Court's precedents. Perhaps the
misapplication is more serious when it is an incorrect determination that
one of the Court's precedents is no longer good law. But most of this idea's
force comes from a sense that the lower court has committed an act of dis-
obedience or defiance, and for reasons suggested above, this is not necessar-
ily so. If the lower court's decision is rendered skillfully and in good faith, it
could better be characterized as an act of respecting the Court's prece-
dents-even if the Court later determined that the lower court's respect was
misplaced.
Further, the Court perhaps should feel obliged to act, and act relatively
promptly, when its decisions are in such disarray that one of their number is
arguably nullified by later authority. Empowering lower courts to make
such a determination would exercise pressure on the Court to clarify and
rationalize its untidy precedent. Rodriguez de Quijas is acutely concerned
with the disciplinary power the Supreme Court wields over lower courts.
But it ignores the possibility that disciplinary pressures from the bottom up
might be beneficial-at least when the Court cannot claim to have excelled
in its managerial role. 36
Besides the disciplinary and rationalizing pressure they could create,
the lower courts have another positive role in the process of legal change-
that of elaborating the new legal principles the Court announces in its
law-changing decisions. Consider, for the moment, the more ordinary cases
535. See id. at 230-34.
536. Paulsen's recommendation of a much more general practice of "underruling," see supra
text accompanying note 518, depends in part on the premise that underruling would compel supe-
rior courts to rethink mistaken precedent. Caminker acknowledges that in some cases such
"forced rethinking" might be beneficial, although as noted above, see supra note 533, ultimately he
rejects the proposal, in part because of line-drawing problems. See Caminker, supra note 1, at 860-
65. Still, Caminker has suggested elsewhere that declining to follow a decision the Court itself has
"implicitly overruled" would be consistent with the idea that lower courts are to interpret and follow
superior-court precedent rather than predict outcomes in superior courts. See discussion supra notes
525-527 and accompanying text.
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of Court-induced legal change, when the Court's law-changing decision
does not implicitly overrule, without expressly overruling, an earlier Court
precedent. In these cases-the ones that Rodriguez de Quijas's interpretive
principle does not address-the Court's law-changing standard may resolve
the legal uncertainty that prompted the Court to grant certiorari. But at
the same time, the Court's announcement of a new legal standard typically
creates fresh uncertainties-uncertainties, for example, as to the precise
scope and particulars of the new standard's applications. In these ordinary
cases, all would concede, the lower courts have an important role in imple-
menting and specifying the new legal standard. The Supreme Court can
supervise this process of implementation and specification, by undertaking
review of a decision that applies the new standard. Typically, however, the
Court will stay its hand until after a number of lower courts have had a
chance to address the new uncertainties. And typically, though not
invariably, the Court will wait until a "certworthy" conflict has developed
over implementation of the new standard-generally, a conflict between or
among federal courts of appeals, or a conflict between a federal court of
appeals and a state high court. In these more ordinary cases of legal change,
the lower courts participate, albeit under the Supreme Court's supervision,
in the process of implementing legal change.
Rodriguez de Quijas, however, changes this dynamic in the lower-court
cases its interpretive principle covers: those in which the Court has ren-
dered a decision that seriously undermines, without expressly overruling, an
earlier precedent that "directly controls" ''3 the lower court's decision. In
these circumstances, Rodriguez de Quijas prescribes, the lower courts must
follow the earlier precedent, leaving to the Supreme Court the "preroga-
tive" of implementing further change. In the cases covered by Rodriguez de
Quijas, then, the lower courts are ousted from their ordinary role of imple-
menting, under the Supreme Court's supervision, the legal changes that the
Court has initiated.
An example of the role that lower courts might play in implementing
legal change-but for Rodriguez de Quijas-appears in the interaction
between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts after Brown v.
Board of Education." ' In Brown, the Court declared that the "separate but
equal" standard of Plessy v. Ferguson..9 had "no place" in "the field of public
education."4 ' The Court did not, however, expressly overrule Plessy, nor
did it discuss whether the "separate but equal" standard still might apply in
537. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
538. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
539. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
540. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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fields other than public education. And the Brown opinion specifically
emphasized the special significance of education, as well as the special effect
that segregation in public schools has on the "hearts and minds" of chil-
dren."' The Court's discussion certainly undermined the Plessy doctrine,
but the Court stopped short of declaring that "separate but equal" had no
legitimate place in any aspect of public life.
The task of extending Brown to other public institutions and facilities
fell in the first instance to the lower courts. Less than a year after Brown
was decided, the Fourth Circuit, in Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Bal-
timore, 42 held that city beaches and bathhouses could not be segregated,
whether or not the separate facilities were equal. No sensible distinction
could be maintained, the court reasoned, between recreational facilities,
whose use was "entirely optional," and the system of compulsory education
in which the Supreme Court had ruled segregation unlawful-at least not a
distinction that favored the statute's constitutionality."' In so holding,
Dawson dealt directly not with Plessy, but with circuit and state-court
precedent that had approved segregated park facilities.44 But because that
precedent was based on Plessy, and because Plessy would control if it were
still good law, 45 Dawson necessarily determined that Plessy effectively had
been overruled, even beyond the context of public education that Brown
had addressed directly. In so holding, the court violated the principle later
announced in Rodriguez de Quijas: The court refused to enforce an otherwise
binding Supreme Court precedent that had not yet been expressly over-
ruled, citing later authority that undermined the precedent's rationale.
One year after Dawson, a lower court faced the question whether any
aspect of Plessy had survived the Court's decision in Brown. The question
was presented this starkly because the facts posed the narrow issue decided
in Plessy: Could government segregate seating by race on intrastate trans-
portation? The case was Browder v. Gayle,546 and the particular challenge
was to the practice of segregated seating on Montgomery, Alabama city
buses.
A three-judge district court decided in Browder that Plessy was no
longer good law, even in its domain of original application. The court
relied both on Dawson and on the lower court's decision in Barnette. In
541. See id. at 492-95.
542. 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955) (per curiam).
543. Id.
544. See id. at 386-87.
545. Unless one were to read Plessy narrowly, and unconvincingly, as a case only about
seating on intrastate railroads, rather than a decision that constitutionally underwrote an entire
regime of status regulations.
546. 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
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both cases, the Browder court suggested, a Supreme Court precedent, not
yet expressly overruled, was "so impaired by later decisions as no longer to
furnish any reliable evidence" as to the state of the law. 47 The primary
decision that "impaired" Plessy was, of course, Brown, but the court relied
also on the line of Supreme Court cases disapproving instances of segrega-
tion in higher education, and a case holding that segregated seating on
interstate rail transportation violated the Interstate Commerce Act.54
Browder thus determined that Plessy, an otherwise directly controlling
Supreme Court case not yet expressly overruled, had been so undermined
by subsequent Supreme Court cases that it was no longer good law-even
in its original domain of seating on intrastate transportation.549 In so hold-
ing, the court did exactly what Rodriguez de Quijas later prohibited, even
more clearly than the Dawson court had done.
The Court, however, summarily affirmed both Browder 5 " and
Dawson."'1 And on the day that it summarily affirmed Dawson, the Court
relied on that decision to reverse summarily a Fifth Circuit decision that
had permitted "separate but equal" treatment with respect to city golf
courses.52 Using only its powers of summary affirmance and summary rever-
sal to superintend the process, the Court thus relied on the lower courts to
extend Brown's equality principle from public education to public facilities
generally. The Court's summary affirmances gave these lower-court deci-
sions the status of binding national precedent, while allowing the Court to
remain in the background as an entire legal regime was uprooted. These
lower-court decisions would not have been possible had the Court been
committed to the principle Rodriguez de Quijas later announced.
Certainly one can argue, as Herbert Wechsler argued, that in extend-
ing Brown's reach through unexplained summary affirmances the Court
abdicated its responsibility to explain its decisions.553 Or one could defend
the Court's strategy of lying low after Brown, and relying heavily on the
assistance of lower courts, as a wise preservation of its institutional capital,
given the national tumult over Brown. However one resolves the debate
over whether the Supreme Court properly exercised its management powers
post-Brown, the point for present purposes is simply that the Court found
547. Id. at 716; see also id. at 716 n.14.
548. See id. at 715-16.
549. See id. at 716-17.
550. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (per curiam).
551. Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (per curiam).
552. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam), vacating 223 F.2d 93
(5th Cir. 1955).
553. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 22-23 (1959).
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the lower courts useful partners in implementing the legal changes initiated
with Brown-in circumstances under which Rodriguez de Quijas now would
require the Court to go it alone. With Wechsler, one might well suppose
that the Court should have noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument
in Dawson, Browder, and the other cases in which it acted summarily."4 But
even so, the Court would not have acted more properly, or more wisely, if
it had required the lower courts to follow Plessy-leaving to the Supreme
Court the question whether Brown should be extended beyond the sphere of
public education. Nothing would have been gained by requiring the lower
courts to pass the cases up to the Supreme Court for it to decide that question
in the first instance.
Relaxing Rodriguez de Quijas's constraints, then, would be normatively
defensible. Rodriguez de Quijas is anomalous in its treatment of lower courts'
role in legal change, and the features of the context that case covers do not
sufficiently justify the anomaly. The proposal I have been considering-
allowing lower courts to refuse enforcement of Supreme Court precedents
that the Court has implicitly overruled-provides sufficient protection
against "rogue" decisions, is consistent with rule-of-law values and ade-
quately protects the Court's legitimate interests in managing legal change.
Of course, one might well disagree with my assessment. But that would
raise only a further difficulty for the Court's transformation of Establish-
ment Clause doctrine in Agostini: The Court needed to follow the course I
have been suggesting, if its Agostini opinion were to be coherent.
Suppose one accepts, as a general matter, that relaxing Rodriguez de
Quijas's limits on lower-court interpretation would be desirable. One fur-
ther question remains: Given Agostini's Rule 60(b)(5) context, could the
Court have followed the strategy I am suggesting in Agostini? The difficulty
is that, as mentioned, the Court has interpreted Rule 60(b)(5) to prohibit
courts from changing the law in their own relief-granting decisions. The
Court, however, would seem to offend this principle, if overruling or modi-
fying Rodriguez de Quias were part of Agostini's theory. The Court, it seems,
would be relying on a change in the law that its own relief-granting
decision effected.
This difficulty is not insuperable. First, although in referring above to
"Rodriguez de Quijas" I have taken the case to have the full scope Agostini
attributes to it, a narrower reading is possible. The Court could have read
Rodriguez de Quijas to bar only "anticipatory overruling," not a lower court's
554. See also New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(per curiam) (invalidating the practice of segregating golf courses), affg 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.
1958); Holmes, 350 U.S. at 879 (reversing summarily a lower-court decision that had approved
segregation in the use of golf courses if opportunities were equal).
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conclusion that the Supreme Court itself already has overruled, even if
implicitly, its own decision. That, as mentioned above, was Caminker's
interpretation of Rodriguez de Quijas before Agostini55 This interpretation
of Rodriguez de Quijas is at least plausible, if not compelling.56
Further, even if the Court would have had to acknowledge modifying
or overruling Rodriguez de Quijas, Rule 60(b)(5) would not have barred the
Court from relying on its new understanding to grant relief in Agostini. The
"change in law" that may entitle movants to Rule 60(b)(5) relief is a
change in substantive law. As the Court put it in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail:"7 "[M]odification... may be warranted when the statutory or
decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to
prevent." ' 8 What the Court cannot do in granting Rule 60(b)(5) relief
is to effect such a change in substantive law in its own relief-granting deci-
sion. But the Rodriguez de Quijas principle is not a substantive rule that
determines the legality vel non of the parties' conduct. It speaks, instead,
to the conduct of lower courts and to the allocation of power among courts
in the hierarchical federal court system. Neither Rufo, nor the Court's other
Rule 60(b)(5) cases, nor the text of Rule 60(b)(5), expressly limits the Court
from effecting and relying upon these kinds of legal change in its relief-
granting decision. 59
555. See supra text accompanying notes 525-527; cf. supra text accompanying notes 528-
529 (discussing Dorfs reading of Rodriguez de Quijas as conflating anticipatory overruling with
lower-court determinations that a precedent already has been implicitly overruled and as
condemning both practices).
556. Against Caminker's interpretation, the lower court in Rodriguez de Quijas indicated
that Wilko, the earlier precedent, already had been "effectively overruled" by the Supreme Court
and that a 'formal overruling ... appears inevitable-or, perhaps, superfluous."' Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1297-98 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation omit-
ted). Yet the Supreme Court disapproved the Fifth Circuit's recognition of this implicit overrul-
ing. The argument in favor of understanding the Fifth Circuit's action as an anticipatory
overruling would focus on the fact that the Supreme Court, in the case that allegedly overruled
Wilko implicitly, in fact distinguished Wilko, suggesting that "stare decisis concerns may counsel
against upsetting Wilko's ... conclusion." Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S.. 220, 234 (1987). The Fifth Circuit, then, could not argue credibly that the Supreme Court
already had overruled Wilko.
557. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
558. Id. at 388.
559. Nor would overruling or modifying Rodriguez de Quijas in the Court's Agostini opinion
lead to paradox. As discussed above, the paradox I identify in Agostini arose because of the Court's
commitment to the Rodriguez de Quijas principle. Overruling that principle, even in a Rule
60(b)(5) case like Agostini, would be like the ordinary case of overruling. While the lower courts
were correct to follow Rodriguez de Quijas's interpretive strictures, the Court could explain, the law
has changed with the Court's decision to modify or overrule that aspect of Rodriguez de Quijas.
And from the perspective of the new, changed law, the lower courts' decisions were legally incor-
rect and may be reversed without paradox.
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Relaxing Rodriguez de Quijas's constraints, then, is normatively defen-
sible, and it was an available option in Agostini. Had the Court selected
that option, the cost to the Court's authority would have been minimal.
Even in relaxing Rodriguez de Quias's constraints, the Court would have
been instructing the lower courts to follow the Court's decisions-to recog-
nize, as tie Court says it is itself constrained to recognize, that more recent
cases rendered Aguilar no longer good law. The Court, however, did not
choose this option. It chose instead to guard its interpretive "prerogative"
jealously, and to maintain its exclusive managerial control over the trans-
formation of Establishment Clause law. The price of this decision is the
incoherence I criticized above-Agostini's supposition that post-Zobrest and
pre-Agostini, "the law" had divided into two simultaneously valid, yet con-
tradictory, bodies of law.
To be sure, the Agostini opinion still would have been implausible,
even if the Court had relaxed the constraints of Rodriguez de Quijas. The
opinion still would have rested on untenable readings of Witters and Zobrest
as implicitly overruling Ball and Aguilar-readings that seem driven by the
desire to reach a particular result, and to reach it as soon as possible, no
matter how implausible and incoherent its opinion would have to be. My
point, instead, is that if the Court had not insisted on sole power to trans-
form the law, its Agostini opinion could have been implausible in only one
respect rather than two. Given the choice between avoiding incoherence
and maintaining maximum power, the Court opts for power.
CONCLUSION
The criticisms of Agostini I have been developing do not depend upon
any particular view of the underlying substantive Establishment Clause
issues. I criticize not the substance of the Court's transformation of Estab-
lishment Clause law-though that, too, surely is at least contestable-but
instead, the process by -which the Court manages its transformation of
Establishment Clause law.
In the Introduction, I said that the criteria by which I would evaluate
the Court's transformation of Establishment Clause law were "effectiveness"
and "legitimacy.'' Under "effectiveness," I said, I would examine whether
the Court had selected an appropriate vehicle for its law-transforming proj-
ect, whether the change-favoring Justices had employed that vehicle
skillfully, and whether they had realized their law-transforming ambitions.
Under "legitimacy," I said, I would inquire whether the Court successfully
560. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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had negotiated the constraints that define its power to manage legal
change, including procedural rules, as well as norms such as stare decisis
issues and the requirement of reasoned explanation.
By these criteria, the Court's management of its law-transforming proj-
ect in Agostini was a failure. The Court's first mistake-and a mistake that
made the other errors in the Court's transformation strategy unavoidable-
was its selection of Agostini as law-transforming vehicle. In any other case,
the Court could have considered the full range of reasons for overruling Ball
and Aguilar, and it would have been free to adopt an Establishment Clause
standard that had not yet been sanctified by precedent. In Agostini, how-
ever, the Rule 60(b)(5) context required the Court to apply current law,
not change it, and accordingly the Court was confined to the argument that
precedents, post-Aguilar but pre-Agostini, "dictate" that "Aguilar is no longer
good law."56' This argument, I have contended, depended upon thoroughly
implausible readings of the Court's precedents, and it led the Court to adopt
an unclear62 Establishment Clause standard that no member of the Agostini
majority had defended in the long struggle over Lemon's continued survival.
Further, the strategy of finding the law-changing decision in the past
allowed the Court to escape present responsibility for changing the law. In
Agostini, we are told, the Court is not presently changing the law, but
merely acknowledging past changes effected in Witters and Zobrest. When
we turn to Witters and Zobrest, however, we find no indication that the
Court was changing the law. And when we look to Kiryas Joel, the decision
that prompted the Agostini proceedings, we find the transformation of
Establishment Clause law projected into the future, as the work of some
later Court-even though, on the theory later announced in Agostini, that
transformation had already occurred in Witters and Zohrest. In this consti-
tutional shell game, the change in the law, and consequently the reasons for
the change, are always somewhere else. In no case does the Court offer the
sort of reasons one would expect from a decision to overrule the Court's
own precedents.
The Court's Agostini decision, I have contended, is flawed for an addi-
tional reason. Agostini holds that Aguilar already was "no longer good law"
no later than the 1993 Zobrest decision, and at the same time the Court
insists that it alone among courts legitimately could recognize this change
in the law. The consequence, I have argued, is that the Court must suppose
that "the law" was really two coexisting but contradictory bodies of law,
one valid from-the perspective of the Supreme Court, the other valid in all
561. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (1997).
562. See supra notes 348-357 and accompanying text.
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other courts. The escape from this bizarre consequence, I have contended,
would have been to authorize lower courts to recognize the implicit
overruling of Aguilar that the Court finds in Witters and Zobrest. Such a
decision would not seriously have compromised the Supreme Court's
authority over other courts, and it would have made the Court's treatment
of the Rule 60(b)(5) issue at least coherent. But instead, the Court insisted
upon full control over the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine.
On the day he announced his retirement, Justice Marshall charged
that "[plower, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmak-
ing." '563 One might well doubt that this characterization is a fair assessment
of the present Court's full body of work-or that, to the extent the claim is
true, it would distinguish the present Court from past Courts."' But in
Agostini, at least, the Court's management of legal change is long on power
and short on reasons for power's exercise.
563. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
564. The legal process thinkers leveled similar charges against the Warren Court, both as to
specific decisions or lines of decisions, and as to the Court's performance more generally. For
classic instances, see, for example, Wechsler, supra note 553, at 19 (stating that courts are "bound
to function otherwise than as a naked power organ," and their decisions have "legal quality" only
so far as they "rest[] on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case"); id. at 22-23 (criticizing
the Court's reliance on per curiam decisions in post-Brown segregation cases); id. 'at 33-34
(suggesting that Brown could not have rested on its stated reasons, and finding difficulties with
other reasons hypothesized to support the result); Henry Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84, 98 (1959) (arguing that the Court's use of case-by-case adjudication in Federal
Employers' Liability Act cases "is a misuse of power"); id. at 98-99 (stating that the Court's
tendency to offer ipse dixits rather than reasoned explanation is a misuse of judicial power); id. at
99 ("Only opinions which are grounded in reason and not on mere fiat or precedent can do the
job which the Supreme Court of the United States has to do."); id. at 100 (noting the Court's
tendency to rely on dogmatic pronouncement rather than reason).
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